2U THE COUNSELS OF THE ALLIES. CHAP. VII. The real purport of their dcter- iiiinutiou : Its confor- mity with the enemy's wislies. atieiuptiug an assault, they would make a good use of their siege-guns ; but theu they were not really going to put all this ordnance in battery without first getting some cover for it; so that what they in truth undertook was to open some trench-work in which to plant their great guns, and with those to cannonade the fortress. In other words, they ^•ere determining — they hardly knew what they did — to enter upon the siege of Sebastopol.^- It was with a hope of inducing the Allies to come to this very resolve that the defenders of iSebastopol had been toiling. The great Engineer who directed the labours of the garrison has declared, as we saw, that the place, at this time, could not have Ijeen held aiiainst such an attack as the Allies had the power to makejf and this is the judgment of one who, compared with all other men, had the fullest understanding and knowledge of the ques-
- In saying parenllietically that the o{)poncnts of the pro-
posal lor assaulting enterc'<l upon the siege witiiout knowing it, I am warranted, I think, by the language of Burgoyne, and those who have followed his view. No ' approaches' were at this time meditated, and, for that reason, there seemed to be a reluctance on the part of the engineers to acknowledge that the intended process was a 'siege.' + Todleben, 'Defense de Sebastopol.' General de Todleben's opinion applies to the state of the defences on the 29th of September, and even to their state at a much later time ; but a great change had been wrouglit in the two days preceding the evening of the 2ntli (see, and compaie the i)lans). An attemjjt to defend the place at the time when the Allies first appeared on the South Side would have been even more desperate thuu it was on the 29tli.
