Page:Vol 5 History of Mexico by H H Bancroft.djvu/476

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SCOTT'S MARCH TO PUEBLA,

too late recognized his mistake in not having secured that point, and endeavored to regain it by three times directing a furious assault against it. But the deadly rifle repelled each attack, and the Atalaya summit remained in possession of the enemy. Childs' troops in their impetuosity rushed down the slope and began to ascend the Cerro Gordo, but the recall was sounded and Childs fell back, with a loss of nine killed and twenty-three wounded.[1] Then from Cerro Gordo a deluge of grape was poured down upon the Atalaya, but the Americans, sheltering themselves on the shelving sides of the crest, sustained little harm. During the night, with incredible labor, a 24-pounder gun and two 24-pounder howitzers were dragged up by hand and placed in position. A 68-pounder howitzer was also, with equal difficulty, transported from Plan del Rio and planted on the south side of the river, bearing upon the batteries on the Mexican right.

On the evening of the 17th Scott issued his order of battle, which from first to last exhibits his confidence in being able to drive the Mexicans from their positions.[2] Twiggs was directed to move forward and take up a position on the national road in rear of the enemy's position and cut off the retreat. Two regiments of volunteers, under Brigadier-general Shields, were ordered to be sent up as a reënforcement, and Worth's division of regulars was ordered to follow up the movement against the Mexicans left along the route pursued by Twiggs. Pillow, in command of Patterson's division, was to pierce the line of batteries on the heights resting on the ravine and dominating the approach from Plan del Rio. He was directed to

  1. Santa Anna, in his despatches of the same day, reported this part of the engagement as a complete triumph on his side. Tributo á la Verdal, 35; El Razonador, 29 Junio, 1847, p. 2.
  2. He gives positive directions regarding the pursuit; states that the army will not return to the encampment at Plan del Řio; and orders the baggage-trains to follow in the afternoon of the 18th or early the next morning. General Orders No. 111, in U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 258-9.