PUBLIC LAW 100-180—DEC. 4, 1987
101 STAT. 1139
advantage conferred by such an agreement on other nations possessing nuclear weapons whose strategic ballistic missile forces would not be siffected by the agreement. SEC. 906. REPORT ON IMPLICATIONS OF CERTAIN ARMS CONTROL POSITIONS
Not later than June 30, 1988, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report, in both classified and unclassified versions, containing the following: (1) A description of the quantitative and qualitative implications for the strategic modernization program of the United States of the publicly-announced position of the United States at the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in Geneva, giving special, but not exclusive, attention to the implications of such position for the Trident SSBN program, the rail-garrison Peacekeeper program, and the small intercontinental ballistic missile ("Midgetman") program. (2) A description of the advantages and drawbacks of following the recommendations made in 1983 in the report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces with regard to research on smaller ballistic-missile carrying submarines, each carrying fewer missiles than the Trident, as a potential follow-on to the Trident submarine force. (3) The recommendations of the Secretary of Defense with regard to paragraphs (1) and (2) on United States force modernization policy and arms control policy. SEC. 907. SUPPORT FOR NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS
(a) Congress applauds the recent signing of an agreement between international the United States and the Soviet Union on the establishment of agreements. nuclear risk reduction centers. Congress regards this agreement as an important and practical first step in reducing the threat of nuclear war due to accident, misinterpretation, or miscalculation. Congress notes that the agreement calls for centers to be established in each nation's respective capital for the routine exchange of information and advanced notification of nuclear and missile testing. (h) It is the hope of Congress that this first step in nuclear risk reduction will increase the confidence and mutual trust of both parties to the agreement and lead to an expansion in functions to reduce further the chances of accidental war. Such functions may include joint discussions on crisis prevention and the development of strategies to deal with incidents or threats of nuclear terrorism, nuclear proliferation, or other mutually agreed upon issues of concern in reducing nuclear risk. TITLE X—MATTERS RELATING TO NATO COUNTRIES AND OTHER ALLIES PART
A—NATO DETERRENCE
SEC. 1001. REPORT ON REQUIREMENTS FOR STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE
MAINTAINING NATO'S
(a) REQUIREMENT.—The Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report regarding the ability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to maintain its strategy of deterrence through the 1990s. The report shall include a specific discussion of the
�
