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Royal Naval Biography/Silvester, Philip Carteret

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SIR PHILIP CARTERET SILVESTER, Bart.
(Late Carteret.)
A Companion of the Most Honorable Military Order of the Bath.
[Post-Captain of 1806.]

Son of the late Rear-Admiral Philip Carteret, the circum-navigator, by Mary Rachael, sister of the late Sir John Silvester, Bart. Recorder of the city of London.

The first ship in which this officer went to sea was the Lion 64, commanded by Sir Erasmus Gower, who had served as his father’s first Lieutenant in the Swallow sloop, during a voyage of discovery round the globe, which commenced in 1766, and was not concluded till Mar. 1769[1].

After accompanying Sir Erasmus Gower to and from China[2], Mr. Philip Carteret removed with that officer into the Triumph 74, which ship formed part of the squadron under Vice-Admiral Cornwallis, off Belleisle, on the memorable 16th June, 1795. In the running fight which then took place, the subject of this memoir received a slight wound; but his name did not appear in the list of casualties, as Sir Erasmus Gower made no report of the Triumph’s loss or damages[3].

Shortly after this event, Mr. Carteret was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant, in the Imperieuse frigate, commanded by Lord Augustus Fitz Roy; and we subsequently find him serving as such on board the Greyhound 32, Britannia a first rate, and Cambrian of 40 guns, under the respective commands of Captains James Young, Israel Pellew, Richard Lee, the Hon. Arthur K. Legge, and George H. Towry. His commission as a Commander bears date April 29, 1802; at which period he was appointed to the Bonne Citoyenne sloop of war, on the Mediterranean station.

The Bonne Citoyenne being paid off in 1803, Captain Carteret remained on half pay till the spring of 1804, when he received an appointment to the Scorpion brig of 18 guns, employed in the North Sea, where he captured, April 11, 1805, l’Honneur, Dutch national schooner, of 12 guns, having on board 1000 stand of arms, a complete set of cloathing for that number of men, and a considerable quantity of warlike stores, including two 12-pounder field-pieces, 2 mortars, tents for troops, &c. Among the prisoners taken on this occasion, was M. Jean Saint-Faust, member of the Legion of Honor, a person long noted for his successful depredations on British commerce, and considered by Napoleon Buonaparte as one of the most brave, able, and enterprising officers in the French or Batavian service. He was going to Curaçoa, there to assume the command of a Dutch naval force, and from thence to attack, by a coup-de-main, some of our West India possessions. L’Honneur was also charged with important despatches, which the enemy endeavoured In vain to destroy[4].

Captain Carteret was advanced to post rank, Jan. 22, 1806; but being then absent on foreign service, a variety of circumstances, of which the following is an outline, prevented him from leaving the Scorpion until the spring of 1807.

Having received orders, when on the eve of promotion, to join Sir Alexander Cochrane at the Leeward Islands, Captain Carteret proceeded thither, and was employed by that officer on various services, in the course of which he had the good fortune to be mainly instrumental in saving a valuable fleet of merchantmen from being captured by a French squadron, under the orders of Rear-Admiral Villaumez, who had arrived at Martinique on the 20th June, 1806; and the better to conceal his real intentions, had caused a report to be industriously spread, by means of neutral traders, that he was bound to St. Domingo, for the purpose of taking on board the seamen who had escaped on shore after Sir John T. Duckworth’s action, in the month of Feb. preceding.

This report not being credited by Captain Carteret, who was carefully watching the enemy, he purchased a small vessel at St. Lucia, and sent her with a letter to the President of Nevis, at which island she arrived time enough for sixty-five deeply laden West Indiamen to put to sea from St. Kitts, under the protection of Captain Kenneth M‘Kenzie, of the Carysfort frigate, who ran to leeward with his change and escaped unseen by Rear-Admiral Villaumez, who had quitted Fort Royal bay very suddenly on the 1st July, probably with a view of cutting off Captain Carteret, whose men were on the yards, bending a new suit of sails, at the moment when the French squadron was observed under weigh. The Scorpion, it should be observed, had hastened back from St. Lucia, and was at this time watching the enemy so closely, that one of them was enabled to throw a shot over her before the sails could be set and trimmed. Captain Carteret’s confidence in the zeal and activity of those under his command, and his dependance on the Scorpion’s superior sailing, however, proved well-founded, for the enemy’s second shot fell alongside, and the third astern. Having thus escaped out of range, he continued to dog the enemy, who proceeded to Montserrat, Nevis, and St. Kitts, but only succeeded in capturing seven merchant vessels which had missed the above-mentioned convoy; nine others were effectually protected by the fort on Brimstone Hill, and a battery near the beach of the latter island.

Rear-Admiral Villaumez next stood for Tortola, in hopes of capturing tHe greater part, if not the whole of the fleet there assembled, ready to proceed on its homeward bound voyage. Fortunately, however. Captain Carteret had also sent a despatch to Sir Alexander Cochrane, which induced that zealous officer to hasten towards the same place, and thereby compelled the enemy to abandon his design. By this means two-hundred and eighty sail of valuable merchantmen were rescued from the grasp of Rear-Admiral Villaumez, who afterwards steered to the northward, in the equally vain hope of intercepting the Jamaica convoy. His subsequent disasters have already been partially noticed, in our memoir of Sir William Hargood, K.C.B.[5].

Captain Carteret formed a junction with his own Admiral off the island of St. Thomas, July 6; and after witnessing the flight of M. Villaumez before an inferior British force, he was sent to Barbadoes, from whence the Scorpion accompanied Sir John Borlase Warren to the coast of America, in pursuit of the same French squadron.

It appears to have been the intention of the latter officer to send Captain Carteret back to his proper station as early as possible, he having withdrawn him from thence without consulting Sir Alexander Cochrane, in consequence of there being only one frigate, and not a single sloop or smaller vessel attached to his own squadron. Circumstances , however, rendered it necessary for him to detain the Scorpion, and Captain Carteret was thus kept in ignorance of his promotion, whilst at the same time his appointed successor, having arrived in the West Indies, had the mortification to find himself without a command, or the least chance of obtaining one, at that period of active warfare.

After several months had elapsed, the Scorpion was directed to escort a French prize-brig to England; and on her arrival Captain Carteret was placed under the orders of Admiral Young (who then commanded at Plymouth), it being determined that he should remain in that sloop until superseded by the officer originally nominated to succeed him. By this arrangement, he was afforded an opportunity of capturing a formidable French privateer named le Bougainville, of 18 guns and 93 men, after a long chase, and a running fight of 45 minutes, off Scilly, Feb. 16, 1807. The enemy on this occasion had several men killed; the Scorpion not a man hurt. Captain Carteret had previously assisted at the capture of la Favorite, French cutter privateer, of 14 guns and 70 men[6].

In July 1809, the subject of this memoir embarked as a volunteer on board the Superb 74, bearing the flag of Sir R. G. Keats, and forming part of the grand armament destined to act against the enemy’s forces in the Scheldt. During the whole of that campaign he commanded a flotilla of gun-boats, and his conduct on every occasion was highly spoken of by the naval commander-in-chief, from whose public despatches, reporting the surrender of Camvere and Flushing[7] we make the following extracts:

Aug. 4, 1809.– The fire of the gun-boats was exceedingly well-directed, and did much damage to the (former) town. The officers and men engaged in that service had a great claim to my admiration. Three of our gun-boats were sunk.”

Aug. 17.– I cannot conclude this letter without assuring their Lordships that every captain, officer, seaman, and marine, have most zealously done their duty; nor will it, I hope, be thought taking away from the merits of others, in drawing their Lordships’ particular notice to the energetic exertions of the captains, officers, and men employed in the gun-boats: they have been constantly under fire, and gone through all the hardships of their situation with the utmost cheerfulness.”

The hardships alluded to by Sir Richard J. Strachan, are more fully noticed by a surgeon belonging to one of the bomb-vessels, in whose diary we find the following passages:

Aug. 2,– At half-past 11, in consequence of being sent for, I went on hoard the Harpy brig. A poor man belonging to one of the gun-boats, had been shot through both arms, and was brought for assistance to the Harpy. Before my arrival, Mr. Parsons, Surgeon of the Harpy, and Mr. Mortimer, Assistant-Surgeon of the Charger gun-brig, had amputated the right arm, and the tourniquet was already fixed on the other. Both arms had been shockingly fractured and lacerated. The man expired in five or six minutes after my arrival. He had been wounded an hour and a half before getting on board of the Harpy; his death, as it appeared to myself, Mr. Mortimer, Mr. Parsons, and the Assistant-Surgeon of the Safeguard, was imputable to the loss of blood he had sustained, and the shock the nervous system had received.”

Aug. 4.– A gun-boat. No. 47, has been upset by a squall just under the fort (Rammekens), and three poor fellows unfortunately drowned: two of them were below at the time coiling away the cable. The life of the other, who was swept away by the current, might easily have been saved, had they had a row-boat of any description, which, however, none of these gun-boats are allowed; the bad consequences of which has already been repeatedly experienced by them * * * * * *. They appear to be little attended to; the service in them is peculiarly severe; officers and men are almost equally destitute of comfort and accommodation: their victualling is neglected, and the risk they run extreme. It was but the other night that a sailor was wounded in one of them, and died without being seen by a medical man. Another, who was suddenly taken ill, probably with a spasm in his stomach occasioned by exposure to all manner of hardships, died before there was an opportunity of applying to any ship for assistance. The immediate employment of one or two doses of a powerfully diffusable stimulus, in all likelihood would have saved the man’s life * * * * * *. It is an apparent mismanagement, which, however, I fancy, is inseparable from the nature of this service.”

Speaking of the arrangements made for completing the evacuation of Walcheren, and covering the retreat of our land forces from that pestilential island, Sir Richard J. Strachan, in a letter to the Admiralty, dated Dec. 20, 1809, says:–

“Their Lordships have already been apprised of the excellent arrangements of Commodore Owen, for the naval defence of the Slough and Terveere; nevertheless, the enemy has made several attempts to molest our flotilla in that navigation, but in all of which he has been foiled; the gallantry of the commanders, officers, and seamen, under Captain Carteret, under all the difficulties to which they have been exposed, have been conspicuous, and as I expressed in my memorandum on that occasion, ‘all have supported the character of British seamen!’ * * * *. I enclose for their Lordships’ information the commanders’ communications connected with this important service, together with Captain Carteret’s reports, and my memorandum, thanking the officers and men for their distinguished behaviour.”

Commodore (now Sir Edward W. C. R.) Owen, in a letter to the commander-in-chief, detailing the operations which had taken place under his immediate directions, expresses himself as follows:

“The merits of Captain Carteret in the general command of this part of our force, I have, in some particular instances, had occasion to report to you; in every instance I have known, his conduct has been good alike.”

Captain Carteret was appointed to the Naiad of 46 guns, about July 1811. On the 20th Sept. following, while lying at anchor off Boulogne, he observed much bustle among the enemy’s flotilla, then moored along shore, under the protection of their powerful land batteries. At about noon, Napoleon Buonaparte, who had recently left Paris on a tour of inspection, was distinctly seen to proceed along the line to the centre praam, which immediately hoisted the imperial standard at the main, and lowered it at his departure, substituting for it the flag of Rear-Admiral Baste; he afterwards visited others, and then went by sea to inspect the harbours of Vimereux and Ambleteuse, the Prince of Neufchatel, and the Minister of Marine, accompanying him in his barge.

It being the well-known custom of that personage to adopt measures likely to confer eclat on his presence, Captain Carteret concluded that something of that kind was about to take place; and at 1 P.M. he saw the centre praam and six others weigh and stand towards the Naiad. As the wind was S.W. with a very strong flood-tide setting to the N.E. while the enemy bore nearly south from the British frigate, it was clear that by weighing she would only increase her distance from them; so that the only chance of closing with them at all was by remaining at an anchor. The Naiad, therefore, quietly awaited Mons. Baste’s attack in that position, with springs on her cable.

The leading praam soon arrived within gun-shot, “successively discharged her broadsides,” and then stood away; her followers did the same, and in this manner they manoeuvred until joined by ten brigs and a sloop (each of the former mounting 4 long 24-pounders); from which period the Naiad was occasionally cannonaded by the enemy’s whole detachment for upwards of two hours.

At slack water. Captain Carteret weighed and stood off, partly to repair some trivial damages, but chiefly, by getting to windward, to be better able to close with the French Rear-Admiral, and get between some of his vessels and the land. After standing off a short time, the Naiad tacked and made all sail towards them; but at about sun-set it became calm, when the enemy anchored under the batteries eastward of Boulogne, and Captain Carteret brought up nearly in his former position. In this affair not a British subject was hurt, and the damages sustained by the frigate were of little or no consequence. The result of the next day’s proceedings will be seen by Captain Carteret’s official letter to his Commander-in-chief, Rear-Admiral (now Sir Thomas) Foley:

H.M.S. Naiad, off Boulogne, Sept. 21, 1811.

“Sir,– This morning, at 7 o’clock, that part of the enemy’s flotilla which was anchored to the eastward of Boulogne, consisting of seven praams and fifteen smaller vessels[8], weighed and stood out on the larboard tack, the wind being S.W. apparently to renew the same kind of distant cannonade which took place yesterday. Different, however, from yesterday, there was now a weather-tide. The Naiad, therefore, weighed, and getting well to windward, joined H.M. brigs Rinaldo, Redpole, and Castilian (commanded by Captains James Anderson, Colin Mac Donald, and David Braimer), with the Viper cutter (Lieutenant Edward Augustus D’Arcy) who had all zealously turned to windward in the course of the night, to support the Naiad in the expected conflict. We all lay to on the larboard tack, gradually drawing offshore in the hope of imperceptibly inducing the enemy also to withdraw further from the protection of his formidable batteries.

“To make known the senior officer’s intentions, no other signals were deemed necessary, but ‘to prepare to attack the enemies van,’ then standing out, led by Rear-Admiral Baste, and not to fire until quite close to the enemy.’ Accordingly, the moment the French Admiral tacked in shore,having reached his utmost distance, and was giving us his broadsides, the King’s small squadron bore up together with the utmost rapidity, and stood towards the enemy under all the sail each could conveniently carry, receiving a shower of shot and shells from the flotilla and land batteries, without returning any until within pistol-shot, when the firing on both sides of H.M. cruisers threw the enemy into inextricable confusion. The French Admiral’s praam was the principal object of attack by this ship; but, as that officer in leading had of course tacked first, and thereby acquired fresh way, and was now under much sail, pushing with great celerity for the batteries, it became impossible to reach him without too greatly hazarding H.M. ship. Having, however, succeeded in separating a praam from him, which had handsomely attempted to succour her chief, and which I had intended to consign to the particular care of Captains Anderson and Mac Donald, while the Castilian attacked others, it now appeared best to employ this ship in effectually securing her.

“The Naiad accordingly ran her on board; Mr. Grant, the master, lashed her alongside; the small-arms men soon cleared her deck, and the boarders, sword in hand, soon completed her subjugation. Nevertheless, in justice to our brave enemy, it must be observed, that his resistance was most obstinate and gallant, nor did it cease until fairly overpowered by the overwhelming force we so promptly applied. She is named la Ville de Lyons, was commanded by a Mons. Barbaud, who is severely wounded; and she had on board a Mons. la Coupe, who, as commodore of a division, was entitled to a broad pendant[9]. Like the other praams, she has 12 long (French) 24-pounders, but she had only 112 men, 60 of whom were soldiers of the 72d regiment of the line; between 30 and 40 have been killed and wounded.

Meanwhile, the three brigs completed the defeat of the enemy’s flotilla, but I lament to say, that the immediate proximity of the formidable batteries, whereunto we had now so nearly approached, prevented the capture or destruction of more of their ships or vessels. But no blame can attach to any one on this account; for. all the commanders, officers, and crews, did bravely and skilfully perform their duty. If I may be permitted to mention those who served more immediately under my own eye, I must eagerly and fully testify lo the merits of, and zealous support I received from Mr. (John Potenger) Greenlaw, first Lieutenant of this ship, as well as from all the excellent officers of every description, brave seamen and marines, whom I have the pride and pleasure of commanding. I have the honor herewith to inclose reports of our loss, which I rejoice to find so comparatively trivial, and that Lieutenant Charles Cobb, of the Castilian, is the only officer who has fallen[10], &c.

(Signed)P. Carteret.”

Thus terminated the French naval review at Boulogne; and on the following day Napoleon Buonaparte proceeded along the coast to Ostend, on his way to Cadsand, Flushing, and Antwerp[11].

On the 6th of the following month, Captain Carteret captured le Milan, French lugger privateer, pierced for 16 guns, with a complement of 50 men; and shortly afterwards le Requin, a vessel of the same description, with 58 men. In April, 1812, he had a very narrow escape, his gig having upset off Cowes, to which place he was conveyed in an apparently lifeless state. By this accident 3 of his boat’s crew were unfortunately drowned. Towards the close of 1812, he was appointed to the Pomone of 46 guns, then on the North Sea station, but subsequently employed as a cruiser in the Channel.

The following is a narrative of all the circumstances connected with a court-martial which sat on board the Salvador del Mundo, at Plymouth, Dec. 31, 1813, to investigate the conduct of Captain Carteret, for not having brought an enemy’s frigate to action, on the 21st Oct. preceding; and which court-martial was ordered to assemble by the Board of Admiralty, at Captain Carteret’s own urgent request:–

The Pomone had encountered a heavy gale of wind in the Bay of Biscay, whereby she lost her fore-yard, and her main-yard was badly sprung in two places. While repairing these damages, early on the morning of Oct. 21, 1813, she fell in with a ship under jury-masts, which soon proved to he a French frigate. Immediate preparations were made to attack her; and Captain Carteret was about to do so, when another ship hove in sight (which every body on board considered to be a frigate), with a brig under French colours, both steering the same way with that first seen. Soon afterwards, three other ships were seen astern of these last, and nobody now doubted that it was a French squadron. The utmost caution, therefore was necessary, especially in the Pomone’s nearly disabled state; but Captain Carteret, thinking that he might still keep company with them until he could obtain a reinforcement, resolved to get well to windward of them, so as to reconnoitre them accurately, and yet not hazard the safety of his ship: the disabled frigate was not quite a secondary object. The weather being remarkably hazy and deceptive, rendered all objects so very indistinct, that many hours were lost in reconnoitring. When the weather cleared away in the afternoon, it was discovered that all the ships were merchantmen, excepting the disabled French frigate, and the ship which every body had considered to be a frigate also, and which they still deemed to be such. The brig under French colours, on seeing the Pomone wear the first time to stand towards them, ran away down to the disabled frigate, as if with some message from one to the other. As the weather ultimately became quite clear, and as only the supposed frigate was to be seen. Captain Carteret bore up to attack her; but, alas! she proved, on near approach, to be nothing more than a large Portuguese East Indiaman, which had been taken by the enemy, and recaptured by some British cruisers. Grieved and mortified, at having thus let the disabled Frenchman slip through his fingers, Captain Carteret made all sail after her, but in vain; for on the fourth day of his pursuit or search, he fell in with a British man of war, and received information that the said crippled ship was la Trave of 46 guns, and that she had been captured on the 23d, without making any resistance, by the Andromache; which occurrence we have already noticed in our memoir of Captain Tobin, C.B.[12].

On his arrival at Lisbon, Captain Carteret gave a detailed report of all these circumstances to the Admiral commanding there, who was thoroughly satisfied therewith; but wishing the Board of Admiralty to be so too, Captain Carteret requested him to transmit it home. Some days afterwards, a letter, addressed to the Admiral at Lisbon, was picked up on the Pomone’s deck, which her commander immediately took to him. He read it, and gave it back to the gallant officer. Finding it to be an anonymous letter, subscribed “Pomone’s Ship’s Company,” asserting that he had “run from a French frigate,” Captain Carteret at once asked for a court–martial. That, however, could not well be granted then, because all the Captains there were his juniors; besides which the Pomone was under orders to go home, so that much time would not elapse before the desired investigation could take place. Captain Carteret, hereupon avowed his determination to have one, if possible, and implored the Admiral to forward the anonymous accusation, and his application for a court-martial, by the first packet, in order that not a moment might be lost. On arriving at Plymouth, he renewed his application to the Admiralty, and soon found that their Lordships had anticipated his anxious wishes. On the 29th Dec., Captain Carteret addressed his people; told them of the pending trial; that he had demanded it himself in consequence of the anonymous letter, which none of them would own; and that he required them all to come forward fairly and openly, to say the truth before the Court. He, at the same time, promised to guarantee them from all harm on account of their evidence, if true; and, not to be mistaken by them, he wrote an order to the above effect, and stuck it up in a conspicuous place, that all or any might come forward and subscribe their names as witnesses against him. Finding that not a man would show himself ready to become his accuser, Captain Carteret was compelled to order all those whom be suspected to be most averse to him to be summoned, as well as an entire quarter of the ship’s company taken by lot. On the 3lst, the court-martial assembled, and Captain Carteret was arraigned as the prisoner before it. Rear-Admirals T. Byam Martin was president; Rear-Admirals Pulteney Malcolm and Charles V. Penrose were also among his judges. The examinations of the Pomone’s officers and men were as strict as possible; but not one word was said in any the remotest degree affecting the conduct of the ship when in presence of the enemy. Captain Carteret declined making any defence, and the Court fully acquitted him of all blame,” in not bringing the enemy’s frigate to action.

We shall only repeat the just observation of the Editor of the Naval Chronicle, that “this diabolical attempt to blast his reputation, could not have happened to a man whose tried and established character was better able to stand. His services, especially when commanding the gun-boat flotilla in the Scheldt, and when defeating Buonaparte’s designs at Boulogne, sufficiently prove his merits.”

On the 4th Mar. 1814, Captain Carteret, then in company with the Cygnus frigate, captured the Bunker’s Hill, American privateer (formerly H.M. brig Linnet) of 14 guns and 86 men. He was nominated a C.B. June 4, 1815; and about the same period appointed to la Desirée, from which frigate he removed, with his officers and crew, into the Active of 46 guns, on the 26th Oct. following. The latter ship was employed for some time on the Jamaica station, from whence she returned to England in 1817; since which period he has not been employed.

In Jan. 1822, Captain Carteret obtained the royal permission to assume the name of Silvester, in addition to his own patronymic; and he succeeded to the title now enjoyed by him, Mar. 30, in the same year, agreeably to his deceased uncle’s patent of baronetage[13].

Agent.– Messrs. Cooke, Halford, and Son.



  1. In the month of Aug. 1766, the Dolphin, a 20-gun ship, was fitted out to proceed on a voyage of discoveries, under the command of Captain Samuel Wallis. The Swallow 16, was ordered to accompany her until they should have cleared the straits of Magellan. On the 12th April, 1767, they entered the Pacific Ocean, and separated. The Dolphin steered to the westward, and the Swallow to the northward. Captain Wallis returned to England in May, 1768; the sufferings and diseases experienced by Captain Carteret and his crew have been related, though but imperfectly and faintly, in the account written by the late Dr. Hawkesworth. We have only room in this place to remark, that the Swallow had been nearly 20 years out of commission, and some considerable time previous to her being fitted for this voyage, she had been slightly sheathed with wood to preserve her bottom from the worms; but being nearly 30 years old, she was totally unfit for foreign service. The Dolphin, on the contrary, had been sheathed with copper, and had received every necessary repair and alteration that her former commander, the Hon. John Byron, had pointed out as wanting. Captain Carteret strongly represented the age and defects of his vessel; but the only reply he obtained from the Admiralty, was “that the equipment of the sloop was fully equal to the service she had to perform.” These are curious facts, and we record them as such, for the future naval historian. Captain Carteret obtained post rank in 1771, was made a Rear-Admiral in 1794, and died at Southampton, July 21, 1796.
  2. See Vol. II. Part II. note †. at p. 636.
  3. See id. 913.
  4. Mons. Saint-Faust commanded the four Dutch vessels mentioned in our memoir of the late Captain Alexander Campbell. See Vol. II. Part II. p. 902.
  5. See Vol. I. p. 400.
  6. Le Bougainville was named after a French circumnavigator whom Captain Carteret’s father fell in with on his return from the South Seas, in 1769, and whose artful attempt to draw the English commander into a breach of his obligation to secrecy, is very properly described by Campbell, “as unworthy of that spirit of enterprise, which led him to undertake so dangerous a navigation, which he has related with so much elegance.” See “Lives of the British Admirals,” edit. 1813, Vol. V. p. 251, et seq.
  7. See Vol. II. p. 906, et seq.
  8. Ten brigs, one sloop, and four armed luggers.
  9. Mons. la Coupe’s broad pendant was displayed both days, but it appears to have been hauled down, in order to keep it clear of the mast-head, when la Ville de Lyons put her head, for the last time, towards the French shore, and the rapid approach of the British squadron caused the enemy to neglect re-hoisting it.
  10. Total 3 killed, 16 wounded; 2 of the former, and 14 of the latter on board the Naiad.
  11. See note at p. 24.
  12. See Vol. II. Part II. p. 634.
  13. By the will of the late Sir John Silvester, who died Mar. 30, 1822, his freehold and copyholds in the county of Essex, are given to trustees for the use of Dame Harriet Silvester, relict of the said Baronet, during her life; and after her demise, to his nephew, Sir Philip Carteret Silvester, whose services we have been recording.