Report of the Executive Committee of the Communist International/The Concluding Address of Comrade Zinoviev
CONCLUDING ADDRESS OF COMRADE ZINOVIEV
Delivered at the Ninth Session of the Congress,
June 29th, 1921.
Not being quite well, I will be very brief and confine myself to a few remarks. I can do so the more easily since the discussion, although very extensive, has offered very little criticism of the activity of the Executive, in so far as I could see. You should have criticised us more than you did. But, as you have not done so, I can afford to be very brief. I have nothing to add on the Italian question after the speeches of comrades Gennari, Rakosi, Lenin, Rakovsky, Trotsky and others. I am fully in accord with them. I note with satisfaction that Comrade Zetkin is now willing to support the attitude of the Executive in the Italian question. With regard to this question I should like to draw the attention of Comrade Zetkin to the following quotation that appeared in the June issue (No. 3, p. 84) of the "Soviet," published by Paul Levi, with the collaboration of a number of comrades: "The results of the election signify the defeat of the Italian Communist Party and the overwhelming victory of the Italian Socialist Party:—121 mandates for the Italian Socialist Party, 16 mandates for the Communists. Such defeat cannot be described otherwise than as a catastrophy. And this is not only the defeat of the Italian Communist Party but also of the Executive of the Third International and the V.K.P.D. as well."
As you see, there are altogether too many defeats in this little quotation, and yet—(Interjection—"The article is by Kurt Geyer!"). Yes, by Kurt Geyer, who claims to be in the Communist International, who left the Central Committee of the V.K.P.D. together with this group. I hope that Comrade Zetkin will succeed in convincing Kurt Geyer that he was wrong.
When a young Communist Party, surrounded by enemies, obtains 400,000 votes and 16 mandates, this is by no means a defeat. Still less can it be considered as a defeat for the Communist International, even as it is no defeat for the International when Scheidemann can still obtain millions of votes after the murder of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg.
Such assertions are clearly intended as a cowardly thrust in the back of the Italian Communist Party. It is also obvious that after this Congress there can be no question of tolerating things of this kind. Of course I cannot anticipate the attitude of the new Executive to such questions. I do think, however, that after the Congress has registered—unanimously, I hope—its decision concerning the Italian question, no member of the Communist International will come out with such articles. (Approval.)
Comrades, I believe that in the Italian question, more than in all other questions, the Executive has the unanimous support of the Third World Congress. This we state with satisfaction, As has been said, the Italian question has been the most important political question of the year. It has been shown that in respect to this question, the point of view of Comrade Zetkin was wrong, while that of the Executive was right. I must emphasise this because Comrade Zetkin in her speech insisted that she was justified in leaving the Central Committee because of the Italian question. You will recollect that Comrade Zetkin said that the representative of the Executive, Comrade Rakosi, had made this and that declaration about Livorno, that he had said that Livorno was an example, that other parties should follow; that she, Comrade Zetkin, was unable to reply to this statement but that she was bound to sound the alarm, which she did by quitting the Central Committee of the V.K.P.D. I think such standpoint is entirely untenable. In the first place, there are many means of sounding the alarm, without the necessity of leaving the Central Committee. Comrade Zetkin did not write a single letter to the Executive, although she was a member of the Executive. I believe she was in Moscow much later than Rakosi; she took part in all the discussions of the Executive, but never manifested any great divergence of opinion so far as principles were concerned. She knew quite well that we were not in favour of sectarianism; it was upon her urging that I went to Halle. When I came back from Halle, if I am not mistaken, Comrade Zetkin was still staying here. She was perfectly aware that the Executive favoured not sects, but mass organisations.
Even if Comrade Rakosi did really say the words ascribed to him, Comrade Zetkin is in the wrong just the same, because she left the Central Committee together with a whole group, causing thereby a serious crisis in the Party. And that is why we maintain that the Executive was right when it rebuked this step, particularly because it has since been demonstrated that we acted quite correctly in the Italian question. I do not know what Rakosi may have said, but I would like to quote a passage from Lenin's speech of yesterday: "58,000 Communist workers in so small a country as Italy are not at all negligible. They represent the first step towards the formation of a mass organisation." Now, this passage could be taken out of its context and made the basis for an assertion that Lenin is also in favour of sectarianism. On this point, Comrade Zetkin is totally wrong, and I believe she cannot help but acknowledge her mistake.
On the question of the K.A.P.D. I have the following remark to make; The comrades of the K.A.P.D. assert that it has been no easy matter for them to decide whether or not they should leave the Third International. This we quite believe, for we too have found it no easy matter to decide this question. We think that the K.A.P.D., just like any other party, should adapt itself to international discipline.
This is the only thing that matters. The comrades say: You must tolerate opposition. But they behave as if they do not want any opposition from the International. They would like to impose their views on the Third International. This can be the only meaning of the phrase—that their programme must remain "invoilable"; that means "do whatever you wish, pass any resolutions that you like, we will laugh at your decisions." Such a situation is impossible in the long run. We have shown a fair amount of patience in this matter; we would like the comrades to continue to attend the Congress, and we feel that the Party should be given at least two or three months before deciding, so that all the workers in the K.A.P.D. can consider the question. We consider it to be our absolute duty, in the name of the International, to allow the workers of the K.A.P.D. to make the decision themselves.
I must reply to Comrade Marcovich who protested pretty sharply against my report. He is of the opinion that I am wrong in thinking that certain Centrist elements are still to be found in the Yugo-Slavian Party, and he has begged us to remember the past of this Party. The glorious past of this party, and the glorious past of many martyred leaders of this party, is well known to us, and we have never doubted it.
I must explain what has lead to my point of view on the subject. I had an interview with the Yugo-Slavian delegation when it first arrived here. There were about fifteen comrades present, and after our interview it became clear that Comrade Marcovich, who appears to be the chairman of the delegation, does not share our point of view concerning the Italian and the German questions; on the contrary, he even opposes it. Comrade Marcovich said in his speech before the Congress that according to his present conviction, the March action meant a step forward. At our first interview he shared Levi's point point of view. I am very glad that Marcovich himself has taken a "step forward" in respect to this question.
If what I have just stated appears incomprehensible to certain comrades, this should be ascribed to the fact that Comrade Marcovich entertained grave doubts concerning both these important questions, the Italian as well as the German, and he made no secret of his difficulty. Undoubtedly he is quite justified in defending his own opinion, but it was also my very good right to state my fear that in this Party there are still serious misconceptions, and a great lack of clarity, concerning these decisive questions. If this is not the case, then I can only congratulate the Yugo-Slavian Party, which I have always looked upon as one of the oldest proletarian parties, and which I hope will continue to fight in the foremost ranks of the International.
I cannot refrain from saying a few words concerning one point in Comrade Zetkin's speech, namely—the question of our representatives abroad. She was of the opinion that we have not always been lucky in our choice of them, or, indeed, that we have always been unlucky. It was she who coined the expression: "irresponsible representatives."
Comrades, since the friends whom we sent abroad to the different parties have been abused and decried—designated by Levi as "Turkestaneese"; by Serati as "grey cardinals"; Turati also paid them a few compliments,—I consider it my duty to explain in the name of the Executive that, naturally, we have no infallible representatives at our disposal, just as we, poor sinners, are not quite infallible ourselves. We, as well as our representatives, have all been guilty of blunders and mistakes. But there is no ground to speak of irresponsible representatives, or to use a parliamentary expression, I mean—one ought not to do so. The comrades whom we had sent to the different countries, did all that they could for the Party: they risked all kinds of dangers, and they naturally have acted only according to their conscience as revolutionists. We did not receive a single official protest from any party or group or individual, not even from Comrade Zetkin herself. It is easy to come after the defeat and say: You have acted in an irresponsible way. It is easy to play wiseacres after the event. Naturally the Executive bears the responsibility for the representatives that it sends abroad. It is responsible for them just like the International is responsible for the Executive. We ask all parties to kindly see to it that the future Executive should have a better staff of workers at its disposal. Perhaps then the representatives in the different countries, as well as the management and the political leadership will be better than they have been up to now. But we protest against the use of such indiscriminate expressions under the existing conditions—as has been resorted to by Levi—which are really irresponsible. Under such conditions old experienced revolutionists, who may have made mistakes as we are all liable to make, but who have frequently proved themselves as willing to make sacrifices for the proletariat, must be spared such expressions.
Comrades, I have finished with my remarks. I must only once more expressly declare with regard to the incident with the French comrades that the March action must be discussed minutely in the deliberations on the question of tactics. In the German question, on which you are to express your attitude now, there were three important moments: First, Halle, the split of the U.S.P. (Ind. Soc. Party), and the amalgamation of the Communist Party. The second important moment, Levi's expulsion. The third important moment, the March action and the consequent political confusion. The third moment, the March action will in its essentials be discussed when the question on tactics is taken up. The second moment, the split and consolidation of the party, Levi's resignation and his exclusion by us, also the censure of the Zetkin group are to be put to the vote, I think that we have shown that everything was done not to render the conflicts more acute. We are of the opinion that the comrades of the German opposition should not talk so much of the past, but should rather think more of the future. In our capacity of Executive Committee we have done everything in our power to give the comrades, who had no mandate with a decisive vote, the opportunity to defend their points of view before the congress of which they have already availed themselves and are still going to do so. But we urgently beg the comrades to understand one thing, which must also be understood by the comrade of the K.A.P.D.; they must tell themselves, Levi may have been their friend, but the Communist International and the proletarian revolution ought to be greater friends for them. (Animated approval.) Therefore, comrades, we are convinced that the German Party will return home strengthened after this Congress, that it will shake off the people who have violated its discipline, who have attacked it from behind, as Levi has done, and that we shall all learn by the mistakes of the struggle in Germany, in which probably the first issues of the revolution are to be solved. We hope that we will have a single revolutionary party in Germany, which. will march shoulder to shoulder with the Communist International, and which will accept all that will be decided here as a law to be obeyed. (Animated approval and applause.)
