But for the success of this intervention it was necessary that Germany should also be honourably neutral. This appeared doubtful from the very first, and in the course of the negotiations the suspicion became stronger and stronger that she was only using her neutral attitude as a pretext to be able unostentatiously to assist Austria, who allowed nothing to lead her from her policy of war.
England had to reckon with the possibility that Germany, with Austria, was pressing for a war against Russia and France, in which, in alliance with Italy, she could be certain of victory. If this view was correct, then it was to be feared that Germany would be strengthened in her bellicose tendencies by the prospect of England's neutrality. It was therefore necessary to warn Germany that she must not count on this neutrality. This warning might still save peace, which was dangerously threatened. It was given on July 29th.
July 29th.
The warning fell on prepared soil. We have already given an account of the revulsion of feeling in Berlin, which began on July 28th, produced by the Socialist demonstrations against war in Berlin. Then by Lichnowsky's representations and Italy's perverseness, which caused the possibility to arise that out of the joyful war of two against two there might develop a very disagreeable one of two against four.
Bethmann now endeavoured to win England by promises.
In a conversation with Sir Edward Goschen on July 29th he observes:
