Thus not only on the Serbian frontier, but also on the Russian, Austria was making preparations for war.
This is of great importance in view of the discussions with regard to the various mobilizations. Mobilization is the most important, the most conspicuous and the ultimate act of preparation for war, but it is not the only one. There are also movements of troops, assembling and transport of munitions of war, and recall of officers on leave. Means of transport and similar things can be placed in readiness before the mobilization is announced. The latter will take place the more rapidly and effectively, the better the rest of the preparations for war are carried out. The Central Powers in this respect were able, on the outbreak of war on July 24th, to be far ahead of the others, because ever since the 5th they had counted on the possibility of war with Russia.
In spite of this, Austria was much more behindhand than was agreeable to the German war-politicians. After all, she finally declared war on Russia only on the 6th of August, notwithstanding that she had ordered the general mobilization as early as July 3ist. To add to this, differences of opinion arose between the statesmen of the dual State of Austria- Hungary, which was so little a homogeneous entity that its politicians knew no other name for it than "the Monarchy."
Berchtold, as far back as July 5th, had got permission for the war from Potsdam, but only on July 14th could Tschirschky report that Budapest, too, had given its unreserved consent. And only then did the Ministers in Vienna begin to attempt to come to an understanding with one another with regard to Serbia. It is remarkable that before this even Berlin had not felt the need of being clear as to the object of the war which had
