Preface
My purpose in the following pages has been to analyze, so far as the fragmentary sources permit, the precise influences that urged the Roman republic toward territorial expansion. Imperialism, as we now use the word, is generally assumed to be the national expression of the individual's "will to live." If this were always true, a simple axiom would suffice to explain every story of conquest. I venture to believe, however, that such an axiom is too frequently assumed, particularly in historical works that issue from the continent, where the overcrowding of population threatens to deprive the individual of his means of subsistance unless the united nation makes for itself "a place in the sunlight." Old-world political traditions also have taught historians to accept territorial expansion as a matter of course. For hundreds of years the church, claiming universal dominion, proclaimed the doctrine of world-empire; the monarchs of the Holy Roman Empire and of France reached out for the inheritance of ancient Rome; the dynastic families, which could hold their own in a period of such doctrine only by the possession of strong armies, naturally employed those armies in wars of expansion. It is not surprising, therefore, that continental writers, at least, should assume that the desire to possess must somehow have been the mainspring of action whether in the Spanish-American war or the Punic wars of Rome.
However, the causes of territorial growth cannot in every given instance be reduced to so simple a formula. Let us imagine a people far removed from the economic pressure as well as the political traditions of modern Europe, an agricultural people, not too thickly settled and not egged on by commercial ambitions; a republic in which the citizens themselves must vote whether or not to proclaim a war and in voting affirma tively must not only impose upon themselves the requisite war tax -- a direct tribute -- but must also go from the voting booths to the recruiting station and enroll in the legions; a republic, moreover, in which the directing power is vested in a group of a few hundred nobles, suspicious of the prestige that popular heroes gain in war and fearful of a military power that might overthrow its control. In such a nation are there not enough negative cross currents to neutralize the positive charge that rises from the blind instinct to acquire? Such a nation was the Roman republic.
Obviously the student of Rome's growth must not rest content with generalizations that have come into vogue in a later day. He must treat each instance of expansion as an individual problem and attempt to estimate all the contributing factors. He must also give a just evaluation of the opposing factors, which have so often been overlooked. Livy naturally did not devote as much space to telling of the falterings and the retreats as to the glories of the onward charge, but, though less picturesque, they are equally important to history. An adequate analysis must reveal the halting places as well as the victorious advances, it must lay due emphasis upon the checks imposed by the fetial rules, the hesitation of the senate before taking the inviting step into southern Italy and Sicily, the refusal of the people to grow enthusiastic over the foreign policy of the Scipios, the "hauling down of the flag" in Illyricum, Macedonia, Africa, Syria, and Germany. It will bring to light the fact that Rome's growth is far from being comprehended in a single formula of modern invention, and it will explain the apparent paradox that Rome became mistress of the whole world while adhering with a fair degree of fidelity to a sacred rule which forbade wars of aggression.
Unfortunately a detailed study of Roman territorial expansion necessarily creates an impression that is misleading. We must in such a study deal so constantly with records of war that Rome inevitably emerges with the character of an irritable and pugnacious state. Only a full record of Rome's success in preserving amicable relations with scores of neighbors could offset this erroneous impression. One must needs bear in mind that ancient international conditions were far more intricate than modern. In the days of the early republic the Mediterranean world consisted of hundreds of independent city-states, and in the second century Rome numbered more than a hundred allies in her federation and perhaps as many more states in her circle of "friends," while on the periphery were countless semi-barbaric tribes ever ready to serve as catalytic agents of war. When one remembers that modern nations must employ all the arts of diplomacy to keep peace with their few neighbors, one is surprised not at the number of wars Rome fought but at the great number of states with which she lived in peace.
Notes have been added at the end of each chapter, partly in order to aid the reader who wishes to pursue the subject further, partly in order to indicate the basis for such new statements as I have presumed to make, partly to give some little measure of credit for excellent work that has been of service. In this last respect the notes are by no means adequate. Who could record his full debt to authorities like Mommsen and Meyer? It is the fate of great historians that their dicta are generally taken for granted in space-saving silence and are mentioned only on those rare occasions when their followers dare to differ. Nor have I always been able to jot down a grateful note when I have accepted the suggestions of other historians. The names of Abbott, Beloch, Botsford, Cardinali, Chapot, Colin, De Sanctis, Ferguson, Greenidge, Heitland, Kornemann, Kromayer, Niese, Pais, Pelham, Rostowzew, and many others would fill pages of additional notes if I could have recorded all my obligations. My gratitude is especially due my colleagues, Professor A. L. Wheeler and Dr. J. L. Ferguson, for kindly reading and amending several chapters. Finally, the book is inscribed to one without whose incisive criticism I should not venture to invite perusal of the following pages.
T. F.
BRYN MAWR, PENNSYLVANIA,
January 20, 1914.