Page:Thomas Hare - The Election of Representatives, parliamentary and municipal.djvu/58

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MAJORITIES, MINORITIES,

concurrence and veto of different bodies, which happily is, in this country, provided for by a different constitution; but all the remarks on the error of so dealing with numbers as to extinguish interests, is equally applicable to the constitution of the House of Commons. The danger of a popular body, unbalanced by the introduction of elements other than those which have their origin in a triumphant numerical force, is stated, with equal confidence, by Mr. Burke. He says,—“Of this I am certain, that, in a democracy, the majority of the citizens is capable of exercising the most cruel oppressions upon the minority, whenever strong divisions prevail in that kind of polity, as they often must; and that oppression of the minority will extend to far greater numbers, and will be carried on with much greater fury, than can almost ever be apprehended from the dominion of a single sceptre.”[1]

Those who contend that neither good government nor individual liberty is necessarily secured by a suffrage which commits the government absolutely to the numerical majority, do not, therefore, argue that there must not be a resort to arithmetic. It is impossible to suppose a popular form of government in which the votes must not be counted. The problem of constitutional organism is, in what manner the individuals composing the entire community are to be classed so that no opinions or interests shall be unheard, or extinguished, in representation.

Most of the advocates for the amendment of our system of representation seem content with, or to despair of obtaining anything better than, a division of the country into certain districts or localities.[2]

  1. Reflections on the French Bevolution, &c., p. 186. See Mill, Considerations on on Representative Government, c. vi. (Note to 3rd ed.)
  2. Lord Grey, in the last edition of his work on Parliamentary Government (pp. 209–213), has suggested that the votes of graduates of colleges and universities, and of workmen in trades, to be incorporated for the purpose, might be taken without regard to localities, but still, as I gather, by majorities, and not in unanimity, as here proposed. (Note to 3rd ed.)