no intention of incorporating the kingdom with her own territory. Strategic rectifications of the frontier which may be necessary, as well as the diminution in size of Serbia in favour of other States, or a temporarily necessary occupation of Serbian territory, are naturally not excluded by this resolution" (Red Book of 1919, pp. 65-67).
Of the whole of this programme the Powers were, as a matter of precaution, only informed of the first sentence, that "the Monarchy is not waging a war of conquest." The sentences following were suppressed, and these, in reality, contained the disclaimed programme of Count Hoyos, and also did not exclude the reservation of Count Berchtold, which he had so finely clothed in the words: "At the end of the war it may no longer be possible for us to avoid annexation."
Tisza, strange to say, was quite in agreement with this arrangement. His object for waging war was not the conquest but the annihilation of Serbia. Such, then, was the direction in which the war was "likely" to lead, according to the intentions of the guiding spirits of the Austrian State.
In what direction it really led was explained to the Imperial Chancellor immediately before this, on July 16th, by Prince Lichnowsky in an admirable exposé which may be quoted here in its entirety.
Lichnowsky wrote:
"From Count Berchtold's standpoint it is quite comprehensible that he should aim at restoring his position, which was badly shaken by the Peace of Bucharest, and also the influence of the Monarchy in the Balkans, which was diminished through the
