Posthumous Memoirs of Talaat Pasha/Bulgaria and Romania
In answer to Germany's pressure for our immediate aid, we insisted so much upon a definite decision by Bulgaria that at last Germany asked us if it would not be advisable to enter into diplomatic negotiations with Bulgaria to that effect. It would" have been unwise if not impossible to refuse such a suggestion. At that time Mr. Radoslavov was at the head of the Bulgarian Government, and Mr. Gnadiev, with whom we were personally acquainted, was his Foreign Minister. After a long discussion of the matter in a meeting of the Cabinet, we decided to send a delegate to Sofia to get into personal touch with leading persons and to investigate the situation. In company with Halil Bey, Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies at that time, I went to Sofia. We interviewed Messrs. Radoslavov and Gnadiev: we discussed at length with them the position of Bulgaria, and after many
close conferences we understood that the key of the situation was not in Sofia, but at Bucharest. Bulgaria, deprived of her previous gains by the second Balkan War, was ready to go against Serbia. Even the threatening attitude of Greece was not considered dangerous at Sofia. The only source of fear was Rumania. The Bulgarian leaders were afraid of a Rumanian blow, which, with the help of the Russian Army, might be a great menace in the Balkans. It was impossible to secure the help of Bulgaria without assuring her protection from the danger that threatened in the rear. We left Sofia, therefore, for Bucharest.
Bratiano was the Prime Minister of Rumania at that time. The German Embassy was occupied by von Kuhlmann, later Foreign Minister of Germany, and the Austrian Embassy by Count Tchernin, later Foreign Minister of Austria. We visited both of them and also saw Mr. Radev, Bulgarian Ambassador to Rumania. According to the program planned in our conferences with them, each of us began to pay separate visits to the King, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and different political leaders of Rumania. In the evening we met in one of the embassies, where we reported our activities and prepared the program for the next day.
After a long discussion of the matter with the Rumanian leaders, we got the impression that Rumania was in favor of strict neutrality. The Rumanian Government promised us to keep its neutrality, despite all changes that might occur in the Balkans. Radoslavov, the Prime Minister of Bulgaria, informed of the pacific intention of Rumania, asked a written agreement to that effect. When we applied to Bratiano for a written assurance he said: " Rumania promised the world to remain neutral during the present war. Serbia belongs to one of the hostile parties. To give a written promise to Bulgaria, encouraging her to war with Serbia, would mean to use our neutrality in favor of one of the combating nations. This act, therefore, would be the negation of our promise. Consequently, to sign a written agreement in favor of one of the combating parties is against our interest and our national honor. But verbally I promise you that Rumania will not change her neutral attitude, even if Bulgaria should declare war against Serbia."
This assurance, though valuable, was not strong enough to induce Bulgaria to make a decision. She wished, and insisted upon getting, a written promise. Realizing that our mission had failed, we returned to Constantinople.
I do not know how far the aim and the result of our trip to Sofia and Bucharest were known by the allied representatives, but after our return the situation went on in the same indeterminate way. The German and Austrian Ambassadors continued playing their tricks to lead us into the war, and the allied representatives endeavored to avoid breaking political relations with the Porte. The Porte, between these two opposing forces, tried to delay war as long as possible.