478 THE BATTLE OF INKEKMAN. c;iiAP. Whatever the value of that conclusion as a 1_ guess or surmise, it was certainly based, when first hazarded, upon an imperfect knowledge of the facts essential to a trustworthy judgment. The Careenage Ravine is a chasm which forbids united action to forces advancing along the two ridges on either side of it. If Dannenberg's wish had been followed, the force under Soimonoff and the one under PaulofF must have been kept com- pletely asunder by the interposed chasm, and in that state compelled to advance against a foe who — commanding the head of the ravine — would be free to throw his weight against one of them whilst simply checking the other. The camps of the Allies were so placed on the Cher- sonese, that, to meet perils threatening from the western side of the Careenage Eavine, they could effect a rapid concentration. With their forces assembled, and fast assembling, on the left of the Windmill, and the trenches of ' Gordon's Attack ' on their left front. General Canrobert and Lord Eagian would have been well circumstanced for giving a hot reception to any Eussian force which — after overcoming all the earlier difficulties of the enterprise — should attempt to debouch from the narrow Victoria Eidge in the face of an Anglo- Frencli army.* Of course, it is possible that if Soimonoff — de- ferring to Dannenbftrg — had delivered his attack on the west of the Careenage Eavine, the chances
- The succession of 'earlier difficulties' might have comprised
- first, obstinate pickets : then, unless it weie somehow eluded,
