paſſion of which the mind of man is ſiſceptible, the emotions of the by-ſtander always correſpond to what, by bringing the caſe home to himſelf, he imagines, ſhould be the ſentiments of the ſufferer.
Pity and compaſſion are words appropriated to ſignify our fellow-feeling with the ſorrow of others. Sympathy, though its meaning was, perhaps, originally the ſame, may now, however, without much impropriety, be made uſe of to denote our fellow-feeling with any paſſion whatever.
Upon ſome occaſions ſympathy may ſeem to ariſe meerly from the view of a certain emotion in another perſon. The paſſions, upon ſome occaſions, may ſeem to be transfuſed from one man to another, inſtantaneouſly, and antecedent to any knowledge of what excited them in the perſon principally concerned. Grief and joy, for example, ſtrongly expreſſed in the look and geſtures of any one, at once affect the ſpectator with ſome degree of a like painful or agreeable emotion. A ſmiling face is, to every body that ſees it, a chearful object; as a ſorrowful countenance, on the other hand, is a melancholy one.
This, however, does not hold univerſally or with regard to every paſſion. There are ſome paſſions of which the expreſſions excite no ſort of ſympathy, but before we are acquainted with what gave occaſion to them, ſerve rather to diſguſt and provoke us againſt them. The furious behaviour of an angry man is more likely to exaſperate us againſt
