Page:The New International Encyclopædia 1st ed. v. 04.djvu/434

CAVALRY. 370 CAVAXRY. to three ranks. The amiaiiient ami equipment were also lightened, but movements were not so rr.pid in aetion. In the reign of Louis XIV. there appeared a galaxy of stars military in the persons of Tu- renne, LuxembnirLr, and Conde on one side, and JIarlborongh, Mnntecueuli, and Eug&ne on the other, and a decided advance was made in the movements of armies, hut no important changes in cavalry methods, .gain, the Swedes eanio to the front under the rule of Charles XII., and radical alterations were instituted. He made the cavalry independent of the infantry, and tauglit it to rely upon the sword and hold and impetuous charges for success. "Ilis daring and chivalrous character was suited to the spirit of cavalry tactics; he led his horsemen, sword in hand, against cavalry, ag;iinst infantry, against fortified positions, over any country. . . . Un- tiring in pursuit, he followed up the Saxons under Marshal Schulenburg in their retreat into Silesia, for nine consecutive days without un- saddling, overtook them at Siinitz. near Punitz, and, with two regiments of cavalry only, charged them, 10,000 strong, rode over their infantry, who lay down to avoid the impetuous rush of the Swedes, defeated and drove the Saxon cav- alry off the field, and then returned to attack the infantry and guns." (Nolan.) After Poltava (170!)), war ensued between Kussia and Turkey, in which the cavalry of the latter power, which had long been the best in Europe, bore a conspicuous part. Their horses, admirably trained, their sharp scimitars and skill in harassing the enemy made them a terror to the less mobile Russians, whose infantry wctc compelled to. carry with them portable cbevaux de frise and add pikes to their armament in order to hold their own against the Turks. In the Polish Army, about 1717, there were the Tartar hussars who bore a cuirass covered with a panther's skin slung over the back, the head being fastened on the left shoulder. The back- piece of the cuirass was adorned with feather wings. They carried a gilt lance 1-t feet long with a small flag near the point which, fluttering in the attack together with the rustling of the wings, was intended to frighten the enemy's horses. The French in the meanwhile, luuler I^ouis XV., restored the lancp, but otherwise lightened the equipment of their mounted troops. The brilliant ilarshal Sase recognized and ap- plied the experience of the Austrians and Rus- sians to the development of the French cavalry. As to the importance of mobility, he held that "the secret of victory resides in the legs of the soldiers," and as to horsemen, "such as cannot go at speed over a couple of thousand yards to pounce upon the foe is good for nothing in the field." Frederick the Great ushered in a brilliant cavalry epoch. At the eonunencement of his reign his army of 80.000 ccmtaincd CO squadrons of hcay and 51 of light cavalry — about 1.3,000 men. They were Hieavy' in every sense — their quickest gait the trot, their most serious per- formance a pipe-clay parade. At the battle of Mollwitz they received a lesson fnmi the .us- trians, who charged them in the Turkish man- ner and drove them, including their royal mas- ter, in confusion from the field. Frederick profited by this example to reorganize his cav- alry after the methods of Saxc, laying down a rule that "all evolutions are to he made at the greatest speed, . . . the cuirassiers to be as handy and expert on horesback as a hussar, and well exercised in the use of the sword. Every squadnm as it advances to the charge must at- tack the enemy sword in hand, and no com- mander shall be allowed to fire under penalty of infamovis cashiering. . . . Every ollicer of cavalry nuist ever bear in mind that there are but two things required to beat the enemy: first, to charge him with the greatest possible speed and force; and second, to otitllank liim." With these admonitions, and led by the invincible .Seydlitz and Ziethcn, the Prussian cavalry per- formed wonderful feats in the historic battles of Strigau, Rossbach, Leuthen, and Zorndorf. The Prussian leaders combined great boldness with skill in niana'uvring in the presence of the enemy, of which Rossliach (17.57) was an in- stance. The French and Imperialists, confident in their numbers, approached carelessly, exposing their flank to the Prussian advance imdcr Seyd- litz, who instantly, without waiting for his infan- try, charged with his 4000 moiinti'd men andcom- pU-tely routed the allies, who lost ."iOOO killed and wounded, 5000 prisoners, and 70 gims. (Wag- ner.) At Zorndorf (1758) the success was still greater. There Seydlitz with 20 squadrons not only turned the fortunes of the day, but cheeked the victorious Russian cavalry, drove it from the field, returned, fell upon the Russian infantry, ■which stoutly resisted, and when broken by the Prussian horsemen rallied, again and again, but finally gave way with immense loss. Ziethen was equally distinguished, and by his vigilance at Hochkirch (1758) saved Frederick and his army fnmi a sur])rise. It is said that of twenty- two general engagements Frederick's cavalry won fifteen. "In reviewing the deeds of the Prussian cavalry of those days it must be borne in mind that they dealt with infantry which sought the open plain, advanced in long lines — avoiding obstacles of all descriptions, because such ob- stacles disturbed their array. Their fire was quick, but not true in its aim, and their squares seldom held oVit long against the horsemen." (Nolan.) Xapoleon endeavored to introduce Frederick's methods into the French cavalry. In 180fi at Jena and Auerstiidt he first pitted his cavalrj- against the Prussians with brilliant results. The boldness which characterized the Prussian .sys- tem was reproduced, but the speed in the charge, skill in manoeuvres, and good jtulgment on the battlefield were often lacking. The French, with 80.000 cavalry, were badly mounted, not good horsemen, heavily equipjied. and. while employed in masses, seldom provided reserves. .V notable instance of the last-named defect occurred in 1813 near Leipzig. IMurat, at the head of 5000 horse, charged the centre of the allied army, rode down the Russian cavalry of the guard, took .30 guns, and pierced the enemy's centre: but -100 Cossacks, skillfully handled, attacked the French cavalry, gaining their flank by a narrow by-path, retook the guns and caused IMurat to retire in disorder. A similar error at La Rottaire re- sulted in the loss of 28 guns to Xapoleon. There were some brilliant exceptions to these failures, the mast important being Kellerman's decisive charge at Marengo (1800) when the Austrians, having practically defc:itcd the French arin.v, were advancing with more zeal than care; sud-