ETHICS. 244 ETHICS. have as yet come to any agreement as to the na- ture of the summum bonum, the answer must be Xo. However, the following description of the summum bom m is given, because it seems to do justice to all the determining factors of the prob- lem. The summum bonum of any moral man is not any one single object, whether attainable at
- stroke or altogether unattainable, which if at-
tained would continue to satisfy him. It is rather a progression of objects. Tlie summum bonum is a serial system of ends which are. each in its turn, the most desirable ends capable of pursuit. An element in its desirability is that it shall fix favorable conditions for further pur- suit of further similar ends, as well as give pleasure in the ends already attained. Again, because the normal man is a social man and thus interested in seeing the good of at least some of his fellows, there is found among the ends included in the summum bonum the welfare of these fellow-men. By wel- fare is meant the progressive realization of the progressive summum bonum of each of these fel- low-men. Now the fact that the summum bonum of each normal man includes within itself the welfare of some other men constitutes a com- munity of welfare. The question how many per- sons shall be included in the community of wel- fare is determined partly by objective conditions and partly by the actual reach of the benevolent emotions:* by objective conditions, because no matter what may be my affectional attitude toward another man, it may be the case that unless he has his welfare he will be an impedi- ment to my obtaining my welfare; by the actual reach of the benevolent emotions, as is proved by history, which shows that as men have become larger-hearted, the community of interests is shared in by a larger number of individuals. It must be borne in mind that the summum bonum thus described is not imposed upon any individual by any obligation. Unless an individual is bo constituted that he finds such an end the most desirable of all ends, it is not his summum bonum. All that has been attempted is to describe in very general terms an end that it is believed will be found to be most desirable by normal human be- ings. Abnormal human beings, who have no liking for their kind, or who are rabidly mono- maniacal, or who in some other essential features vary from the kindly race of men, are not taken into account. Their summa bona are radically different, anil because this is so there is ap- parently no possibility of welfare for them con- sistent with welfare for normal men. They are not included directly in the community of human interests. All that can be demanded for them is so much of welfare as is consistent with the welfare of mankind in general. But though ethics as a science cannot impose, an end nn man. man individually and collectively can impose ends upon man to a certain extent. It is a fact, as we have already seen, that what a person shall desire is to a laiue extent deter- mined by what Other persons desire. A com- munity <ir an individual with a definite concep- tion of a supreme end can do much to influence a child "r even an adult In de-ire llial same end; and this make- moral training possible Moral training and the teaching of ethical science are two quite distinct operations, although they may, ami often do. go hand in band. Moral training consists in an attempt to habituate a person to actions and dispositions such as are desired by the trainer. It is the process of inducting a per- son into a communion of ends with another per- son or with a group of persons. Ethical teaching is the process of bringing a person to see and understand the facts of tin- moral life. The for- mer is an attempt to develop appreciations, the latter to develop insight. An appreciation with- out insight is blind; insight without appreciation is ineffective. Moral training, however, is a fact in the moral life, ami a- such has a place in ethics as a science of the moral life. Ethics studies the facts of moral training and discovers what its purpose i-. and what the realization of that purpose does in the way of meeting human needs. It may ascer- tain e.g. the fact that the actual end pursued in any particular species of punishment is of an evil nature; that is, that men being what they are. .society is injured rather than benefited by a realization of the end. It may discover that other ends if realized would avert these evil con- sequences and produce advantageous results, and it may discover the best means to the securing of these ends. All this is a matter of descriptive science, not in the least directly prescriptive. The beneficial ends and the expeditious means to the ends are prescribed to men by their desire for the advantages described. A study of moral training shows that it is a very complex affair, and into its complexities we cannot here enter. Example and precept, admonition and chastise- ment, reward and 'pious fraud,' threats, actual infliction of pain, appeals to nascent desires and aversions, are all employed more or less frequent- ly. All these instruments of moral training have their characteristic effect, and these must be experimentally ascertained. And again, not only moral training, but vengeance, is a phenomenon of the moral life. It aims at the infliction of pain on an offender to appease by his suffering the suffering of his victim or of the sympathizers of his victim. It has its characteristic results. These are studied by ethics. The results of this study may. as a fact do, secure general condem- nation of such vengeful punishment ; but this. again, i- because the outcome of a vengeful policy is undesirable. Another question must now be taken up. Is it not possible that ethical insight may tend to dis- countenance morality ? When it is seen that morality is reasonably obligatory only because imposed by a supreme plan of life, and that the supremacy of this plan is given to it by the vol untary adoption of it on the part of the im'li-
idual, may he not decide voluntarily to adopt
some othei plan? This would be possible if one's choices were not determined by one's character, and one's character by one's desires, instinct, habits, and expression in general. If scientific knowledge' id' conduct could radically change a person'- character, then scientific ethics might profoundly change morality. But while some change is pos-ildc and actual under the influence of new ideals gained by new knowledge, this change ha- it- limits, and within these limits it is desirable. Morality is not a tiling of yester- day and to-day, but will continue so long as man i- a rational being with wants and desires, among which his social needs are of paramount urgency. The possibility id' the evolution of morality out of non moral conditions was some years ago seriously contested on metaphysical and theolog-
