regards the military situation and rate of destruction of
merchant shipping.
I have had daily conferences with the First Sea Lord, both at his office and residence, and also have been given entire freedom of the Admiralty and access to all Government Officials. I have freely consulted with such officials as the following :
Prime Minister.
First Lord of Admiralty (Sir Edward Carson).
Ministers of Munitions, Shipping, Trade, and other Cabinet officials.
First Sea Lord, and his assistants.
Chief of Naval Staff.
Directors (corresponding to our Chiefs of Bureaus) of Intelligence, Anti-submarine operations, Torpedoes, Mines, Mining, etc.
3. General Statement of the Situation :
Since the last declaration of the enemy Government, which from intelligence information was anticipated, the submarine campaign against merchant shipping of all Nations has resolved itself into the real issue of the war and, stated briefly, the Allied Governments have not been able to, and are not now, effectively meeting the situation presented.
4. As stated in my first despatch, the communications and supplies to all forces on all fronts, including Russian, are threatened, and the " Command of the Sea " is actually at stake.
5. My own views of the seriousness of the situation and the submarine menace have been greatly altered. My convictions and opinions, as probably those of the Department also, had been largely based upon Press reports and reports of our Attaches and other professional Americans who have been abroad during the War. All of this information has been either rigidly censored or else has been given out in such form that it would be of minimum assistance to enemy moral.
6. The necessity for secrecy, which the British Government has experienced, and which I repeatedly encounter in London, and even in the Admiralty itself, is impressive. There have been remarkable and unexpected leakages of information throughout the war. Certain neutral legations of smaller countries are now under strong suspicion.
7. The extent to which the submarine campaign is being waged is in itself excellent evidence of the importance attached to it by the enemy, and of the degree to which they counted, and still are counting, upon it.
The Intelligence Department has reliable information (as reliable as can be) that the enemy really reckoned that the Allies would be defeated in two months through shortage of supplies.
