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ETHICS. 245 ETHICS. ical grounds. The theological grounds do not concern us. The metaphysical grounds of objec- tion are invalid. The strongest argument of the opponents of evolutionistic ethics is based on the necessity of self consciousness for morality, and on (lie alleged impossibility of the evolution of self-consciousness. The fallacy of this argu- ment has boon often pointed out. The 'tinieless- ness' of self-consciousness docs not. consist in the fact that the self lias no1 a place in time as an event, but in the fact that the objects of that self's knowledge are not confined to the periph- erally aroused sensations of the present mo- ment. The assertion that a • onsciousness in time cannot know time is an unfounded dogmatic dic- tum, and yet only on the supposition thai this statement is true can it be maintained that con- sciousness and self-consciousness are in their na- ture incapable of explanation by evolution. The exact course taken in the evolution of morality from the non-moral is still an open question; but the truth of the statement that morality is an evolved product stands or falls with the gen- eral truth of the evolution of man from the non- moral animals. The only other question that can be discussed here is that of free will in its bearing on moral- ity. Can there be moral responsibility if the will is determined, that is. if the volitions of man are events which find their complete causal explana- tions in previous events? In the light of what has been said it must be maintained that unless the human volitions were determined, responsibil- ity would be impossible. Ethical responsibility is the liability of a person to answer for his conduct before the bar of reason. A commits an act and is held responsible. This means that A is amenable to the demand to prove that his act is in accord with the supreme plan of life, or that his supreme plan is the right plan. Given a supreme plan, intelligent experience can determine the relation of an act to the realization of that plan. A reasonable person who adopts that plan may be constantly called upon to justify the means he takes to realize that end. Condem- nation of an act in such a case means that it is recognized as not conducive to that end, and that it is disliked as having that tendency. Ap- proval means that it is recognized as conducive to that end and is liked as having that tendency. Or again, instead of raising a question of means to an end, there may be a question about the end. We have seen that though the actual supreme end pursued is not imposed by reason, yet knowledge of the bearing of the attained end upon actual desires may iead to change of ends. Moral re- sponsibility may mean the liability of a person to justify his supreme end — that is, to show that it is desirable as well as desired. Approval or condemnation of the end is a recognition of its desirableness or undesirableness, and the result- ing affeetional tone. It of course carries with it approval or disapproval of the means leading up to it. In ordinary life the supreme end is unre- flectively pursued, and the means to it taken for granted as presented in some moral code. The only function of conscience in such cases is the approval or disapproval of an act as conforming to the moral code. In any case the whole activity of conscience is useless unless the judgments and feelings involved determine future conduct. Not only so, but also the past conduct judged, if con- ceived as wholly or in part the pure chance product of some blind arbitrary aj 1 'will,' i ion i miis to any end, ami ' hen approvable nor condemnablo as such. .Vow, ire.. will, either in the sense "i .1 liberty of indiffi n or a, liberty of alternative choice, in so far a- it is undetermined, is pure chance, a- i- eon...! Professor .lames, one oi 1 lie mosl promim a porters of indeterminiem. Responsibility does not, therefore, presuppose indeterminism of thi will, but ii doe, presuppose thai the will can be determined either bj the Knowledge of tin COnduciveness of cans to an end, or by the knowledge of the adaptedness of an end to sat isfy a. desire. person who can by rational means he brought lo See the inadequacy of his acts to the supreme moral end. or the inadequacy of his supreme 1 al end to his whole nature a, a. being with definite needs, is responsible; thai 1 , in case his acts or his ends are undesirable, he can be convinced of their undesirability and In- led to condemn them. In other word-., he has a conscience. Bibliography. For the history of ct.hies. con- sult: Ziegler, Geschichte der Ethik (Bonn, 1881'- 80) ; Kostlin, Geschichte der Ethik, vol. i. (Tu- bingen, 1887) ; Jodl, Geschichte der Ethik in der Hater.' Philosophic (Stuttgart, 1882-89); Sidg ■wick, History of Ethics (4th ed., London, 1896). For ethical theories, Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics, translated by Peters [ London, Issl ), and by Welldon (ib., 1807); Plato, Republic, trans- lated by Davies and Vaughn (London, ISS1 ). and by Jowett (3d ed., ib., 1893); Hobbes, Human Xature (1050), Leviathan (1051), Dc Corpore Politico (1650); Spinoza, Ethics, translated by White (London, 1883) ; Selby-Bigge, British Uor alists: Being Selections from Writers Principal!;/ of the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1897) ; Hume, Treatise of Human Xature I 1739-40). and Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751) ; Kant, Critique on Practical Reason, ami other Works on the Theory of Ethics, translated by Abbott (5th ed., London, 1890) ; Bentham, In- troduction to the Principles of Morals and Legis- lation (1789) ; Hegel, Philosophy of Mind, trans- lated by Wallace (Oxford, 1894) ; Philosophy of Rights, translated by Dyde (London, 1896) ; Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (5th ed., Lon- don, 1893) ; Bradley, Ethical Studies (London, 1876) ; Spencer, Principles of Ethics (London, 1879-93), which includes the celebrated Data of Ethics; Stephen, The Science of Ethics (London, 1882) ; Green, Prolegomena to Ethics (Oxford, 1883) ; Wundt, Ethics, translated by Titchener (London, 1897-1901) ; Martineau, Types of Eth- ical Theory (3d ed., Oxford, 1898) ; Hoffding, Ethik, German translation (Leipzig, 1901 ) ; Alex- ander, Moral Order and Progress (London. 1889) ; Caird, The Critical Philosophy of Kant, vol. ii. (Glasgow, 1889) ; Fouillee, Critique des systdmes de morale con tern poraine (Paris, 1887) ; Gizycki, I nt rod 'net ion to the Study of Ethics (London. 1891); Simmel, Einleitung in die Moralwissenschaft (Berlin. 1892-93); Wil- liams, Review of the Systi ms of Ethics Founded on the Theory of Evolution (London, 1893) ; Seth, A Study of Eth ical Principles ( 6th ed., Edin- burgh, 1902) ; Baldwin, Social and Ethical Inter- pretations of Mental Development (New York, 1897) ; Ehrenfels. System der Werttheorie (Leip- zig, 1897-98) ; Sutherland. Oriain and Growth of the Moral Instinct (London. 1898): Thilly.* In- troduction to Ethics (New York, 1900) ; Mezes,