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Index to Periodicals A luminous analysis, containing one of the most notable of recent legal expositions. "We have stated ante two alternative proposi tions, one or the other of which must be proved in order to hold a rival claimant. (In brief: either that defendant did not believe in his own statement; or that he was actuated by a wrong motive.) There are other and more common forms of stating the essentials to the liability of a rivial claimant. What are the reasons for discarding these common forms and for adopting those here substituted? . . . "Now malice is an ambiguous, and often mis leading term. Sir Frederick Pollock wisely said that 'the less we have to do with it the better.' It is preferable to drop the word 'malice' alto gether and to substitute for it the meaning which is really intended to be conveyed by it. "Here we have stated two alternative grounds of liability. Either of these standing alone is sufficient, without aid from the other." Due Process of Law. "The Evolution of Due Process of Law in the Decisions of the United States Supreme Court." By Francis W. Bird. 13 Columbia Law Review 37 (Jan.). "It seems reasonable therefore to believe that there is nothing contained in the fourteenth amendment as expounded by the Supreme Court of the United States which will interfere with the power of the legislature, state and national, to adopt soundly progressive legislation for the protection of its citizens." Federal and State Powers. "A Historic Judicial Controversy and Some Reflections Sug gested by It." By S. S. Gregory. 11 Michigan Law Review 179 (Jan.). Dealing with the circumstances of Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, in which Chief Justice Taney upheld the constitutionality of the Fugi tive Slave law and the right of the United States to enforce its penalties without the consent of the courts of the state in which the culprit was found. In this historic decision Taney, though of a party of which state sovereignty was one of the battle cries, "made a vigorous assertion of national power which would have done credit to John Marshall." Federal Incorporation. See Monopolies. Fourteenth Amendment. See Due Process of Law. Government. See Federal and State Powersf Social Legislation, Recall of Judicial Decisions. Indemnification for Errors of Criminal Justice. "European Systems of State Indem nity for Errors of Criminal Justice." By Edwin M. Borchard. 3 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 684 (Jan.). "Austria, France, Portugal and Geneva (code of criminal procedure, January 1, 1885), grant an indemnity for the injury suffered by reason of conviction and imprisonment where on retrial

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an acquittal takes place. Indemnification both for acquittal on appeal after a conviction, and for detention pending trial followed by acquital or discharge is provided for in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Berne, Fribourg, Neuchatel, Basle and Tessin. The award of an indemnity is compulsory in case of acquittal on appeal after a conviction — that is, a right of action is given to the individual — in Germany, Norway, Denmark, Hungary, Portugal, Mexico, Neuchatel and Basle. It is also compulsory in case of detention followed by a discharge from custody or acquittal on first trial in Germany, Denmark and Norway. In Germany, however, before the action lies, the court acquitting the accused on retrial, must, simultaneously with the judgment of acquittal, issue a decree to the effect that an indemnity in the case is warranted by the facts, which decree is a condition prece dent to the right of action. The relief is dis cretionary in both cases — acquittal after con viction and detention pending trial — in Sweden and Fribourg. It is discretionary in case of acquittal after conviction only in Austria and France, and discretionary in cases of discharge from custody in Hungary, Vaud, Neuchatel and Basle." Insane Prisoners. "Insanity and Criminal Responsibility." (Report of Committee B of the Institute.) By Edwin R. Keedy, Chairman. 3 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 719 (Jan.). "It is not the desire of this committee to engage in an academic debate with the New York com mittee [of the New York State Bar Association], nor to indulge in captious and unimportant criticism. However, since the purpose of each committee is to reach a proper solution of the problem of dealing with persons suffering from mental disease who are charged with crime, a comparison of the two plans proposed and the contemplated results of each is deemed desir able. On many points the two committees are in agreement. Both committees favor overthrow ing the legal insanity test of M'Naghten's case; both wish to secure the conviction and punish ment of persons who are relying upon feigned insanity as a defense; and both urge confinement in a hospital for persons who by reason of their mental condition are a public menace. This committee deems it of great importance that any new legislation should provide for the proper disposition of all cases, no matter what the char acter of the offense nor the symptoms of mental derangement. This defense is by no means con fined to prosecutions for homicide. Following are some of the crimes of which defendants have been convicted when mental disease was set up as a defense; rape, burglary, forgery, running illicit distillery, larceny, mailing obscene litera ture, writing forged instruments, abduction, arson, embezzlement, robbery, slander, and incest. The statute proposed by this committee would cover all these, no matter what the char acter of the mental disease, because the statute is based on the proper relation of mental disease to criminal responsibility. In addition to declar ing a test for determining what treatment,