SEQUEL TO INKEKMAN NARRATIVE. 479 of war might have ueutrahsed the mischief of lus char isolation, and given him the coveted victory; hut '_ in such case, apparently, he must have owed everything to his own good fortune or to his own strength ; for it is hard to believe that in the event of his finding liimself checked on the Vic- toria Ridge, or baffled in his attempts to debouch from it, he would have had the least help — except in the way of a somewhat weak diversion — from any of Pauloff's troops.* The experience of the battle as actually fought lays a ver}' safe ground for inferring that if Pau- loff's troops only had attempted Mount Inkerman, they must have not only failed to carry the posi- tion, but even to make themselves formidable. It is true that the main body of Pauloff's troops travelled round by the East Sapper's Eoad and finally ascended Mount Inkerman in a condition — though weary — to fight with determination and spirit ; but they did all this under the shield the Lancaster Battery, and the forces issuing from it ; then, possibly, the fire of siege-guns from Gordon's Attack ; then the whole of the Light Division ; and lastly, the men armed with rifles in the camp of the Naval Brigade.
- To apprehend the feebleness which must liave apparently
characterised any attack on Mount Inkerman attempted by Pauloff's troops only, one should know the circuitous route to which they were nece.ssarily condemned (see ante, pp. 89, 90, 160), and cast a fresh glance at the map. That route was safe enough for a general advancing under SoimonofFs shield, but would have been perilous in the extreme for troops uncovered by utner forces. The great ])roportion of Pauloff's artillery to his infantry — 97 guns to 16,500 foot — would have been a cir- cumstance adding immensely to the difficulty of the under- taking.
