does not consult others in matters of honour and vital questions.—W.]
"The Minister is clearly trying to do everything to prevent European complications, and could not conceal his great regret at the challenging tone of the Austrian Note and the short time-limit.
"From another source I was informed in the Foreign Office that there was reason to assume that Austria considerably underestimated Serbia's power of resistance. In any case, it would be a long and desperate struggle, which would greatly weaken Austria and cause her to bleed to death. [Nonsense! it may bring England Persia.—W.] They also claim to know that Rumania's attitude is more than uncertain, and that it had been stated in Bucharest that they would be against the party who attacked."
Three points are particularly noteworthy in this document:
Firstly, the serenity with which William still contemplated war on July 26th. That Austria may bleed to death in it he declares to be nonsense. The fear that it will bring economic ruin and revolution to all belligerents seems to him so ludicrous that he marks the passage with an exclamation point.
Secondly, we see that William, on July 26th, when he read Lichnowsky's report, still reckoned on Italy's entry into the war—of course, on Germany's side.
Finally, however, it is to be noted that Grey describes the war which he fears as one of four participants only; he says nothing of England. He is, therefore, endeavouring to remain neutral—and he had to if he was to appear as an intermediary.
