This was entirely contradictory to the rules of Prussian militarism, which places the greatest value on swiftness of movement. It, however, also threatened to ruin the diplomatic conception of the situation, which was that Europe should be confronted with accomplished facts before it was well aware what had happened, while it would be difficult for Serbia to come to an understanding with the Powers and for the Powers to come to an understanding with one another. Consternation and confusion were to make it possible to fish in troubled waters, and to lessen the danger of the Powers uniting against the impious disturbers of the peace.
This is the reason for the short time-limit which was to be given the Serbians for answering the Note.
Under the circumstances it appeared to be dangerous to delay sending off the Note, as every day of hesitation might bring new incidents, might expose the aims of the conspirators, and so bring them to nought. The insistency of Germany, after she had once given her consent to the war, is therefore quite intelligible.
But the delay on the part of Austria is not so intelligible. It may partly be attributed to the inveterate Austrian slovenliness, and partly perhaps to the delay, arising from this, of the preparations for war which had begun in Austria immediately after the decisions of Potsdam. On July I2th Jagow telegraphed to Tschirschky:
"Strictly confidential instructions for Count Berchtold.
"According to secret intelligence, Russia and Serbia have obtained confidential information that Austria-Hungary is quietly strengthening her garrisons on the Serbian and Russian frontiers."
