Report of the Executive Committee of the Communist International/The French Question
THE FRENCH QUESTION.
Zinoviev's Speech at the Session of the Executive Committee on June 17th, 1921.
Comrades, I would like to fully explain to the members of the Executive our attitude towards the French Party.
As a matter of fact, the old Executive in its last composition had come to accept this Party, and this decision was made known through a series of notices.
As you know, Serati complained against me and against the Executive, asserting that we, in his opinion, had made exceedingly great concessions to the French Party. As regards the attitude of the Italian Socialist Party, we have a whole collection of documents and resolutions at our disposal. This collection sets out all the alleged reasons why, as a representative of the Executive, I treated the French Party differently from the Italian; why I had signed a special covenant with the French comrades, so to speak. Serati had written a great number of articles wherein he demanded the same treatment for the Italian Party as was given to the French Party.
I deem it my duty to explain here the attitude which we have maintained towards the French comrades, and for what special reasons.
It is true that we had the intention of acting more cautiously and in a more conciliatory manner with regard to the French Party than towards the Italian Party, which had already joined us, for the simple reason that we thought the situation in the French Party different from that of the Italian Party. At the time when Cachin and Frossard were at Moscow, we had in France a Party that had not yet experienced its first split. The French Scheidemanns—Thomas and Renaudels—were still active. We had to take into consideration that the Communist Group within the French Party was relatively weak and its leaders, without an exception, were all in jail. For this reason we considered that a much milder attitude must be taken towards the French Party as compared with the Italian Party, which was affiliated to the Third International, which had officially participated in the Second Congress, and assumed obligations which it unfortunately fails to fulfil.
The agreement with Renaudel contained one point, namely, that in case Longuet accepts the conditions laid down by the Second Congress, we would recommend to the next Congress to make an exception for Longuet. This was the concession asked from us by Renaudel on behalf of Loriot, to which we agreed. And we have never regretted it. When Longuet delivered his famous speech in Halle, it was clear that Longuet could not agree to the 21 conditions.
The French comrades insisted, however, that it be shown documentarily to the French workers that we were ready to make an exception for Longuet. I believe that in doing so we have acted quite properly, and Serati is altogether wrong when he asserts that he also would have been able to remain in the Party if given a similar right. Anyhow, Longuet did not accept these conditions, and the Party gave him up.
Even after Longuet's declaration that he would not accept the conditions, Frossard implored Longuet not to leave the Party. Those comrades who attended the Congress at Tours will readily recollect that the Executive at the very last moment addressed a telegram to the Congress, taking a very sharp attitude towards Longuet, branding him as a reformist, also as an agent of capitalism, and demanding his expulsion. Frossard tried to explain away this telegram of the Executive regarding Longuet. He said: Well, those Russians are somewhat hasty in using words; it must not be taken so seriously. The telegram was written in a rather sharp language; but Longuet left the party not on account of it. I do not know whether this telegram actually did play a decisive part or not, but it certainly was a contributing factor. Frossard was wrong, of course, in persisting in the attempt to retain Longuet within the Party. After the decisions at Tours, the question arose as to what should be our attitude to the French Party. We were quite aware that the Party was not yet a Communist party, not quite a Communist party.
There have remained in the Party individual elements which are even now either Centrist or semi-Centrist, who assert these traditions everywhere in party, press and parliament. Yet we still remained of the opinion that we must treat this party differently from the Italian, which had already been affiliated to the Communist International for two years. We had a sort of tacit understanding with the French comrades of the Communist group in the French Party to allow a few months for the purpose of re-grouping and organising work. We did not bring the least pressure to bear upon the Party.
Loriot quoted an article yesterday wherein I am supposed to have said that the French Party had in general acted rightly. This I confirm. It refers to a telegram sent by the Executive to the French Party at its last administrative congress. In this telegram the Executive declares that we still greet the Party and will discuss at the Congress with representatives of the Party, where the question of the changes in the policy of the French Party is concerned.
We must be clear in our judgment of the Party, and we must talk over its organisation. This we have done yesterday and to-day in our debates on this platform. I believe the Executive acted rightly in maintaining during half & year the greatest foresight and toleration towards the French Party. This however should by no means be taken as a reason for preventing us from saying now what we think proper to say. I am of the opinion that just for the French Party, the so-called "Leftist foibles" are now not quite so dangerous. On considering the present situation in the French Party as a whole, everybody is bound to admit that the danger to the Party is not so much from the Left side, but rather more from the side of the opportunist elements. (Approval.)
The movement among the young people in France is weak. If it commits follies, they must be pointed out. Even if the Party, as a whole, is opportunist, the young people as the vanguard need not be opportunist too. The attitude of the young people can be very useful to the Party from a sanitary standpoint.
I believe that just in the French Party the old traditions brought in by some parliamentary deputies are very dangerous, and must be combatted at all costs. Yesterday and also to-day it was pointed out here that the "Humanité" it not quite a Communist paper. Comrade Kun was already rebuked here to-day, and I do not wish to add in any way to the unpleasantness of his existence. Already his assertion that "Humanité" is worse than the "Freiheit," does not correspond to the reality: The "Freiheit" is a directly counter-revolutionary paper, while the "Humanité" is at most not quite a Communist paper. The "Humanité" is developing forward, the "Freiheit" backwards. Frossard goes forward, slowly, hesitatingly, retreating now and then. The "Humanité" is honestly for Russia; "Freiheit" conducts a disguise…
FROELICH—An open one.
ZINOVIEV—… and dirty propaganda against the only proletarian State. It is doing black-leg work. Yet we must insist on the "Humanité" becoming really revolutionary paper, developing upon revolutionary lines. Comrade Trotsky in his speech yesterday gave a striking illustration. There are a score of such questions which the "Humanité" has left out of consideration. By the way, this is being admitted by French comrades themselves, in official reports as well as in private conversation. Loriot to-day gratefully said: "We are well aware that our paper, that our faction, is opportunist. We know that we are still doing many things badly." The Executive believes that the right moment has come now for the Executive to act firmly and say frankly what we expect from the French Party.
Comrade Lenin was right in stating that the French Trade Unions are in good condition, that a decided step forward can be seen in the Trade-Union movement. But when he adds that this is due to the work of the French Party, I must say that Lenin did not study the question well. Even the French comrades make ho such claim. Loriot himself has said that the Party does no good work within the unions, pursuing there a rather hazy sort of policy. Should the Syndicalists obtain a majority at the next Congress, they would not know what use to make of their majority, nor would the Party be any wiser in this respect. Yet, we see a decided forward movement in the unions, in spite of the hesitation and haziness of the Party upon this question. (Approval).
The Party has not yet taken a clear course in this question, and it is because of this that the Syndicalists have no clear course. This has also given rise to the present situation, where the Syndicalists are consciously striving to create their own political party.
Here I would like to say a few words in regard to the arguments advanced by Comrade Schwab. He said that the example of France should teach us the lesson that the decisions of the Second Congress in regard to the Trade Union Congress, did not answer the purpose. On the contrary, it is just this French example which furnishes the best proof of the soundness of our proposition to form nuclei within the Trade Unions. Had we followed the proposals of our comrades of the K.A.P.D., where would we find ourselves now? We would be even further removed from our goal than we are now, and we would have merely added water to the mills of Jouhaux. Our advice was a Communist one. In spite of the hard conditions within the Party, in spite of the unfavourable situation generally, we have a large number of the Trade Unions on our side. Relatively chaotic as the situation in France may be, there is still the hope that the Party will find the way to the Syndicalists and to the Trade Unions. It is the very example of France that shows how the Second Congress acted rightly in enjoining the Party to turn its attention to the Trade Unions.
I maintain that in spite of all the weaknesses, in spite of all the evil habits, which has been brought over from the old Party, we must have confidence in the French Party. France is the very place where during the war no confidence could be entertained in the Labour Party, and you know that also the workers were full of mistrust towards the Party.
But just because there is a Communist group present in Parliament and in the Trade Unions, we may now safely declare without exaggeration that confidence in our banner, and in our ideas, has been fully re-awakened in France. This is clear. We already have a Party of over 100,000 members. A new spirit is reigning in the French Party, although we do not close our eyes to its weaknesses and imperfections. Our greatest enemy is the opportunist tendency. Yet we must admit that we have made a big step forward, that we have regained the confidence of the workers in France.
In the French parliament there is a small and weak, but International Communist faction. The situation is yet far from favourable, but it improves day by day.
Our French comrades say themselves that they admit their mistakes. Let them, therefore, accept from the Executive the advice of the Communist International. The Executive must declare frankly and clearly, by a resolution or by a letter, what it has to say to the Party. There can, of course, be no talk of a proposal to be made by us for the expulsion of Frossard. Such a proposal cannot even be the subject of serious discussion. The development in France is moving forward, while opportunism, our enemy, is still there. We must overcome the enemy. We must tell the French workers what is at stake.
Perhaps there will be some more splits, perhaps the Party, in the course of greater struggles, will not only experience a cleavage, but also pass through a grave crisis. This is borne out by French Communists themselves. Nevertheless, we are determined to support the Party and help it remain a Party of the masses. Events in the French Party have shown that the Second Congress has adopted the right tactics upon this question. A right tactical stand against the follies of the Left, as Comrade Lenin has termed it to-day, and particularly against the opportunist crimes. The line of conduct established by the Second Congress must also be retained here at the Third Congress. (Loud applause.)
