Page:The New International Encyclopædia 1st ed. v. 04.djvu/435

CAVAJLRY. 371 CAVALRY. denly a Fronoh battery, hitherto eoneealed by an aecident ol ground, tired a parting shot at the head of the Austrian cohimn which eauscd great confusion, tteneral Kellernian, at the head ol" 200 sabres, seized the opportunity to fall upon the enemy's exposed Hank, nxie over the leading battalions, and produeed a panie in the entire allied foree, whieh lied from the Held, leaving behind them their commander and 2OO0 pris- oners, liut if less fortunate in operations en masse. Xapoleon surpassed Frederick in the use of cavalry on outpost and scouting duty. His troopers vere ubiquitois as the "eyes and ears' of his army. Miile Xapolcon's cavalry was tauglit to place its principal dependence upon the sjibre. he authorized, on occasions, the use of tirearms. At Kylau (1807) the colonel of the Twentieth Chasseurs i Cheval observed a large foree of cavalry advancing toward his position, moving slowly through the snow and heavy ground. Ordering his officers into the ranks and his men to "advance carbine.' the colonel waited until the enemy's leading files were within six paces, when the command to fire was given with great elfect. Although in the melee which en- sued the French regiment lost 100 men. the Russians left nearly 300 on the spot from which they were forced to retire. (Wagner.) At Somo Sierra in the Peninsular campaign (ISOS) the Third Polish light cavalry charged directly in front of an intrenched battery strongly sup- ported by infantry guarding a mountain defile, drove back the Spaniards and captured 16 guns. This des]>erate but successful feat was accom- plished l>y General Montbrim, who led the regi- ment in person. In Spain, at that time, there were many gal- lant actions. Under Wellington the cavalry of the German legion attached to the British army was conspicuous, making, on one occasion, ac- cording to the French general, Foy, "the most daring charge during the Peninsular War." At Garcia Hernandez (1S12), when the French army was retreating, three squadrons of Bock's German brigade, which had been ordered to charge the cavaliy of the enemy's rear guard, unexpectedly encountered three battalions of in- fantry formed in squares. Without hesitation, Bock's cavalr- charged these squares, success- fully penetrating them at places where woiuided horses or falling men had caused a gap in the side of the square. The vigor and skill with which this small force (about 110 sabres) was handled resulted in the dispersion of the French infantrj' with a loss of 1 general officer and 1000 men : the German casualties were 4 otBcers, 48 men. 07 horses killed, and 2 officers, 56 men, 46 horses wounded, with 6 men missing. Xapoleon's disastrous Russian campaign de- moralized his cavalry. The intense cold, deep snows, want of food for horses and men. and ceaseless encounters with the Cossacks reduced the French horsemen in numbers and spirit. General Morand says of the Cossacks: "These natural horsemen are not organized in divisions, pay no attention to regular alignments, rest their fcvt in great stirrups which serve as sup- ports when using their weapons: trained to pass at once from the halt to the gallop and from the gallop to the halt, their horses second their dexterity. These ungroonied animals of irregular size, supplied by their riders, possess wonderful endurance, are guided entirely by the snalBe, and easily accomplish 100 verst (00 miles) in twenty- Jour hours.' Their method of attack in Napo- leon's time called 'the lava,' consisted of a charge in small, irregular groups — in open or close order as circumstances seemed to require — these 'groups' hovering around the enemy until laimched at a vulnerable point. Since then the close association with the regular system of the Russian Army has cau.sed the lava to degen- erate into a simple 'charge as foragers.' In some respects the Cossack methods are not un- like those of the North American Indian of the plains. riie Crimean War was remarkable for the cavalrj" errors committed. Neither the Russians nor the Allies employed the arm effectively either for reconnaissance, outpost, or in large bodies on the battlefield. The most unfortunate instance of this nature, the charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava (18.54) — where gal- lant men were sacrificed through the folly of tlieir commander and the ambiguity of an order, gained undying fame by a poet's pen. On the same field the heavy cavalrjnnen of both armies met — the one body at a slow pace, the other at a halt — with negative results. From the experi- ence of the Crimea and that of the Italian cam- paign of 18.59 doubts arose as to the value of cavalry in future o])erations. Austria making a decided reduction in that ai-m. "The awaken- ing from this transient period of theory came from a nation not trained to arms, and it is to the American Civil War that we owe the re- vival that took place in the use of the cavalry arm." (Liddell.) The experience gained in the Civil War in the United States (1861-05) laid the foundation for renewed confidence in the value of mounted troops and led to many changes in the armament, equipment, and instruction of European cavalry. At the outset the aged General Scott and the new commander of the United States forces ( 5Ie- Clellan) did not expect that a large mounted force would be needed. In the Nortli and West people were not accustomed to the saddle: in the South the majority were good horsemen. So it happened that the Confederates, at the begin- ning of the war. displayed greater mobility in their operations, screened them effectually, and were better informed as to the enemy's move- ments than were the Union troops. The lesson of the first year taught the United States Gov- eniment the importance of a due proportion of cavalry in the compositicm of its armies, and by the spring of 1803 the Union cavalry were able to cope with the Southern horse. The mounted service of the United States in 1801 consisted of two regiments of dragoons, one of mounted rifles. and two of cavalrj-. variously armed, but later in that year another regiment was created and all were armed alike, with carbine, pistol, and sabre, were taught to fight as 'dragoons,' and were denominated 'cavalry.' On this basis was organized a great body of volunteer horsemen, eventually aggregating .300.000. The Confeder- ates created their mounted force principally from the numy mounled militia regiments and the thousands of goorl horsemen with which their secticm of the country abounded: these were offi- cered in many cases by ex-offieers of the Unit<"d States .rmy and by young planters. For want of carbines and sabres many Southern organiza- tions were armed with rifles, but as a rule with