Page:The Theory of Moral Sentiments.pdf/14

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4
Of Propriety.
Part I.

conceive at the miſery of thoſe wretches affects that particular part in themſelves more than any other; becauſe that horror ariſes from conceiving what they themſelves would ſuffer, if they really were the wretches whom they are looking upon, and if that particular part in themſelves was actually affected in the ſame miſerable manner. The very force of this conception is ſufficient, in their feeble frames, to produce that itching or uneaſy ſenſation complained of. Men of the moſt robuſt make, obſerve that in looking upon fore eyes they often feel a very ſenſible ſoreneſs in their own, which proceeds from the ſame reaſon; that organ being in the ſtrongeſt man more delicate than any other part of the body is in the weakeſt.

Neither is it thoſe circumſtances only, which create pain or ſorrow, that call forth our fellow-feeling. Whatever is the paſſion which ariſes from any object in the perſon principally concerned, an analogous emotion ſprings up, at the thought of his ſituation, in the breaſt of every attentive ſpectator. Our joy for the deliverance of thoſe heroes of tragedy or romance who intereſt us, is as ſincere as our grief for their diſtreſs, and our follow-feeling with their miſery is not more real than that with their happineſs. We enter into their gratitude towards thoſe faithful friends who did not deſert them in their difficulties; and we heartily go along with their reſentment againſt thoſe perſidious traitors who injured, abandoned, or deceived them. In every

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