not alone the Roman empire, but the entire world of classical antiquity.
In like manner Čaadaev arrives at peculiar estimates of classical civilisation in general. In Greek civilisation he esteems its material beauty alone, condemning Socrates, Marcus Aurelius, the stoics, the Platonists, and Homer "the corrupter of mankind." The old world was not destroyed by the barbarians, but fell to pieces at a touch, for it was already a corpse. None the less he has praise for Epicurus and his ethical system, for therein he discerns the factor that binds human beings together. It is equally uncongenial to find that while he esteems Mohammed and Islam, and also the religions of Hindustan, he has no word of commendation for Aristotle and his undeniable services. Apropos of the settlement with Islam he is bold enough to admit that Christianity can adopt divers religious forms, and that in case of need it may even enter into alliance with error in order to attain its aims to the full! Two of his philosophical essays are devoted to these questions.
Čaadaev simultaneously touches on the problem of freedom. On the one hand he admits the determinism of many historical events and facts, as when he refers to the influence of geographical situation. He insists, too, upon the internal logicality, upon the "syllogism," of historical development, thus reminding us of the Hegelian dialectic. On the other hand he maintains that the individual is free, for "the absolute freedom of the human spirit" has been preserved by Christianity; and he desires also to rescue the "universal reason." In the letter written to Schelling in 1842 he condemns the Hegelian dialectic as a fatalistic logic which practically abolishes free will. It cannot be said that he even approaches to a clear formulation of the problem. He tells us that history is the product of the divine energy; but how can we conceive the freedom of the individual and of the universal reason as reconcilable with this theism? What is the general significance of the immanence of God; what is the individual reason; and what is the "universal reason"? What is the relationship of immanent teleology to freedom and to necessity?
It would seem that these problems flitted through Čaadaev's mind, though he failed to formulate them adequately. He was familiar with the difficulties which Tolstoi (among others) was subsequently to encounter in the elaboration of a philosophy of history.
