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NOTES OF RECENT CASES trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence consisting of the affidavit of the accused's former wife. The court held that the evidence was not newly discovered in the proper sense of the term, but merely evidence which the accused knew of but which was not available at the time of his trial, and hence did not constitute a sufficient ground for the granting of a new trial. PROPERTY. (Tenancy in Common.) Miss. •—• In Beaman v. Beaman, 44 So. Rep., 987, it appeared that Alexander Beaman died intestate, leaving certain real estate incumbered by a deed of trust, and that plaintiffs and one of defendants were his children and heirs claiming as tenants in common. The property was sold under the trust deed and purchased by the wife of the defendant coterlant. Plaintiffs sued to have the deed set aside. The court held that the rule preventing a co-tenant from purchasing an outstanding title and setting it up against the other tenants also applied to a purchase by a cotenant's wife. RECEIVERS. (Insolvency Due to Acts of Applicant.) If. J. Ct. of Ch. — An application for the appointment of a receiver of a corporation because of its insolvency was opposed on the ground that the misfortunes of the corporation were due to the wrongful conduct of the applicant. The question as to whether proof of this claim was sufficient to defeat the application was considered by the Court of Chancery of New Jersey in McMullin v. McArthur Electric Manufacturing Company, 68 Atl. Rep., 97. The court held that the application could not be so defeated; that any creditor or stockholder, however unworthy, had a statutory right to apply for a receiver, the application not being treated as one for his indi vidual benefit. They stated further that where such an application is made the court must ascertain whether insolvency exists and whether a receivership is necessary, and whether the corporation will be able to resume its business with safety to the public and advantage to its stock holders, and only where the evidence justifies the belief that the creditors will be paid and the

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business of the corporation resumed if a receiver is not appointed, a receiver will not be appointed. REPLEVIN. (Depreciation in Value of Property Replevied.) N. Y. Sup. Ct. — A rather novel question arose in the case of Pabst Brewing Company v. Rapid Safety Filter Company, 107 N. Y. Supp., 163. Plaintiff sought to replevin an automobile from defendant and secured possession, which it retained till time of trial. Judgment was rendered for defendant for possession, or, in case of failure to secure possession, for the sum of $1000. Plaintiff thereafter tendered possession and demanded satisfaction of judgment which was refused by defendant on the ground that the property had seriously depreciated in value by removal of parts and otherwise while in plaintiff's possession. There was no dispute but what it was in the same condition when tendered as at the time of trial and the court said that defendant's judgment being for return of the property should be considered as satisfied when. that was done. TORT. (Conversion — Stock.) Tex. Sup. Ct. •— A peculiar question as to the conversion of a party's interest in a corporation, arose in San Antonio Irrigation Company v. Deutschman, 105 S. W. Rep., 486. It appeared that a franchise for the disposition of city sewage was granted to "R. and S. and their associates " in which plain tiff was to have a one-third interest as payment for services rendered in procuring the franchise. Subsequently, the owners formed a corporation and R. and S. transferred the franchise to it, plaintiff agreeing to take one-fourth of the stock on credit. Before the transfer was made, however, R. and S. refused to grant the stock to plaintiff unless he paid one-half the price therefor at once. Plaintiff contended that this breach of the agree ment deprived him of his interest in the corpora tion and constituted a conversion of it. The court held that depriving plaintiff of the right to take stock in the corporation with the privilege to pay for it in a reasonable time, as had been agreed, did not constitute a conversion of his interest.