Report of the Executive Committee of the Communist International/The Czecho-Slovakian Problem
SUPPLEMENTS.
THE CZECHO-SLOVAKIAN PROBLEM.
Zinoviev's Speech at the Session of the Executive
Committee on June 14th, 1921.
I have been alloted the task of defending the resolution drawn up by the Small Bureau with regard to the Czecho-Slovakian question, which has been submitted to the Executive Committee. First of all I desire to express our regret that Comrade Smeral is not present. At the congress of his party in Praga he threw down the gauntlet, so to speak, to the Third International. In our opinion it was his duty to appear at this congress and to defend his opinions here. We have therefore, after conferring with the Czech comrades present, decided to send a telegram to Smeral requesting him, if it is at all possible, to come to the congress at Moscow and to defend his attitude here. As yet we have no reply, but we have not given up all hope that Smeral will appear here in person.
To begin with I shall discuss the National question, a problem of great importance in the Czecho-Slovakian case. We must proceed very prudently here. First I want to remark that the "Pravo Lidu" ascribed a very silly statement to the Executive Committee, and to me in particular, to the effect that I did not even recognise the Czecho-Slovakian State. (Laughter. ) "Pravo Lidu" made this apocryphal statement. How is it possible that the Executive Committee, or one of its members, should not recognise an actual fact? We shall have no quarrel with the Czecho-Slovakian comrades, if they desire to work within their State, which is the result of the war, a result of historic development; but we should not like to assert that history has spoken the last word in all these territorial questions. Of course, we are for the national self-determination. We are convinced that all these questions will be finally settled only after Soviet Governments have been instituted everywhere. The boundaries which the Soviet Governments will determine will be the final boundaries. I trust that when Czecho-Slovakia shall have become a Soviet State, the representatives of the Czecho-Slovakian Soviet Government will co-operate with us in a war to the finish against all monarchistic and "democratic" republics. At the very first Congress of the Third International we emphatically declared that the present boundaries of all countries were only very indefinite, merely temporary boundaries which would be revised by history at a very early moment. That has been the standpoint of the Communist International from the very beginning of its existence, and I trust that the Czecho-Slovakian comrades will also recognise this fact. Our Czech comrades must always support the International standpoint on this question. The bourgeois Czecho-Slovakian State is not being ignored by us; but as Internationalists we declare that our Czecho-Slovakian comrades must settle all national questions which are acute at present, and will grow more acute in the future from the viewpoint of proletarian policies. ("Hear, hear.")
Now, as to the Party of the masses. We must undoubtedly give credit to the Czecho-Slovak comrades for the fact that they are entering the Communist International with a party membership of 350,000 This is certainly a great achievement for the Czecho-Slovak comrades. It is quite manifest that in Czecho-Slovakia we have made a big step forward, having inflicted an ignominious defeat upon the Social Democratic Party. This is a great accomplishment not to be overlooked. We are more in favour of mass parties, far more indeed than the gentlemen who, like Levi, have constantly the argument of mass party upon their lips, but who, as we can easily prove, created nothing but sects. We readily admit that the Czecho-Slovak Party is really a proletarian mass party. This is the starting point and the basis upon which we determine our policy in this question.
There are mass parties, however, which are, neither Socialist nor Communist nor revolutionary. Unfortunately such mass parties do exist. We know that in Germany there is still a highly respectable mass party controlled by the Social Democrats. We know that the Labour Party in England is an even greater mass party; we know that in Italy the working class forms a big mass party; but does it suffice? Had there been no counter-revolutionary Social Democratic mass parties, we probably might long since have had the revolution all over the world. ("Hear, hear.") We can easily imagine that there are mass parties which still uphold bourgeois and semi-bourgeois ideology. A considerable part of the masses is still susceptable to Centrist influences. We must clearly see this and take it into consideration. It has long been our wish to have this party as a mass party within the frame-work of the Communist International. We have given to Comrades Muna, Zapotocki and also to Comrade Smeral no cut-and-dried scheme of organisation. On the contrary, we warned them against forming the Communist Party in a hurry. We advised them to bide their time. But we added, once a Communist Party is formed, it must be a real Communist Party. (Applause.) But when the Czecho-Slovak comrades here declare repeatedly that we are going to experience a second Livorno, every time that we speak against Smeral, then I ask what does this mean? Does it mean that they admit the Czecho-Slovak Party to have become a Centrist organisation? (Applause.) Now then, what of Livorno?
Not wishing to anticipate the Livorno debate, I will now touch but briefly upon the Livorno incident. At Livorno we have seen a split in a mass party of 200,000 members. The majority went to the Centrists, and the minority to the Communists. The only fault on our part had been our placing too much confidence in Serati, and having failed to organise a strong opposition in the Italian Party against Serati. When they declare that if we condemn the opportunism of Smeral—the Czecho-Slovak Party will immediately break up and only a small minority will remain Communist—what does it mean? It means that they have a big mass party wherein only a minority are Communist. Were the case really so tragic, they should be entertaining no illusions. But I do hope that the case is not so tragic. We know that there exists a group within the Czecho-Slovak Party which has fully grasped these facts. For, have we not read the letter that was written from prison by Comrades Muna and Zapotocki? This letter must be very diligently studied by everyone. The letter represents a very interesting document. They say the same thing as we are saying. It is much to be regretted that they did not mention the name of Smeral. I do not know for what reason. But they see things exactly as we do. The fact that nobody dared to protest against their letter, shows that these comrades have a following in the party. It is at least the duty of the Communist International to declare its solidarity with the declarations of these comrades who are still languishing in prison. But we must go even further and speak against Smeral all that we have to say.
We do not wish to tell the comrades: "Make your revolution at once." We are not to be drawn into any such thing. Nor do we say: "You must break loose to-day, to-morrow, or within a month." But we do say that the agitation and propaganda must be revolutionary and not Centrist. As I listened to the speech of Comrade Tausik yesterday I had to say to myself: These are the words of a man of the Two-and-a-half International. He said among other things the following: "We are surrounded by economically ruined States, therefore make no revolution." Now, what does this mean? Shall we, can we, wait until Capitalism regains all its forces, and then only set out against the flourishing Capitalist States? I also overheard an interjection by Comrade Tausik who interrupted a speaker.
The speaker was pointing out that we, Czechs, should not wait for other States. Comrade Tausik exclaimed: "Then there should be a good movement also in Poland!" Now, I am of the opinion that there ought to be a good movement in Poland, and such a movement does exist there, in spite of the White terror. But Comrade Tausik says about the same thing that is being said by the Second International. The Second International says: "I am ready to strike, but my neighbour must strike at the same time." How do they expect this to happen? Perhaps in such a manner that one fine morning the leaders will meet in common counsel and exactly appoint the date upon which the revolution shall break out everywhere. This would be a splendid thing, to be sure.
But revolutions have a habit of not arriving in such a simple manner that it should be necessary only to agree at some conference, for the revolution to break out by itself. Now, the outbreak of revolution depends upon numerous factors. Indeed, according to such theories one could ask, why should backward Russia make the first start and not capitalist, enslaved America? (Vivid approval). We must do away with these theories of the Second and Two-and-a-half International. In no case would we advise any party to strike the blow right now. No such proposal could ever come from the Executive. Such an important question must naturally be weighed a thousand times before the decision is taken. But we are dealing here with questions of quite a different nature.
Must we allow leaders to get up at a Party conference and simply spit upon the International? (Approval.) We have here about a thousand delegates; let the comrades seclude themselves by groups in different rooms and read the speech of Smeral with close attention. I am convinced that every one of the comrades would come to the conclusion that the Smeral speech is a semi-Centrist one. In this speech we find the same tone, the same method, the same insincerity as in Serati's speech a year ago, And this speech was delivered at a moment when the Party had already declared its readiness to join the Third International. The Party should have protested immediately against Smeral's speech. Now we have to take determined action against it. The situation at the time was quite different.
The resolution proposed by the Czecho-Slovaks repeats two or three times that they accept the 21 points and will carry them out. Why so many repeated assurances where it would be better to proceed at last to the carrying out of these conditions.
What's the use of the willingness to carry out the 21 conditions when the leaders of the party carry on a press campaign against them? How can they claim to be carrying out the 21 conditions, when Smeral speaks against the formation of the Communist Party, when many of them speak against joining, and against the 21 conditions, when Smeral even now begins to talk of collaboration and co-operation with other Parties, finding the plausible excuse that the party is so big that we could definitely exercise a practical influence upon the present government? He who is familiar with the history of Socialism until the year 1921 knows quite well the significance of these words in the mouth of so shrewd a diplomat as Smeral. What happened during the December strike? Everyone who has come from Czecho-Slovakia will confirm the fact that if there were any that showed childish helplessness in face of the events, it were some of the leaders. The question as to whether we ought to accept the Party, we must answer: Yes. But what shall be the fate of Smeral?
We do not demand his expulsion, but we claim the right to tell the Czecho-Slovak workers exactly what we have to say, warning them against such speeches and public appearances as those of Smeral. We ought not to forget that Smeral's speech which lasted three hours, was by no means an improvisation. The Speech had beer carefully prepared beforehand, every word weighed and measured. We call upon. the Czecho-Slovak workers to continue progressing and not to slide backwards. The Czecho-Slovak comrades have told us that the bourgeois press would be jubilant over our resolution. I don't know if their jubiliation would be justified. We know that the bourgeois press will attempt to make capital out of this compelled polemic. They will again indulge in foolish talk about the dictatorship of Moscow; or of the Hungarian comrades. I know also, that there are Party members who are susceptible to this kind of insinuation and sophistry. Indeed, our internationalism does not make it incumbent upon us to worry about such foolish prattle. It should therefore in no way whatever, affect our decisions. We must speak sincerely to the Czecho-Slovak workers. We have not a word to say against Smeral personally. When he came to us last year, opening his soul to us, and declaring: "I am a Social Patriot, but I have come here,"—we put no obstacle in his way. We have received him as a brother, we have supported him in the course of a whole year, to the best of our ability. We have no reason whatever to take exception to him personally, He is no doubt a man who wants to serve, unselfishly, the proletarian class. But we must point out his political flaws.
Comrade Kreibich was right: when he stated that in our discussion (in the autumn of 1920 in Berlin) with him about Smeral, we took a stand against Smeral. Kreibich tried to dissuade us in a tone of conviction. He was still thinking at the time that it was merely a matter of paltry differences of opinion regarding Smeral's tactics. Subsequent events, however, caused Kreibich to see things in a different light.
We ask the Czecho-Slovak comrades to cast aside all national considerations in regard to this question. I know we are all human, brought up upon bourgeois ideology, susceptible to the national sentiments imbibed with mother's milk. At any rate, this is by no means a national question, nor a German and Czecho-Slovak question; it is a question of the alternative between thorough-going Communism and vacillating semi-Communism. Why does Smeral just now advance the question of reconstruction and federalisation? How can one now figure the Third International to oneself otherwise than represented by a uniform Party in every country? How can this continue to be a disputed problem within the Communist Party? We must simply establish a Bureau which would carry out the centralisation as quickly as possible without putting it off any longer.
For these reasons, comrades, we must tell the Czecho-Slovak comrades quite plainly what we think about the situation. It was by no mere coincidence that the representatives of the Bulgarian, Italian, German, Russian, and Polish Party have said the same thing. We are following this question with utmost attention. I am convinced that there will be no Livorno here. We may rest assured that the majority, when hearing what the Communist International has spoken, and not only the majority but also those who are now in friendly relations with Smeral, will say: "Smeral is our friend, but the Communist International is our greater friend." I am convinced that the great majority of the workers in Czecho-Slovakia will identify themselves with our decisions, and I hope that this will also be the attitude of the great majority of comrades in other countries. We hand our resolution to the Executive with firm assurance, with complete conviction that these resolutions will contribute much towards the development of the Czecho-Slovak Labour movement into a real Communist party, into a real militant party. (Stormy, prolonged approval and cheers.)
