that he might be able to place a considerable portion of his troops in healthy towns on the Rio Grande and take and hold Monterey, the important question of striking at the city of Mexico was left pending upon Taylor's advice.[1] Four days later General Scott wrote him in quite a different strain, setting it down as the wish and expectation of the president that he would press his operations toward the heart of the enemy's country, making the high road to the capital one of the lines of march which he was expected to take up beyond the Rio Grande. Such contradictory orders could only perplex Taylor, and engender indecision.
Taylor replied in a communication to the adjutant-general of the army, dated July 2d. Confining himself almost entirely to the question of subsistence, he expressed the opinion — based upon calculations made on the supposition that the people of the country would at least be passive, and willing to part with their produce — that a force exceeding 6,000 men could not be maintained beyond Saltillo. The distance from Camargo, where he proposed to establish his depôt, to the capital was little less than 1,000 miles; and except in the improbable case of entire acquiescence on the part of the Mexican people, he considered it impracticable to keep open so long a line of communication. It was, therefore, his opinion that operations from the northern frontier should not look to the city of Mexico, but should be confined to cutting off the northern provinces — an undertaking comparatively easy.
Previous to the receipt of this communication at the war-office, the necessity of striking directly at the Mexican capital through Vera Cruz seems to have dawned upon the government. With the facts before its eyes that Mexico was without a commercial ma-
- ↑ 'Shall the campaign,' says Marcy, 'be conducted with the view of striking at the city of Mexico? or confined, so far as regards the forces under your immediate command, to the northern provinces of Mexico?' Id., p. 324.
