shown that—than towards Britons or Germans, for example [Right.—W.], the Minister replied that, although he might share this view, he did not believe that it would be shared in Russia. [But then the Russians are no better.—W.]
"The danger of a European war if Austria entered Serbian soil [This will certainly happen.—W.] would become immediate. The results of such a war of four belligerents he expressly emphasized four, and meant Russia, Austria-Hungary, Germany and France [He forgets Italy.—W.] it was quite impossible to foresee. Whatever course the situation took, one thing was certain: that there would be complete exhaustion and impoverishment; industry and commerce would be ruined, and the power of capital destroyed. Revolutionary movements, as in 1848, would be the result in consequence of the ruin of industry. [!—W.]
"What Sir Edward Grey most lamented, besides the tone of the Note, was the short time-limit; which made war almost inevitable. He said to me that he would be ready to make representations with us in Vienna for a prolongation of the period '[Useless.—W.], as then a way out might perhaps be found. [?!!—W.] He asked me to transmit this proposal to your Excellency.
"He further suggested that in case of a dangerous tension, the four Powers not immediately concerned—England, Germany, France and Italy—should undertake negotiation between Russia and Austria. [This is superfluous, as Austria has already made matters clear to Russia, and Grey can propose nothing else. I am not intervening only if Austria expressly asks me to, which is not probable. One
