grounds. He asked for a unanimous decision on this point. As a Magyar, he wished for no increase in the number of Serbians in the Monarchy.
Count Berchtold was of a different opinion. He thought it was only with certain reserves that he could associate himself with this conception of the matter. He was also of the opinion that Austria-Hungary should annex no territory belonging to Serbia, but, on the other hand, should assign as large pieces as possible to Bulgaria, Greece and Albania, and possibly also to Rumania. Serbia must be so reduced in size " that she would no longer be a source of danger." The situation in the Balkans might, however, change. It might be " that at the end of the war it will no longer be possible for us to avoid annexation."
One can see that the views which Count Hoyos had unfolded in Berlin on July 5th were not only his own personal views, but were just as much those of Count Berchtold.
Count Tisza, however, did not admit the reservations of Count Berchtold. Count Stiirgkh thought that, even if the occupation of Serbian territory were out of the question, security could be obtained by the deposition of the dynasty, by a military convention, or by other suitable measures. As the Minister of War showed himself to be willing to guarantee the limitation of the annexation to strategic rectifications of the frontier and to the permanent occupation of a bridge-head across the Save, it was unanimously decided by the Ministers assembled:
That immediately at the beginning of the war it shall be declared to the Foreign Powers that the Monarchy is not waging a war of conquest, and has
