NOTES OF RECENT CASES the petition it was alleged that the services were unique, requiring a cultured saleswoman of strong individuality and good address and ability as a lecturer, which requirements defendant was al leged to meet in an exceptional degree, and on the basis of this an injunction was sought. But the court notes that it was not shown that exceptional talent was required to understand the corset, nor was it shown why any other woman of intelligence and good address could not perform the service required. By way of introduction to the consid eration of the main question, the court states that an injunction in favor of an employer against an employee, forbidding the latter to engage in the service of another, is in the nature of a decree for specific performance; and that the remedy for a violation of a contract to perform personal services or labor is universally recognized as being at law the damages there recoverably constituting the full measure of relief to which the employer is en titled. In the early English case of Kemble v. Kean, 6 Sim. 333, an injunction was denied when sought for the purpose of preventing an actor from entering the services of another theatrical man ager, he having engaged to play at plaintiff's thea ter and expressly bound himself not to play at any other theater in the same city during a stated period. A later case (Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De Gex M. & G. 604) is generally regarded as over ruling Kemble v. Kean, and in Montague v. Flockton, L. R. 16 Eq. 189, the court, professing to fol low the Lumley case, extended the rule to uphold an injunction where the contract contained no express negative stipulation. But this case, the court notes, appears to have been overruled by later decisions (Whitman v. Hardman, 2 Ch. Div. 416) which distinctly refuse to approve the idea that an injunction is allowable in the absence of an express negative covenant to which the writ may give effect. The doctrine of the latter case the court regards as the one prevailing in England at this time. The court observes that there are cases in this country where the negative covenant of an employee has been enforced by an injunction, and that in some of them the courts have indulged in the suggestion, obiter, that the writ will lie to en force an implied negative of this character. But these dicta have not had general acceptance, and so far as the courts of last resort in this country have had occasion to speak in cases involving the question, they have never been known to extend the rule to contracts containing no express nega tive covenant. As an exception to the general American doctrine, the court cites the case of Duff v. Russell, 133 N. Y. 678, 31 N. E. 622, but even in that case the court considers that the contract contained something more than an implied con tract not to enter the services of another during
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the period covered by the defendant's engagement. Further discussing the authorities, the court comes to the conclusion that equity will not undertake lo decree specific performance of contracts for per sonal services; that in the absence of express neg ative covenant equity will not aid the enforcement of such contract by injunction, and that even where there is an express negative covenant, in junction will not be granted save in exceptional cases, where by reason of the peculiar and extra ordinary character of the promised services a vio lation of the agreement will cause injury to the other party, for which an action at law will not afford an adequate remedy. Coming to these con clusions, the court naturally held that in the case at bar plaintiff was not entitled to an injunction. EVIDENCE. (Phonograph.) Mich. — An ex ceedingly novel question was raised in Boyne City G. & A. R. Co. v. Anderson, 109 N. W. Rep. 429, which was a condemnation proceeding for damages for laying tracks on a city street opposite respondent's property. The trial court permitted a phonograph to be operated in the presence of the jury to reproduce sounds claimed to have been made by the operation of trains in proximity to respondent's property, proper proofs having been made to justify the introduction of the instrument as substantially accurate and trustworthy repro ducer of the sounds actually made. This action of the trial court the Supreme Court supports. The court notes that communication by means of the telephone have been held admissible in evidence, and states that the ground for receiving the testi mony of a phonograph would seem to be stronger than that of communications by telephone, since in the case of the phonograph there is not only proof by the human witness of the making of the sounds to be reproduced, but a reproduction by the mechanical witness of the sounds themselves. This appears to be the first instance in which an American Supreme Court has ruled upon the ad missibility of testimony given by the medium of a phonograph. But it is not the first instance of the admission of such testimony. Before the date of the above decision (Nov. 14, 1906), by nearly a year, i.e., on Dec. 7, 1905, and probably before the trial in the above case, this had been done by Judge Wait of the Superior Court of Suffolk County, Mass achusetts, in the trial of Loring v. Boston Elevated Company, the issue and the purpose of the evi dence there being precisely the same as in the Mich igan case. In the Boston case, Mr. Morse for the plaintiff stated that he had known of at least one prior instance in England (Boston Daily Trans cript, Dec. 7, 1905). Of the propriety of the evi dence, with the safeguard above stated, there can be no doubt. J. H. W.
