THE COUNSELS OF THE ALLIES. 213 ported, as we liave already seen, by the authority chap, of General Canrobert, and apparently by the ^ ^^' unanimous, or all but unanimous, judgment of those who had weight in the counsels of the French army. And, again, it would seem that the judgment of the Allies was in some measure governed by a foregone conclusion. By some, unless I mistake, the expediency of making use of the siege-guns, then in process of landing, was hardly in form decided, but rather taken for granted. . What criticism ascribes to those who con- The error ,,., p . ,. 1-1 ascribed )>y demned the idea ot any immediate assault, is the xociieben . . 1 t° those of error of exchangmg their iiower to overmaster the the Allies „ . . who opposed stronghold at once for an opportunity of mere- the assault. ly besieging it, and that too with inadequate means.* Being men, they could hardly be blamed for not seeing into the future ; but the impeach- ment is, that they did not so read the facts lying plainly within reach of their knowledge as to be able to obtain a clear sight of the conditions in which they were placed. Thus, to take but one instance, they failed to see how they were bound by the vital condition of time. In adopting a measure which was only the first and the easiest of a long, arduous, and bloody undertaking, the men who got the sway of the question were blind, or half-blind, it would seem, not merely to the probable effect, but to the then present import of what they were doing. They conscientiously, no doubt, resolved that, before
- Todkbeii.
