with equal force to the former. The dominant majority for the time would, in reality, through the right of suffrage, be the rulers—the controlling, governing, and irresponsible power,—and those who make and execute the laws would, for the time, in reality be but their representatives and agents.”[1] And he proceeds to show that the abuse of the power which would thus be acquired, could only be counteracted by giving to each division, or interest, through its appropriate organ, a concurrent voice.[2] The majority which is formed by this concurrence he calls the constitutional majority, in contradistinction to that which is obtained by treating the whole community as a unit, having but one common interest. “The first and leading error,” he says, “which naturally arises from overlooking the distinction referred to, is to confound the numerical majority with the people, and this so completely as to regard them as identical. This is a consequence that necessarily results from considering the numerical as the only majority. All admit, that a popular government, or democracy, is the government of the people; for the terms imply this. A perfect government of the kind would be one which would embrace the consent of every citizen, or member, of the community; but as this is impracticable, in the opinion of those who regard the numerical as the only majority, and who can perceive no other way by which the sense of the people can be taken, they are compelled to adopt this as the only true basis of popular government, in contradistinction to governments of the aristocratical or monarchical form. Being thus constrained, they are, in the next place, forced to regard the numerical majority as, in effect, the entire people; that is, the greater part as the whole; and the government of the greater part as the government of the whole.”[3]
The work being adapted to a republican form of government, contains observations on a political organism, by the
