Reflections upon Ancient and Modern Learning/Chapter 13

CHAP. XIII.

Of the Logick and Metaphysicks of the Ancient Greeks.

SInce all that has been said in the Second and Third Chapters, concerning the Ethicks, Politicks, Eloquence and Poesie of the Ancient Grecians, belongs to them in their most flourishing Ages, a great Part of the Subject Matter of this Enquiry has already been dispatched. The remaining Parts of their Knowledge may be reduced to these Four Heads: Logick, Metaphysicks, Mathematicks and Physiology. Logick is the Art of Reasoning; but by it Men commonly understand the Art of Disputing, and making Syllogisms; of answering an Adversary's Objections dexterously, and making such others as cannot easily be evaded; In short, of making a plausible Defence, or starting probable Objections, for or against any Thing. As this is taught in the Schools, it is certainly owing to the Ancients: Aristotle's Organum is the great Text by which Modern Logicians have framed their Systems; and nothing, perhaps can be devised more subtile in that captious Art (h) Vide A. Gellii Noct. Attic. lib. i. cap. 2.(h), than the Sophisms of the Ancient Stoicks. But as Logick is truly the Art of Reasoning justly, so as not only to be able to explain our own Notions, and prove our own Assertions, clearly and distinctly; but to carry our Speculations further than other Men have carried theirs, upon the same Arguments; it has not only been much cultivated by Modern Philosophers, but as far pursued as ever it was by the Ancients: For hereby have the late Enquiries been made into Physical, Metaphysical and Mathematical Matters, the Extent whereof is hereafter to be examined. Hereby the Ancient Mathematicians made their Discoveries, and when they had done they concealed their Art; for, though we have many noble Propositions of theirs, yet we have few Hints how they found them out; since the Knowledge of the fore-going Books in Euclid's Elements is necessary to explain the Subsequent, but is of little or no Use to help us to find out any Propositions in the subsequent Books, (which are not immediate Corollaries from what went before) in case those Books had been lost. Whether the Moderns have been deficient in this noble Part of Logick, may be seen by those who will compare Des Cartes's Discourse of Method, Mr. Lock's Essay of Humane Understanding, and Tschirnhaus's Medicina Mentis, with what we have of the Ancients concerning the Art of Thinking: Where, though it may be pretended that their Thoughts and Discoveries are not entirely new in themselves, yet to us, at least, they are so, since they are not immediately owing to ancient Assistances, but to their own Strength of Thought, and Force of Genius. And since this Art is, indeed, the Foundation of all Knowledge, I ought to take notice, that my Lord Bacon and Des Cartes were the two Great Men, who both found Fault with the Logick of the Schools, as insufficient of it self for the great Design of Logick, which is the Advancement of real Learning; and got Authority enough to persuade the World, in a very great Degree, that other Methods must be taken, besides making Syllogisms; and ranking the Sorts of Things under Predicaments and Predicables, by those who would go much farther than their Predecessors went before them. The true Use of the common Logick, being rather to explain what we know already, and to detect the Fallacies of our Adversaries, than to find that out, of which we before were ignorant. So that the Moderns have enlarged its Bottom; and by adding that Desideratum which the Ancients either did not perfectly know, or, which is worse, did invidiously conceal, namely, the Method of discovering unknown Truths, as Monsieur Tschirnhaus calls it, have, if not made it perfect, yet put it into such a Posture, as that future Industry may very happily compleat it.

Metaphysicks is properly that Science which teaches us those Things that are out of the Sphere of Matter and Motion, and is conversant about God, and Spirits, and Incorporeal Substances. Of these Things Plato and his Disciples wrote a great deal: They plainly saw, that something beyond Matter was requisite to create and preserve the August Frame of the World. If we abstract from Revelation, the Cartesians discourse more intelligibly concerning them, than any of the Ancients. So that though very many of their particular Notions, as also of F. Mallebranche's, M. Poyret's, and other Modern Metaphysicians, are justly liable to Exception, yet the main Foundations upon which they reason, are, for the most part, real; and so, by Consequence, the Superstructures are not entirely fantastical: And therefore they afford a vast Number of Hints to those who love to apply their Thoughts that Way, which are useful to enlarge Men's Understandings, and to guide their Manners. This, which is strictly true of the Modern Metaphysicks, is as much as can be said of the Ancient: And because a Comparison cannot be made without reading their several Writings, the surest Way to try the Truth of this Proposition will be to read Plato and his Commentators; and along with them, Des Cartes's Meditations, Velthuysius de Initiis primæ Philosophiæ, Mallebranche's Recherche de la Verité, Poyret's Cogitationes de Deo, and Mr. Lock's Essay of Humane Understanding, already mentioned. This may be done without undervaluing what the Ancients wrote upon these noble Subjects: And the Question is not, Whether they were great Men? But, Whether the Moderns have said any Thing upon these Matters, without Copying out of other Men's Writings? Which, unless we will do them Wrong, we are bound to say they have.