The Elements of the China Challenge/Endnotes

←

Endnotes

→

3404597The Elements of the China Challenge — Endnotes

Endnotes

1 For another turn to authoritative assumptions and governing ideas to explain the conduct of a great-power rival, see George Kennan, “The Long Telegram,” February 22, 1946, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm.

2 Commission on Unalienable Rights, Report of the Commission on Unalienable Rights, U.S. Department of State, August 2020, https://www.state.gov/report-of-the-commission-on-unalienable-rights/.

3 Daniel J. Tobin, “How Xi Jinping’s ‘New Era’ Should Have Ended U.S. Debate on Beijing’s Ambitions,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, May 8, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/how-xi-jinpings-new-era-should-have-ended-us-debate-beijings-ambitions.

4 On constructive engagement with China and later efforts to encourage China to become a “responsible stakeholder,” see “Clinton Defends ‘Constructive Engagement’ of China,” CNN, October 24, 1997, http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1997/10/24/clinton.china/; President William J. Clinton, “Expanding Trade, Projecting Values: Why I’ll Fight to Make China’s Trade Status Permanent,” The New Democrat, January 1, 2000, https://web.archive.org/web/20060215200454/http://www.dlc.org/ndol_ci.cfm?kaid=108&subid=127&contentid=965; Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” speech to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, New York, NY, September 21, 2005, https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm; President George W. Bush, National Security Strategy, White House, March 2006, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/; and President Barack H. Obama, National Security Strategy, White House, May 2010, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. For a thoughtful critique of this persuasion, see James Mann, The China Fantasy: Why Capitalism Will Not Bring Democracy to China (New York, NY: Penguin, 2008), esp. pp. 69-88 and 101-112.

5 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” The National Interest, No. 16 (Summer 1989), https://www.jstor.org/stable/24027184?seq=2#metadata_info_tab_contents. For a critical view, see Azar Gat, “The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 86, No. 4 (July/August 2007), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2007-07-01/return-authoritarian-great-powers.

6 Daniel J. Tobin, prepared testimony for hearing on “A ‘China Model?’ Beijing’s Promotion of Alternative Global Norms and Standards,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 13, 2020, pp. 4-6, https://www.uscc.gov/hearings/china-model-beijings-promotion-alternative-global-norms-and-standards.

7 See, for example, Paul Heer, “Understanding the Challenge from China,” Asan Forum, April 3, 2018, http://www.theasanforum.org/understanding-the-challenge-from-china/; Michael D. Swaine, “The U.S. Can’t Afford to Demonize China,” Foreign Policy, June 29, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/06/29/the-u-s-cant-afford-to-demonize-china/; M. Taylor Fravel, J. Stapleton Roy, Michael D. Swaine, Susan A. Thornton, and Ezra Vogel, “China is Not an Enemy,” opinion, Washington Post, July 3, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/making-china-a-us-enemy-is-counterproductive/2019/07/02/647d49d0-9bfa-11e9-b27f-ed2942f73d70_story.html; and Fareed Zakaria, “The New China Scare,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 99, No. 1 (January/February 2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-12-06/new-china-scare.

8 Robert D. Blackwill, Trump’s Foreign Policies are Better than They Seem, Council Special Report No. 84, Council on Foreign Relations, April 2019, https://www.cfr.org/report/trumps-foreign-policies-are-better-they-seem.

9 See, for example, James Mann, The China Fantasy: Why Capitalism Will Not Bring Democracy to China; Richard McGregor, The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers (New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 2012); Thomas J. Christensen, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power (New York, NY: Norton, 2015); Michael Pillsbury, The Hundred Year-Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Griffin, 2016); James Fallows, “China’s Great Leap Backwards,” The Atlantic, December 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/12/chinas-great-leap-backward/505817/; Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, “The China Reckoning,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 97, No. 2 (March/April 2018), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-02-13/china-reckoning; Elizabeth Economy, The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019); Larry Diamond and Orville Schell, eds., China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2019), https://www.hoover.org/research/chinas-influence-american-interests-promoting-constructive-vigilance; David Goldman, “The Chinese Challenge,” Claremont Review of Books, Spring 2020, https://claremontreviewofbooks.com/the-chinese-challenge/; Minxin Pei, “China’s Coming Upheaval,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 99, No. 3 (May/June 2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-04-03/chinas-coming-upheaval; Michael R. Auslin, Asia’s New Geopolitics: Essays on Reshaping the Indo-Pacific (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2020); and H. R. McMaster, Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World (New York, NY: HarperCollins, 2020), pp. 89-149.

11 James R. Kurth, The American Way of Empire: How America Won a World But Lost Her Way (Washington, DC: Washington Books, 2019), pp. 240-247. See also H.R. McMaster, “How China Sees the World,” The Atlantic, May 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/05/mcmaster-china-strategy/609088/.

12 Xi Jinping, “Uphold and Develop Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” speech to the CCP Central Committee, January 5, 2013, in Tanner Greer, trans., “Xi Jinping in Translation: China’s Guiding Ideology,” Palladium, May 31, 2019, https://palladiummag.com/2019/05/31/xi-jinping-in-translation-chinas-guiding-ideology/.

13 For authoritative U.S. sources on China’s human rights record, see the respective annual reports of the U.S. Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC). The U.S. Department of State’s entry on China in the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices is available at https://www.state.gov/reports-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/. Congress created the CECC in October 2000 with the statutory mandate to monitor human rights and the development of the rule of law in China, and to submit an annual report to the President and the Congress. The CECC’s annual reports are available at https://www.cecc.gov/publications/annual-reports.

14 Adrian Zenz, “New Evidence for China’s Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang,” Jamestown Foundation, May 15, 2018, https://jamestown.org/program/evidence-for-chinas-political-re-education-campaign-in-xinjiang/; Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,” The New York Times, November 16, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html; Sui-Lee Wee and Paul Mozur, “China Uses DNA to Map Faces, With Help From the West,” The New York Times, December 3, 2019 (updated December 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/03/business/china-dna-uighurs-xinjiang.html; “China Cuts Uighur Births With IUDs, Abortion, Sterilization,” Associated Press, June 29, 2020, https://apnews.com/269b3de1af34e17c1941a514f78d764c; Thomas Lum and Michael A. Weber, “Uyghurs in China,” CRS Report No. IF10281, Congressional Research Service, updated July 13, 2020, p. 1, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10281; Helen Davidson, “Thousands of Xinjiang Mosques Destroyed or Damaged, Report Finds,” The Guardian, September 25, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/25/thousands-of-xinjiang-mosques-destroyed-damaged-china-report-finds; and Mark Mittelhauser, “Goods from Xinjiang: Tarnished by Forced Labor,” U.S. Department of Labor, October 5, 2020, https://blog.dol.gov/2020/10/05/goods-from-xinjiang-tarnished-by-forced-labor.

15 Specific repressive measures include an elevated police presence within monasteries; ideological re-education of Tibetan Buddhist monks and nuns; arbitrary detention and prosecution of Tibetans; tight surveillance and censorship; and increased restrictions on the use of the Tibetan language in schools. For more, see Human Rights Watch, “Relentless: Detention and Prosecution of Tibetans Under China’s ‘Stability Maintenance’ Campaign,” May 22, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/05/22/relentless/detention-and-prosecution-tibetans-under-chinas-stability-maintenance; Chris Buckley, “A Tibetan Tried to Save His Language. China Handed Him 5 Years in Prison,” The New York Times, May 22, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/world/asia/tibetan-activist-tashi-wangchuk-sentenced.html; Thomas Lum and Michael A. Weber, “Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 116th Congress,” CRS Report No. R45956, Congressional Research Service, October 9, 2019, pp. 9-10, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45956; and U.S. Department of State, “Tibet,” in 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, March 11, 2020, https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/china/tibet/. According to recent reporting, “More than 500,000 Tibetans have been transferred to Chinese training centers since the beginning of 2020, as an existing mass labor initiative expanded in the region.” See Emily Czachor, “15 Percent of Tibet’s Population Transferred to Chinese Training Centers as Mass Labor Program Expands,” Newsweek, September 22. 2020, https://www.newsweek.com/15-percent-tibets-population-transferred-chinese-training-centers-mass-labor-program-expands-1533579.

16 Antonio Graceffo, “China’s Crackdown on Mongolian Culture,” The Diplomat, September 4, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/chinas-crackdown-on-mongolian-culture/.

17 Lily Kuo, “In China, They’re Closing Churches, Jailing Pastors – and even Rewriting Scripture,” Guardian, January 13, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/13/china-christians-religious-persecution-translation-bible; and Matthew Taylor King, “The Gospel According to Xi,” opinion, Wall Street Journal, June 4, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-gospel-according-to-xi-11591310956.

18 Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, “PRC National People’s Congress Proposal on Hong Kong National Security Legislation,” press statement, May 27, 2020, https://www.state.gov/prc-national-peoples-congress-proposal-on-hong-kong-national-security-legislation/; “On Beijing’s Imposition of National Security Legislation on Hong Kong,” June 30, 2020, https://www.state.gov/on-beijings-imposition-of-national-security-legislation-on-hong-kong/; and “On the President’s Announcement on Hong Kong,” press statement, July 15, 2020, https://www.state.gov/on-the-presidents-announcement-on-hong-kong/.

19 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: 2019, annual report to Congress, U.S. Department of Defense, May 2019, p. 83, https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/-1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf.

20 Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, “U.S. Position on Maritime Claims in the South China Sea,” press statement, July 13, 2020, https://www.state.gov/u-s-position-on-maritime-claims-in-the-south-china-sea/; and “U.S. Imposes Restrictions on Certain PRC State-Owned Enterprises and Executives for Malign Activities in the South China Sea,” press statement, August 26, 2020, https://www.state.gov/u-s-imposes-restrictions-on-certain-prc-state-owned-enterprises-and-executives-for-malign-activities-in-the-south-china-sea/.

21 Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750 (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2012), pp. 20-44.

22 Washington and Beijing have the two largest national economies, with U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) at $21 trillion in nominal terms and Chinese GDP at $14 trillion. Their annual trade in goods and services is massive – $737.1 billion in 2018 — but asymmetrical: the U.S. Trade Representative reports the United States had a $378.6 billion trade deficit with China in 2018, exporting $179.3 billion in goods and services while importing $557.9 billion. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “The People’s Republic of China: Overview,” accessed May 4, 2020, https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/china-mongolia-taiwan/peoples-republic-china.

23 Beijing uses cyberattacks, theft, and other methods to target key technological and economic sectors in various U.S. states, and transfer to China valuable data, information, and technology. For examples, see U.S. Department of Justice, “Harvard University Professor and Two Chinese Nationals Charged in Three Separate China Related Cases,” press release, January 28, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/harvard-university-professor-and-two-chinese-nationals-charged-three-separate-china-related; “Chinese Telecommunications Device Manufacturer and its U.S. Affiliate Indicted for Theft of Trade Secrets, Wire Fraud, and Obstruction of Justice,” press release, January 28, 2019, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-telecommunications-device-manufacturer-and-its-us-affiliate-indicted-theft-trade; “PRC State-Owned Company, Taiwan Company, and Three Individuals Charged with Economic Espionage,” press release, November 1, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/prc-state-owned-company-taiwan-company-and-three-individuals-charged-economic-espionage; “Court Imposes Maximum Fine on Sinovel Wind Group for Theft of Trade Secrets,” press release, July 6, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/court-imposes-maximum-fine-sinovel-wind-group-theft-trade-secrets; and “Chinese National Sentenced to Prison for Conspiracy to Steal Trade Secrets,” press release, October 5, 2016, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-national-sentenced-prison-conspiracy-steal-trade-secrets. See also Erik Larson, “Chinese Citizen Indicted in Anthem Hack of 80 Million People,” Bloomberg, May 9, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-09/chinese-national-indicted-by-u-s-grand-jury-over-anthem-hack.

24 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Findings of the Investigation Into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, March 2018, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF; and Update Concerning China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation, November 2018, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/enforcement/301Investigations/301%20Report%20Update.pdf.

25 Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, Update on The Theft of American Intellectual Property Report, National Bureau of Asian Research, February 2017, p. 2, http://www.ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_Report_Update_2017.pdf. Quoted in Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Findings of the Investigation Into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, PDF page 203, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF#page=203.

26 FBI Director Christopher Wray, “Responding Effectively to the Chinese Economic Espionage Threat,” speech to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, D.C., February 6, 2020, https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/responding-effectively-to-the-chinese-economic-espionage-threat.

27 Bob Davis and Jon Hilsenrath, “The Great Unraveling: How China Shock, Deep and Swift, Spurred the Rise of Trump,” Wall Street Journal, August 11, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-the-china-shock-deep-and-swift-spurred-the-rise-of-trump-1470929543.

28 World Steel Association, “Global Crude Steel Output Increases by 3.4% in 2019,” press release, January 27, 2020, https://www.worldsteel.org/media-centre/press-releases/2020/Global-crude-steel-output-increases-by-3.4--in-2019.html; International Aluminum Institute, “Primary Aluminum Production,” database, accessed August 2020, http://www.world-aluminium.org/statistics/#data; Harrison Wolf, “3 Reasons Why China is the Global Drones Leader,” World Economic Forum, September 19, 2018, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/09/china-drones-technology-leader/; and ResearchAndMarkets.com, “China’s Shipbuilding Industry 2018-2022: Increasing Global Investment in Oil & Gas Development,” PR Newswire, July 31, 2018, https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/chinas-shipbuilding-industry-2018-2022-increasing-global-investment-in-oil--gas-development-300689204.html. See also Rick Switzer, “U.S. National Security Implications of Microelectronics Supply Chain Concentrations in Taiwan, South Korea and the People’s Republic of China (January to July 2019),” unclassified occasional white paper, Office of Commercial and Economic Analysis, U.S. Air Force, July 2019.

29 SEMI Fab Database Report, SEMI, accessed August 28, 2020, https://www.semi.org/en/products-services/market-data/fab-forecast.

30 “‘Made in China 2025’ to Focus on Ten Key Sectors,” People’s Daily Online, May 22, 2015, http://en.people.cn/n/2015/0522/c98649-8895998.html. See also Karen M. Sutter, “‘Made in China 2025’ Industrial Policies: Issues for Congress,” CRS Report No. IF10964, Congressional Research Service, updated August 11, 2020, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10964; and Senator Marco Rubio, Made in China 2025 and the Future of American Industry, report of the Chairman’s Project on Strong Labor Markets and National Development, Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, 116^th Congress, 1^st Session, February 19, 2019, https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/0acec42a-d4a8-43bd-8608-a3482371f494/262B39A37119D9DCFE023B907F54BF03.02.12.19-final-sbc-project-mic-2025-report.pdf.

31 Gregory C. Allen, “Understanding China’s AI Strategy: Clues to Chinese Strategic Thinking on Artificial Intelligence and National Security,” Center for a New American Security (CNAS), February 2019, p. 6, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/understanding-chinas-ai-strategy. Allen notes: “China is currently making extensive use of AI in domestic surveillance applications.”

32 Arjun Kharpal, “Huawei Says It Would Never Hand Data to China’s Government. Experts Say it Wouldn’t Have a Choice,” CNBC, March 4, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/05/huawei-would-have-to-give-data-to-china-government-if-asked-experts.html.

33 FBI Director Christopher Wray, testimony in open hearing on “Worldwide Threats,” U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 115^th Congress, 2nd Session, February 13, 2018, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/hearings/open-hearing-worldwide-threats-0#.

34 Ewelina U. Ochab, “When a Tech Company Engages in Severe Human Rights Violations,” Forbes, January 6, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2020/01/06/when-a-tech-company-engages-in-severe-human-rights-violations/#788549d16943; David Alton “Huawei’s Human Rights Record Has Been Shamefully Ignored,” The Diplomat, February 7, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/huaweis-human-rights-record-has-been-shamefully-ignored/; “U.S. to Slap Huawei Employees with Travel Bans for China’s Human Rights Abuses,” Associated Press, July 15, 2020, https://www.marketwatch.com/story/us-to-slap-huawei-employees-with-travel-bans-for-chinas-human-rights-abuses-2020-07-15; Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, “U.S. Imposes Visa Restrictions on Certain Employees of Chinese Technology Companies that Abuse Human Rights,” press statement, U.S. Department, of State, July 15, 2020, https://www.state.gov/u-s-imposes-visa-restrictions-on-certain-employees-of-chinese-technology-companies-thatabuse-human-rights/; and Dr. Samantha Hoffman, “China’s Tech-Enhanced Authoritarianism,” prepared testimony for hearing on “China’s Digital Authoritarianism: Surveillance, Influence, and Political Control,” House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 116th Congress, 1st Session, May 16, 2019, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IG/IG00/20190516/109462/HHRG-116-IG00-Wstate-HoffmanS-20190516.pdf.

35 “China’s Cyber Power in a New Era,” in Tim Huxley and William Choong, eds. Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2019, (London, UK: Routledge, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2019), https://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/asiapacific-regional-security-assessment-2019/rsa19-07-chapter-5.

36 Nadège Rolland, “A Concise Guide to the Belt and Road Initiative,” National Bureau of Asian Research, April 11, 2019, https://www.nbr.org/publication/a-guide-to-the-belt-and-road-initiative/; and Elaine K. Dezenski, “Below the Belt and Road,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), May 6, 2020, p. 11, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/05/04/below-the-belt-and-road/. See also Xi Jinping, The Belt and Road Initiative (Beijing, China: Foreign Languages Press, 2019).

37 The so-called “China Hustle” is an egregious example. As the number of China-based companies listed in U.S. markets grew after the 2007-2008 financial crisis, U.S. regulators became aware of hundreds of Chinese companies systematically using irregular investment structures — including reverse mergers with failed U.S.-listed companies — to list backdoor on U.S. markets while avoiding the due diligence and other scrutiny that initial public offerings (IPOs) receive. Many U.S.-listed Chinese companies turned out to be fraudulent, exposing U.S. investors and public pension funds to many billions in losses. See NASDAQ, “33 Chinese Companies Listed on NASDAQ in 2009, More Than Any Other U.S. Exchange,” press release, January 6, 2010, http://ir.nasdaq.com/news-releases/news-release-details/33-chinese-companies-listed-nasdaq-2009-more-any-other-us and Nicole Spering, “The China Hustle Unveils the Biggest Financial Scandal You’ve Never Heard Of,” Vanity Fair, March 28, 2018, https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2018/03/china-hustle-documentary-financial-crisis-scandal-director-interview.

38 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “Chinese Companies Listed on Major U.S. Stock Exchanges,” updated February 25, 2019, https://www.uscc.gov/chinese-companies-listed-major-us-stock-exchanges.

39 Josh Rogin, “Washington Presses Wall Street to Solve its China Problem,” opinion, Washington Post, June 6, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/06/06/washington-presses-wall-street-solve-its-china-problem/; Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, “PCAOB Enters into Enforcement Cooperation Agreement with Chinese Regulators,” press release, May 24, 2013, https://pcaobus.org/News/Releases/Pages/05202013_ChinaMOU.aspx; and Jay Clayton, Wes Bricker, and William D. Duhnke III, Statement on the Vital Role of Audit Quality and Regulatory Access to Audit and Other Information Internationally – Discussion of Current Information Access Challenges with Respect to U.S.-listed Companies With Significant Operations in China, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, December 7, 2018, https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-vital-role-audit-quality-and-regulatory-access-audit-and-other.

40 Belgium invokes privacy laws. Every other country complies.

41 In a case from 2019, the Commerce Department blacklisted Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Co. (Hikvision) — a Chinese state-directed “big brother” surveillance company complicit with China’s human rights abuses against over one million Uyghurs in Xinjiang — on Commerce’s banned Entity List. See “Addition of Certain Entities to the Entity List,” 84 FR 54002, Federal Register, October 9, 2019, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/10/09/2019-22210/addition-of-certain-entities-to-the-entity-list. Yet many prominent state pension funds — such as the California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS), the New York State Teachers Retirement System (NYSTRS), the Florida Retirement System (FRS) — held active investments in Hikvision. See Svea Herbst-Bayliss and Tim McLaughlin, “U.S. pension funds took positions in blacklisted Chinese surveillance company,” Reuters, October 15, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hikvision-pensions-focus/u-s-pension-funds-took-positions-in-blacklisted-chinese-surveillance-company-idUSKBN1WU191; “Hikvision: US pension funds invest in China ‘Big Brother’ firm,” BBC News, March 29, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-47753085; and RWR Advisory Group, LLC, “Chinese ‘Bad Actor’ Enterprises in State Public Pension Systems,” January 29, 2020. U.S. investors also may be passively investing in Hikvision through exchange traded funds (ETFs) or mimicking major index providers that include Hikvision and other deeply problematic Chinese firms. Examples of major index providers, which have included, as constituents, securities for Chinese companies with links to China’s military modernization, espionage, and human rights abuses, are MSCI China All Shares Index, MSCI Emerging Markets (EM) Index, MSCI ACWI Index, MSCI ACWI ex-U.S. Index, FTSE Global Equity Index Series (GEIS). See RWR Advisory Group, LLC, “Chinese ‘Bad Actor’ Enterprises in State Public Pension Systems.” In another case, Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) and its subsidiaries are helping China’s military modernization, designing and supplying the Chinese military with advanced aircraft, unmanned aerial systems, and airborne weapon systems that threaten the U.S. military. See “Listed Subsidiaries,” website of AVIC, accessed May 11, 2020, https://www.avic.com/en/aboutus/listedsubsidiaries/index.shtml. Some state pension funds — such as the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) — have actively invested in AVIC subsidiaries, and many more state pension funds passively invest in AVIC subsidiaries through ETFs or by mimicking major index providers. See CalPERS, 2018-19 Annual Investment Report for Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2019, https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/forms-publications/annual-investment-report-2019.pdf and RWR Advisory Group, LLC, “Chinese ‘Bad Actor’ Enterprises in State Public Pension Systems.”

It is worth noting that Yu “Ben” Meng, who until recently served as chief investment officer of CALPERS, reportedly participated in the Thousand Talents Program. In October 2017, People’s Daily reported that an earlier employer — the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), a government agency regulates China’s foreign-exchange activities — hired Yu through TTP in November 2015. See Wu Chuqi, 为国家用好每一笔外汇（海归人才创新创业风采录）[“Make good use of every foreign exchange for the country (returned talent innovation and entrepreneurship style record)”], People’s Daily, October 2, 2017, http://society.people.com.cn/n1/2017/1002/c1008-29571359.html; and Nathan Su, “Chief Investment Officer of Largest US Public Pension Fund Has Deep Ties to Chinese Regime,” Epoch Times, July 8, 2019, https://www.theepochtimes.com/chief-investment-officer-of-us-largest-public-pension-fund-has-deep-ties-to-chinese-regime_2992183.html.

42 Josh Rogin, “White House Calls China’s Threats to Airlines ‘Orwellian Nonsense,’” opinion, Washington Post, May 5, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2018/05/05/white-house-calls-chinas-threats-to-airlines-orwellian-nonsense/; Adrian Wojnarowski and Bobby Marks, “Sources: NBA Set to Release Revised 2020-21 Salary and Luxury Tax Projections,” ESPN, January 30, 2020, https://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/28596920/sources-nba-set-release-revised-2020-21-salary-luxury-tax-projections; Pei Li and Adam Jourdan, “Mercedes-Benz Apologizes to Chinese for Quoting Dalai Lama,” Reuters, February 6, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mercedes-benz-china-gaffe/mercedes-benz-apologizes-to-chinese-for-quoting-dalai-lama-idUSKBN1FQ1FJ; Josh Rogin, “China Takes its Political Censorship Global: Will America Resist?” opinion, Washington Post, July 26, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/china-takes-its-political-censorship-global/2018/07/26/898d40dc-90f6-11e8-bcd5-9d911c784c38_story.html.

43 Kathy Gilsinan, “How China is Planning to Win Back the World,” The Atlantic, May 28, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/05/china-disinformation-propaganda-united-states-xi-jinping/612085/; Dan Blumenthal, “China’s Censorship, Propaganda & Disinformation,” American Enterprise Institute (AEI), July 10, 2020, https://www.aei.org/articles/chinas-censorship-propaganda-disinformation/; and Joshua Kurlantzick, “How China Ramped Up Disinformation Efforts During the Pandemic,” Council on Foreign Relations, September 10, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-china-ramped-disinformation-efforts-during-pandemic.

44 For recent high-profile examples, see U.S. Department of Justice, “University of Kansas Researcher Indicted for Fraud for Failing to Disclose Conflict of Interest with Chinese University,” press release, August 21, 2019, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/university-kansas-researcher-indicted-fraud-failing-disclose-conflict-interest-chinese; and “Harvard University Professor and Two Chinese Nationals Charged in Three Separate China Related Cases,” press release, January 28, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/harvard-university-professor-and-two-chinese-nationals-charged-three-separate-china-related.

45 Rachelle Peterson, “Outsourced to China: Confucius Institutes and Soft Power in American Higher Education,” National Association of Scholars, April 7, 2017, https://www.nas.org/reports/outsourced-to-china/full-report.

46 The CCP uses Confucius Institutes and other instruments to press U.S. universities to censor free speech and open inquiry and to conform to the Party’s political correctness. In a press release, the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations noted that its February 2019 bipartisan staff report examined “the lack of transparency in how American colleges and universities manage Confucius Institutes — which are located at more than 100 American colleges and universities and have received more than $150 million in support from the Chinese government.” The press release added, “These Confucius Institutes are controlled, funded, and mostly staffed by the Chinese government. The report also details China’s one-sided treatment of U.S. schools and key State Department programs in China and documents the lack of oversight by the Departments of State and Education of U.S. Confucius Institutes.” For more, see Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, “Senators Portman & Carper Unveil Bipartisan Report on Confucius Institutes at U.S. Universities & K-12 Classrooms,” press release, February 27, 2019, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media/senators-portman-and-carper-unveil-bipartisan-report-on-confucius-institutes-at-us-universities_k-12-classrooms; and China’s Impact on the U.S. Education System, staff report, 116^th Congress, 1^st Session, February 22, 2019, https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/PSI%20Report%20China’s%20Impact%20on%20the%20US%20Education%20System.pdf.

47 Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, “U.S. States and the China Competition.” Secretary Pompeo’s speech noted a Beijing think-tank published a report in June 2019 that assessed all 50 of America’s governors on their attitudes towards China, and, to refine its influence efforts, labeled each governor as “friendly,” “hardline,” or “ambiguous.” See 美国对华态度全景 - 州长篇 [Panoramic View of the U.S. Attitudes towards China – Governors], Minzhi International Research Institute, June 22, 2019, https://user.guancha.cn/main/content?id=132238. Minzhi’s website is at http://dcthink.cn/.

Secretary Pompeo also mentioned the PRC’s Consul General in New York, who sent a letter in January 2020, to the speaker of a state legislature urging state lawmakers not to exercise their rights to freedom of speech: “As we all know, Taiwan is part of China… avoid engaging in any official contact with Taiwan, including sending congratulatory messages to the elected, introducing bills and proclamations for the election, sending officials and representatives to attend the inauguration ceremony, and inviting officials in Taiwan to visit the United States.”

Secretary Pompeo cited a third example from August 2019, when a Chinese diplomat in the consul’s office in Houston sent a letter to then-Mississippi Governor Phil Bryant threatening to cancel a Chinese investment if he traveled to Taiwan. Nevertheless, the secretary said, Governor Bryant made the trip.

48 The U.S. Department of Defense’s annual report on China’s military power offers an authoritative and unclassified view of the PLA. For the most recent iteration, see Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: 2020.

49 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2012 White Paper, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/publications/2016-07/13/content_4768293.htm.

50 “Xi Leads China’s Military Reform, Stresses Strong Army,” Xinhua, March 15, 2014, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/kindle/2014-03/16/content_17350020.htm. Quoted in Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, “Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA,” in Phillip C. Saunders, ed., Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 2019), p. 2, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/Chairman-Xi/Chairman-Xi.pdf.

51 John Costello and Joe McReynolds, “China’s Strategic Support Force,” in Phillip C. Saunders, ed., Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms, p. 442.

52 Acting DIA Defense Intelligence Officer for East Asia Daniel K. Taylor, prepared testimony for hearing on “‘World-Class’ Military: Assessing China’s Global Military Ambitions,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 20, 2019, https://www.uscc.gov/hearings/world-class-military-assessing-chinas-global-military-ambitions.

53 Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, “Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA,” pp. 1-3.

54 Robert O. Work and Greg Grant, Beating the Americans at Their Own Game: An Offset Strategy with Chinese Characteristics, CNAS, June 6, 2019, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/beating-the-americans-at-their-own-game.

55 Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis, testimony for hearing “Department of Defense Budget posture in review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2018 and the Future Years Defense Program,” Senate Committee on Armed Services, 115th Congress, 1st Session, June 13, 2017, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/17-06-13-department-of-defense-budget-posture; and Admiral Harry B. Harris, Jr., U.S. Navy, testimony for hearing on “United States Pacific Command in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 2019 and the Future Years Defense Program,” Senate Committee on Armed Services, 115^th Congress, 2^nd Session, March 15, 2018, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/18-03-15-united-states-pacific-command.

56 Robert O. Work and Greg Grant, Beating the Americans at Their Own Game: An Offset Strategy with Chinese Characteristics, pp. 5-6.

57 These hypersonic weapons will backstop the world’s largest theater-based conventional ballistic missile force — a class of weapons that until August 2019 the U.S. was prohibited from fielding as one of two signatories to the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty.

58 Acting DIA Defense Intelligence Officer for East Asia Daniel K. Taylor, prepared testimony for hearing on “A‘World-Class’ Military: Assessing China’s Global Military Ambitions,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 20, 2019, https://www.uscc.gov/hearings/world-class-military-assessing-chinas-global-military-ambitions.

59 Johnny Wood, “The Countries With the Most Satellites in Space,” World Economic Forum, May 4, 2019, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/03/chart-of-the-day-the-countries-with-the-most-satellites-in-space/.

60 Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power, report, January 3, 2019, p. 41, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/China_Military_Power_FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf.

61 Andrea Stricker, “Proliferant States Continue to Rely on China for Nuclear-related Equipment,” FDD, July 2, 2020, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/07/02/proliferant-states-rely-on-china/; and U.S. Department of State, “Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act: Imposed Sanctions,” May 29, 2013; https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/isn/inksna/c28836.htm.

62 U.S. Department of State, “2020 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments (Compliance Report),” June 2020, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2020-Adherence-to-and-Compliance-with-Arms-Control-Nonproliferation-and-Disarmament-Agreements-and-Commitments-Compliance-Report-1.pdf.

63 U.S. Department of State, “2020 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments (Compliance Report).”

64 Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation Christopher A. Ford, “Ideological “Grievance States” and Nonproliferation: China, Russia, and Iran,” Speech to the Institute for National Security Studies’ Arms Control Conference and Experts Forum, Tel Aviv, Israel, November 11, 2019, https://www.state.gov/ideological-grievance-states-and-nonproliferation-china-russia-and-iran/.

65 Elsa B. Kania, “Chinese Military Innovation and Artificial Intelligence,” testimony for hearing on “Trade, Technology, and Military-Civil Fusion,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 7, 2019, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/June%207%20Hearing_Panel%201_Elsa%20Kania_Chinese%20Military%20Innovation%20in%20Artificial%20Intelligence.pdf; and Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation Christopher A. Ford, “Technology and Power in China’s Geopolitical Ambitions,” testimony for hearing on Trade, Technology, and Military-Civil Fusion,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 20, 2019 https://www.state.gov/technology-and-power-in-chinas-geopolitical-ambitions/.

66 Neil J. Morales, “China’s CCCC, Philippines’ Macroasia Win $10 billion Airport Project,” Reuters, December 17, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cccc-philippines/chinas-cccc-philippines-macroasia-win-10-billion-airport-project-idUSKBN1YL12E; and “China is Making Substantial Investment in Ports and Pipelines Worldwide,” The Economist, February 6, 2020, https://www.economist.com/special-report/2020/02/06/china-is-making-substantial-investment-in-ports-and-pipelines-worldwide.

67 Anne Marie Brady, “Magic Weapons: China’s Political Influence Activities under Xi Jinping,” Wilson Center, September 18, 2017, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/article/magic_weapons.pdf; Damien Cave and Jamie Tarabay, “Suddenly Chinese Threat to Australia Seems Very Real,” The New York Times, November 28, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/28/world/australia/china-spying-wang-liqiang-nick-zhao.html; and Joshua Kurlantzick, “Australia, New Zealand Face China’s Influence,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 13, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/australia-new-zealand-face-chinas-influence.

68 Michael J. Green, China’s Maritime Silk Road: Strategic and Economic Implications for the Indo-Pacific Region, CSIS, April 2, 2018, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-maritime-silk-road; Richard Ghiasy, Fei Su and Lora Saalman, The 21^st Century Maritime Silk Road, SIPRI/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, May 2017, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/the-21st-century-maritime-silk-road.pdf; and Kamran R. Chowdhury, “China Can Use Bangladesh’s Largest Seaports, PM Hasina Says,” BenarNews, November 13, 2019, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/bengali/bangladesh-china-11132019171915.html.

69 Jonathan Hillman and Measa McCalpin, “Watching Huawei’s ‘Safe Cities’,” CSIS Brief, November 4, 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/watching-huaweis-safe-cities; and Danielle Cave, Samantha Hoffman, Alex Joske, Fergus Ryan, and Elise Thomas, “Mapping China’s Tech Giants,” Report No. 15, Australia Strategic Policy Institute, April 18, 2019, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/mapping-chinas-tech-giants.

70 Derek Grossman, et al., China’s Long-Range Bomber Flights: Drivers and Implications, RR2567 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), pp. 13-15, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2500/RR2567/RAND_RR2567.pdf.

71 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: 2019, p. 83.

72 “Remote Control: Japan’s Evolving Senkaku’s Strategy,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), CSIS, July 29, 2020, https://amti.csis.org/remote-control-japans-evolving-senkakus-strategy/.

73 “Full Text of Statement of China’s Foreign Ministry on Award of South China Sea Arbitration,” China Daily, July 12, 2016, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2016scsi/2016-07/12/content_26062029.htm.

74 “Mischief Reef: Overview Images,” AMTI, CSIS, accessed August 20, 2020, https://amti.csis.org/mischief-reef/#AnalysisofOutpost-heading.

75 Jeremy Page, Carol E. Lee, and Gordon Lubold, “China’s President Pledges No Militarization in Disputed Islands,” Wall Street Journal, September 25, 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-completes-runway-on-artificial-island-in-south-china-sea-1443184818; and “Chinese Power Projection Capabilities in the South China Sea,” AMTI, CSIS, accessed May 4, 2020, https://amti.csis.org/chinese-power-projection/.

76 Derek Grossman, “Why is China Pressing Indonesia Over its Maritime Claims,” World Press Review, January 16, 2020, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/insights/28476/why-is-china-pressing-indonesia-again-over-the-natuna-islands; Ivy Kwek and Chiew Ping-Hoo, “Malaysia’s Rationale and Response to South China Sea Tensions,” AMTI, CSIS, May 29 2020, https://amti.csis.org/malaysias-rationale-and-response-to-south-china-sea-tensions/; and “Chinese Vessel Rams Vietnamese Fishing Boat in S. China Sea,” Maritime Executive, June 14, 2020, https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/report-chinese-vessel-rams-vietnamese-fishing-boat-in-s-china-sea.

77 Emma Chanlett-Avery and Mark E. Manyin, “U.S.-North Korea Relations,” CRS Report No. No. IF10246, Congressional Research Service, April 29, 2020, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10246/14.

78 Panel of Experts, “Report of the Panel of Experts [to the U.N. Security Council] Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009),” S/2020/151, March 2, 2020, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/panel_experts/reports.

79 For examples, see U.S. Department of State, “Briefing with Special Envoy Lea Gabrielle, Global Engagement Center Update on PRC Efforts to Push Disinformation and Propaganda around COVID,” press release, May 8, 2020, https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-special-envoy-lea-gabrielle-global-engagement-center-update-on-prc-efforts-to-push-disinformation-and-propaganda-around-covid/; and “Briefing on Disinformation and Propaganda Related to COVID-19,” press release, March 27, 2020, https://www.state.gov/briefing-with-special-envoy-lea-gabrielle-global-engagement-center-on-disinformation-and-propaganda-related-to-covid-19/. See also Jakub Janda, “Going Viral: Chinese and Russian Disinfo Ops Compared and Contrasted,” Center for European Policy Analysis, March 19, 2020, https://www.cepa.org/going-viral; and Edward Wong, Matthew Rosenberg and Julian E. Barnes, “Chinese Agents Helped Spread Messages That Sowed Virus Panic in U.S., Officials Say,” The New York Times, April 22, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/22/us/politics/coronavirus-china-disinformation.html.

80 As CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping said in Moscow in June 2019: “Russia is the country I have visited the most times, and President Putin is my best friend and colleague.” Quoted in Holly Ellyat, “China’s Xi calls Putin his ‘best friend’ against a backdrop of souring US relations,” CNBC, June 5, 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/05/putin-and-xi-meet-to-strengthen-ties-as-us-relations-sour.html. Russian president Vladimir Putin similarly praised the “unprecedentedly high level of trust and cooperation” between the two nations: “This is an alliance relationship in the full sense of a multifaceted strategic partnership.” See Vladimir Putin, “Valdai Discussion Club session,” Website of the President of Russia, October 3, 2019, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61719. See also Vasily Kashin, “Russia and China Take Military Partnership to New Level,” Moscow Times, October 23, 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/10/23/russia-and-china-take-military-partnership-to-new-level-a67852; and Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, “Russia-China Strategic Alliance Gets a New Boost with Missile Early Warning System,” The Diplomat, October 25, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/russia-china-strategic-alliance-gets-a-new-boost-with-missile-early-warning-system/.

81 The PRC and Russia also are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a multilateral grouping whose members now also include India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. As one NGO expert notes, SCO’s members “account for 80% of Eurasia’s landmass, 43% of the world’s population, and a quarter of global GDP. In terms of geographic coverage and population size, it is the largest regional organization in the world.” Beijing and Moscow have also sought to provide an alternative to Western-led international order through the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), though with very limited success. See Angela Stent, “Russia and China: Axis of Revisionists,” Brookings Institution, February 2020, p. 6, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/FP_202002_russia_china_stent.pdf.

82 “U.S. Dollar’s Share Collapses in Payments for Russia-China Exports,” Moscow Times, July 26, 2019, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/07/26/us-dollars-share-collapses-in-payments-for-russia-china-exports-a66587.

83 “China-Russia Trade Up 3.4% in 2019 Exceeding Record $110Bln — Chinese Customs,” Sputnik, January 14, 2020, https://sputniknews.com/world/202001141078029670-china-russia-trade-up-34-in-2019-exceeding-record-110bln--chinese-customs/.

84 Muyu Xu and Chen Aizhu, “China Oil Imports from Top Supplier Saudi Arabia Rise 47% in 2019: Customs,” Reuters, January 30, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-trade-oil/china-oil-imports-from-top-supplier-saudi-arabia-rise-47-in-2019-customs-idUSKBN1ZU0EH.

85 Olga Tanas, Anna Shiryaevskaya, and Dan Murtaugh, “How Russia-China Gas Pipeline Changes Energy Calculus,” Bloomberg, November 24, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-25/how-russia-china-gas-pipeline-changes-energy-calculus-quicktake; and Ariel Cohen, “The Strategic Upside Behind Russia’s $55 Billion ‘Power Of Siberia’ Pipeline To China,” Fortune, December 9, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2019/12/06/is-there-strength-behind-russia-and-chinas-new-power-of-siberia-pipeline/#58f405cb1faf.

86 Swee Lean Collin Koh, “China’s strategic interest in the Arctic goes beyond economics,” opinion, Defense News, May 12, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2020/05/11/chinas-strategic-interest-in-the-arctic-goes-beyond-economics/; Elizabeth Buchanan, “Russia and China in the Arctic: Assumptions and Realities,” ASPI’s The Strategist, September 25, 2020, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/russia-and-china-in-the-arctic-assumptions-and-realities/; Mary Kay Magistad, “China’s Arctic Ambitions Have Revived U.S. Interest in the Region,” PRI’s The World, October 12, 2020, https://www.pri.org/stories/2020-10-12/chinas-arctic-ambitions-have-revived-us-interest-region. See also Atle Staalesen, “China’s New Icebreaker Completes First Arctic Expedition,” Barents Observer, September 29, 2020, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2020/09/chinas-new-icebreaker-completes-first-arctic-mission.

87 “Putin Says Action Against Huawei Attempt to Push It Out of Global Market,” Xinhua, June 7, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-06/07/c_138125039.htm.

88 For examples, see Samuel Bendett and Elsa Kania, “A New Sino-Russian High-Tech Partnership,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, October 29, 2019, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/new-sino-russian-high-tech-partnership; and Dmitri Simes, “Huawei Plays Star Role in New China-Russia AI Partnership,” Nikkei Asian Review, February 4, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Asia-Insight/Huawei-plays-star-role-in-new-China-Russia-AI-partnership.

89 Philip Zelikow, et al., “The Rise of Strategic Corruption: How States Weaponize Graft,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 99, No. 4 (July/August 2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-06-09/rise-strategic-corruption.

90 Andrea Kendall-Taylor, David Shulman and Dan McCormick, “Navigating Sino-Russian Defense Cooperation,” War on the Rocks, August 4, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/08/navigating-sino-russian-defense-cooperation/.

91 Richard Weitz, Parsing Chinese-Russian Military Exercises (Carlisle, PA: Army War College, 2015), http://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/2337.pdf. Recently, China participated in Russia’s Vostok (Eastern) exercise in 2018, which included “3,500 Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) personnel, 900 pieces of heavy weaponry and 30 fixed-wing aircraft from the PLA’s Northern Theater Command.” See also Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia, Chinese Troops Kick Off Russia’s Largest Military Exercise since 1981,” The Diplomat, September 12, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/russian-chinese-troops-kick-off-russias-largest-military-exercise-since-1981/.

92 Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, “Press Statements Following Russian-Chinese Talks,” Kremlin, Jun 5, 2019, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60672.

93 Andrew Osborn and Joyce Lee, “First Russian-Chinese Air Patrol in Asia-Pacific Draws Shots from South Korea,” Reuters, July 22, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-russia-aircraft/first-russian-chinese-air-patrol-in-asia-pacific-draws-shots-from-south-korea-idUSKCN1UI072; and Mike Yeo, “Russian-Chinese Air Patrol was an Attempt to Divide Allies, Says Top US Air Force Official in Pacific,” Defense News, August 23, 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2019/08/23/russian-chinese-air-patrol-was-an-attempt-to-divide-allies-says-top-us-air-force-official-in-pacific/.

94 Vladimir Isachenkov, “Putin: Russia-China Military Alliance Can’t Be Ruled Out,” Associated Press, October 22, 2020, https://apnews.com/article/beijing-moscow-foreign-policy-russia-vladimir-putin-1d4b112d2fe8cb66192c5225f4d614c4; and Jun Mai, “Beijing Gives Cautious Welcome to Vladimir Putin’s Hint over Russia-China Military Alliance,” South China Morning Post, October 25, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3107027/beijing-gives-cautious-welcome-vladimir-putins-hint-over.

95 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2019 Report to Congress, November 2019, p. 331, https://www.uscc.gov/files/001166.

96 Yaroslav Trofimov, “The New Beijing-Moscow Axis,” opinion, Wall Street Journal, February 1, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-beijing-moscow-axis-11549036661?mod=hp_lead_pos8&mod=article_inline. On COVID-19’s impact on Russia’s economy, see Anders Åslund, “The Russian Economy in Health, Oil, and Economic Crisis,” Atlantic Council, May 27, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/long-take/the-russian-economy-in-health-oil-and-economic-crisis/.

97 Defense Intelligence Agency, Russia Military Power: Building a Military to Support Great Power Aspirations, report, June 2017, p. 16, https://www.dia.mil/Portals/27/Documents/News/Military%20Power%20Publications/Russia%20Military%20Power%20Report%202017.pdf.

98 Nadège Rolland, “A Concise Guide to the Belt and Road Initiative.”

99 Zhao Lei, “3 Sea Routes Planned for Belt & Road Initiative,” China Daily, June 21, 2017, http://english.www.gov.cn/state_council/ministries/2017/06/21/content_281475692760102.htm.

100 Liu Yazhou, “The Grand National Strategy,” Chinese Law & Government, Vol. 40, No. 2 (December 2014), pp. 13-36, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.2753/CLG0009-4609400201?journalCode=mclg20.

101 Philippe Le Corre, prepared testimony for hearing on “Chinese Investment and Influence in Europe,” House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia and Emerging Threats, 115th Congress, 2nd Session, May 23, 2018, p. 2, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA14/20180523/108355/HHRG-115-FA14-Wstate-LeCorreP-20180523.pdf. Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) and the Rhodium Group (RHG) released a 2019 update report on Chinese FDI in European Union (EU) stating that the trend declined in the last three years largely due to domestic variables, shrinking Chinese global FDI, and growing regulatory scrutiny in host economies. See Agatha Kratz, Mikko Huotari, Thilo Haneman, and Rebecca Arcesati, “Chinese FDI in Europe: 2019 Update,” Rhodium Group, April 8, 2020, https://rhg.com/research/chinese-fdi-in-europe-2019-update/; and Thilo Hanemann, Mikko Huotari, and Agatha Kratz, “Chinese FDI in Europe: 2018 Trends and Impacts of New Screening Policies,” MERICS, June 3, 2019, https://www.merics.org/en/papers-on-china/chinese-fdi-in-europe-2018.

102 Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation Christopher A. Ford, “Competitive Strategy vis-à-vis China: The Case Study of Civil Nuclear Cooperation,” remarks to the Project 2049 Institute, Arlington, VA, June 24, 2019, https://www.state.gov/competitive-strategy-vis-a-vis-china-the-case-study-of-civil-nuclear-cooperation/; Sam Reynolds, “Why the Civil Nuclear Trap is Part and Parcel of the Belt and Road Strategy” The Diplomat, July 5, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/why-the-civil-nuclear-trap-is-part-and-parcel-of-the-belt-and-road-strategy/; and “China Could Build 30 ‘Belt and Road’ Nuclear Reactors by 2030: Official,” Reuters, June 20, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-nuclearpower/china-could-build-30-belt-and-road-nuclear-reactors-by-2030-official-idUSKCN1TL0HZ.

103 “UK Made ‘a Very Bad Decision’ on Huawei, Chinese Envoy Says,” editorial, Xinhua, July 20, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-07/20/c_139226918.htm; “UK and China Relationship ‘Seriously Poisoned,’ Says Beijing’s Ambassador,” BBC News, July 30, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-53595423; Laura Hughes and Helen Warrell, “China Envoy Warns of ‘Consequences’ If Britain Rejects Huawei,” Financial Times, July 6, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/3d67d1c1-98ff-439a-90a1-099c18621ee9; and Ben Quinn, “China Warns UK Relations are at a ‘Historical Juncture’ over Hinkley Point,” The Guardian, August 8, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/aug/08/china-warns-uk-relations-historical-juncture-hinkley-point-liu-xiaoming.

104 Michael Doran and Peter Rough, “China’s Emerging Middle Eastern Kingdom,” Tablet Magazine, August 2, 2020, https://www.tabletmag.com/sections/israel-middle-east/articles/china-middle-eastern-kingdom.

105 Michal Meidan, China’s Energy Security at 70 (Oxford, UK: University of Oxford, October 2019), p. 2, https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Chinas-energy-security-at-70.pdf.

106 “The Growing Appetite for Armed Drones in the Middle East,” The Economist, March 9, 2019, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2019/03/09/the-growing-appetite-for-armed-drones-in-the-middle-east; and Zeina Karam, “Report: China is Driving Use of Armed Drones in the Middle East,” Associated Press, December 17, 2018, https://apnews.com/56cfdc2ab6224891a264fc88f70200c8.

107 Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have increased purchases of Israeli subsidiaries in sensitive sectors and invested in Israeli infrastructure projects that overlap with Israel’s defense and technology sector. This has raised serious concerns about protecting the information of shared U.S.-Israel defense and intelligence activities. Chinese SOEs, some of which are known to have completed work for the People’s Liberation Army, have undertaken the building and operating of four major infrastructure projects in Israel, estimated to be worth more than $4 billion. See Shira Efron, Karen Schwindt, and Emily Haskel, Chinese Investment in Israeli Technology and Infrastructure, RR3176 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2020), pp. 18 and 38-39, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR3176.html.

108 Shira Efron, Karen Schwindt, and Emily Haskel, Chinese Investment in Israeli Technology and Infrastructure, p. 70. See also Ivan Levingston, “U.S. Raises China Concerns Over Israel’s Sale of Largest Seaport,” Bloomberg, October 6, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-06/u-s-raises-china-concerns-over-israel-s-sale-of-largest-seaport.

109 Eleanor Albert, “China in Africa: Backgrounder,” Council on Foreign Relations, last updated July 12, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-africa. See also Joseph Goldstein, “Kenyans Say Chinese Investment Brings Racism and Discrimination,” The New York Times, October 15, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/world/africa/kenya-china-racism.html.

110 Lina Benabdallah, “Spite Won’t Beat China in Africa,” Foreign Policy, January 23, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/23/spite-wont-beat-china-in-africa/. Beijing’s influence operations in Africa have also reshaped voting patterns at the United Nations and other multilateral institutions in ways intended to reorient the international order around China’s goals. See Axel Dreher, et al., “Apples and Dragon Fruits: The Determinants of Aid and Other Forms of State Financing from China to Africa,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 62, No. 1 (March 2018), pp. 182-194, https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/62/1/182/4841635.

111 Jenni Marsh, “China Says It Has a ‘Zero-Tolerance Policy’ for Racism, but Discrimination towards Africans Goes Back Decades,” CNN, May 25, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/25/asia/china-anti-african-attacks-history-hnk-intl/index.html; and “Racist Incidents against Africans in China amid Coronavirus Crackdown Spark Outcry,” CBS News, May 23, 2020, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/coronavirus-racism-africans-china/.

112 This averages roughly 6.2 billion barrels per day of crude oil, condensate, and refined petroleum. See Justine Barden, “The Bab el-Mandeb is a Strategic Route for Oil and Natural Gas Shipments,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, August 27, 2019, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=41073/.

113 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: 2019, p. 16, https://media.defense.gov/2019/May/02/2002127082/-1/1/1/2019_CHINA_MILITARY_POWER_REPORT.pdf.

114 Huawei had sought to build a transoceanic cable connecting South America to Asia but lost out to Japan’s NEC. See Natalia A. Ramos Miranda, “Huawei Wants to Build First Fiber-Optic Cable Between South America and Asia,” Reuters, August 28, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-tech-chile/huawei-wants-to-build-first-fiber-optic-cable-between-south-america-and-asia-idUSKCN1VI2N2; and Sarah Zheng, “China’s Huawei Loses Out to Japan’s NEC on Chile-Asia Trans-Pacific Cable Project,” South China Morning Post, July 30, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3095367/chinas-huawei-loses-out-japans-nec-chile-asia-trans-pacific.

115 Dan Yurman, “Argentina Reports $10 Billion Nuclear Deal with China,” Energy Central, May 25, 2019, https://energycentral.com/c/ec/argentina-reports-10b-nuclear-deal-china; “China Signs $15 Billion Nuclear Deal with Argentina,” Agence France-Presse, November 17, 2015; and “Brazil Looks to China to Finish Nuclear Power Plant,” Reuters, August 29, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/brazil-nuclear-china/brazil-looks-to-china-to-finish-nuclear-power-plant-idUSL2N1LF0WN.

116 Matt Ferchen, “China, Venezuela, and the Illusion of Debt-Trap Diplomacy,” AsiaGlobalOnline, August 16, 2018, https://carnegietsinghua.org/2018/08/16/china-venezuela-and-illusion-of-debt-trap-diplomacy-pub-77089.

117 Matt Ferchen, “China, Venezuela, and the Illusion of Debt-Trap Diplomacy.”

118 Ernesto Londoño, “From a Space Station in Argentina, China Expands Its Reach in Latin America,” The New York Times, July 28, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/28/world/americas/china-latin-america.html.

119 Larry Diamond and Orville Schell, eds., China’s Influence & American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance.

120 Svea Herbst-Bayliss and Tim McLaughlin, “U.S. Pension Funds Took Positions in Blacklisted Chinese Surveillance Company,” Reuters, October 15, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hikvision-pensions-focus/u-s-pension-funds-took-positions-in-blacklisted-chinese-surveillance-company-idUSKBN1WU191; “Hikvision: US Pension Funds Invest in China ‘Big Brother’ Firm,” BBC News, March 29, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-47753085 and RWR Advisory Group, LLC, “Chinese ‘Bad Actor’ Enterprises in State Public Pension Systems.”

121 Edward Wong, Lara Jakes, and Steven Lee Myers, “U.S. Orders China to Close Houston Consulate, Citing Efforts to Steal Trade Secrets,” The New York Times, July 22, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/22/world/asia/us-china-houston-consulate.html.

122 For recent examples, see U.S. Department of Justice, “University of Kansas Researcher Indicted for Fraud for Failing to Disclose Conflict of Interest with Chinese University”; and “Harvard University Professor and Two Chinese Nationals Charged in Three Separate China Related Cases.”

123 China extends its “long arm” of authoritarianism to punish Chinese students studying in the United States who express dissent or otherwise exercise free speech. For example, in July 2019, Chinese police in Wuhan reportedly arrested Luo Daiqing, a University of Minnesota student on summer break who, according to a Chinese court document, “used his Twitter account to post more than 40 comments denigrating a national leader’s image and indecent pictures.” Luo was reportedly sentenced to six months in prison. See Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “University of Minnesota Student Jailed in China Over Tweets,” Axios, January 23, 2020, https://www.axios.com/china-arrests-university-minnesota-twitter-e495cf47-d895-4014-9ac8-8dc76aa6004d.html.

124 Tamar Lewin, “Taking More Seats on Campus, Foreigners Also Pay the Freight,” The New York Times, February 4, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/education/international-students-pay-top-dollar-at-us-colleges.html; Paul Musgrave, “Universities Aren’t Ready for Trade War Casualties,” Foreign Policy, May 19, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/05/19/universities-arent-ready-for-trade-war-casualties-china-trump-us/; and Elizabeth Redden, “Will Coronavirus Trigger an Enrollment Crisis?” Inside Higher Ed, February 13, 2020, https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/02/13/longer-coronavirus-crisis-persists-bigger-likely-impact-chinese-student-enrollments.

125 M. Martel, J. Baer, N. Andrejko and L. Mason, Open Doors 2019 Report on International Educational Exchange (New York, NY.: Institute of International Education, 2019), pp. 8; 39-40; 62.

126 Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, China’s Impact on the U.S. Education System.

127 Axel Dreher, et al., “Apples and Dragon Fruits: The Determinants of Aid and Other Forms of State Financing from China to Africa,” pp. 182-194.

128 Courtney J. Fung and Shing-Hon Lam, “China Already Leads 4 of the 15 UN Specialized Agencies – and is Aiming for a Fifth,” Washington Post, March 3, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/03/03/china-already-leads-4-15-un-specialized-agencies-is-aiming-5th/.

129 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, “The PRC in International Organizations,” updated April 20, 2020, https://www.uscc.gov/prc-international-orgs.

130 Kristine Lee and Alexander Sullivan, People’s Republic of the United Nations: China’s Emerging Revisionism in International Organizations, CNAS, May 2019, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/peoples-republic-of-the-united-nations.

131 Peter Berkowitz, “China, Foreign Affairs, and the Anti-Ideology Delusion,” RealClearPolitics, October 4, 2020, https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2020/10/04/china_foreign_affairs_and_the_anti-ideology_delusion_144345.html.

132 John Garnaut, “Engineers of the Soul: Ideology in Xi Jinping’s China,” speech to an internal Australian government seminar, August 2017, in Bill Bishop, ed., Sinocism, January 6, 2019, https://sinocism.com/p/engineers-of-the-soul-ideology-in.

133 Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750.

134 Mao Zedong, “Opening Speech at the First Session of the First NPC (September 15, 1954),” in Michael Y.M. Kau and John K. Leung, eds. The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949-1976, Vol. 1 (White Plains, NY: East Gate Books, 1986), p. 475.

135 Daniel J. Tobin, “How Xi Jinping’s ‘New Era’ Should Have Ended U.S. Debate on Beijing’s Ambitions.”

136 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” report delivered to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, October 18, 2017, p. 16, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping’s_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf. Chinese text is available at http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/19cpcnc/2017-10/27/c_1121867529.htm or http://www.gov.cn/zhuanti/2017-10/27/content_5234876.htm. See also Daniel J. Tobin, “How Xi Jinping’s ‘New Era’ Should Have Ended U.S. Debate on Beijing’s Ambitions”; and Chris Buckley, “China Enshrines ‘Xi Jinping Thought,’ Elevating Leader to Mao-Like Status,” The New York Times, October 24, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-communist-party.html.

137 Paul Mozur and Aaron Krolik, “A Surveillance Net Blankets China’s Cities, Giving Police Vast Powers,” The New York Times, December 17, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/17/technology/china-surveillance.html; and Kenneth Roth and Maya Wang, “Data Leviathan: China’s Burgeoning Surveillance State,” Human Rights Watch, August 16, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/08/16/data-leviathan-chinas-burgeoning-surveillance-state.

138 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” p. 57.

139 Deng Xiaoping, “Four Cardinal Principles,” speech before the Forum on the Principles for the [Chinese Communist] Party’s Theoretical Work, March 30, 1979, https://cpcchina.chinadaily.com.cn/2010-10/15/content_13918193.htm.

140 Minxin Pei, “A Tale of Three Speeches: How Xi Jinping’s 40^th Anniversary Speech Marks a Departure,” Center for International Maritime Security, June 11, 2019, http://cimsec.org/a-tale-of-three-speeches-how-xi-jinpings-40th-anniversary-speech-marks-a-departure/40566.

141 Karl Marx, “On The Jewish Question,” in Robert C. Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 1978), pp. 26-52; and Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “Manifesto of the Communist Party,” in Tucker, ed., The Marx-Engels Reader, pp. 469-500. For a critique of the Marxist view, see, Peter Berkowitz, “Capitalism, Socialism, and Freedom,” The Hoover Institution, February 24, 2020, https://www.hoover.org/research/capitalism-socialism-freedom.

142 Chris Buckley, “China Takes Aim at Western Ideas,” The New York Times, Aug. 19, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/world/asia/chinas-new-leadership-takes-hard-line-in-secret-memo.html.

143 Daniel J. Tobin, “How Xi Jinping’s ‘New Era’ Should Have Ended U.S. Debate on Beijing’s Ambitions.”

144 Xie Lei and Zhao Jing, eds., 陈曙光：改革开放的世界贡献 [Chen Shuguang: The World Contribution of Reform and Opening Up], People’s Daily, October 7, 2018, http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2018/1007/c40531-30326593.html.

145 John W. Garver, China’s Quest (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 11 and 14.

146 John Irgengioro, “China’s National Identity and the Root Causes of China’s Ethnic Tensions,” East Asia: An International Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4 (December 2018), pp. 317-330.

147 Lucian Pye, China: An Introduction (New York, NY: Harpers Collins Publishers, 1991), pp. 106 -122; John Keay, China: A History (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2009); James Kurth, The American Way of Empire: How America Won a World But Lost Her Way, pp. 240-255; and “Legalism in Chinese Philosophy,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, December 10, 2014, revised Nov. 16, 2018, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-legalism/.

148 See Peter Berkowitz, “The United States, National Traditions, and Human Rights,” Telos, Fall 2020, http://www.peterberkowitz.com/articles/2020/20200900-United_States_National_Traditions_and_Human_Rights-Telos.pdf.

149 Miles Yu, “Understanding China’s Strategic Culture Through its South China Sea Gambit,” Hoover Institution, May 9, 2016, https://www.hoover.org/research/understanding-chinas-strategic-culture-through-its-south-china-sea-gambit.

150 John Pomfret, “U.S. Takes a Tougher Tone With China,” Washington Post, July 30, 2010, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/29/AR2010072906416.html.

151 “Foreign Minister Wang Yi Answers Questions from Chinese and Foreign Journalists,” Xinhua News, March 8, 2014, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014lh/foreign-minister/.

152 Miles Yu, “Understanding China’s Strategic Culture Through its South China Sea Gambit.”

153 Chao Deng and Liza Lin, “In Xi Jinping’s China, Nationalism Takes a Dark Turn,” The Wall Street Journal, October 22, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-xi-jinpings-china-nationalism-takes-a-dark-turn-11603382993.

154 Xi Jinping, “China’s Diplomacy Must Befit Its Major-Country Status,” in Xi, The Governance of China II (Beijing, China: Foreign Languages Press, 2017) pp. 479-483. See also Wang Yi, “Exploring the Path of Major Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics,” speech at the Second World Peace Forum, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China, June 27, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1053908.shtml; and “Bringing the East and West Together in Shared Commitment to Multilateralism,” speech at the 56th Munich Security Conference, Munich, Germany February 15, 2020, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/2461_663310/t1745384.shtml.

155 During this period, the Qing Dynasty in China suffered a series of territorial losses and other concessions at the hands of Western imperial powers, beginning with Britain’s defeat of the Qing Dynasty in the First Opium War (1839-1842). See Alison Kaufman, prepared testimony for hearing on “China’s Narratives Regarding National Security Policy,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 10, 2011, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/3.10.11Kaufman.pdf.

156 For a critique of the tendency to rely on the CCP’s interpretation of Chinese history, see James A. Millward, “We Need a New Approach to Teaching Modern Chinese History: We Have Lazily Repeated False Narratives for Too Long,” Medium, October 8, 2020, https://jimmillward.medium.com/we-need-a-new-approach-to-teaching-modern-chinese-history-we-have-lazily-repeated-false-d24983bd7ef2. See also Charles Horner and Eric Brown, “A Century After the Qing: Yesterday’s Empire and Today’s Republics,” China Heritage Quarterly, No. 27 (September 2011), http://www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/features.php?searchterm=027_century.inc&issue=027; and “The Invisible Battle for Sinophone Asia,” Hudson Institute, December 17, 2014, https://www.hudson.org/research/10873-the-invisible-battle-for-sinophone-asia.

157 Constitution of the Communist Party of China, Revised and Adopted at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 24, 2017, English translation, p. 4, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Constitution_of_the_Communist_Party_of_China.pdf. Chinese text is available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/19cpcnc/2017-10/28/c_1121870794.htm.; and Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” p. 51.

158 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” pp. 11-12.

159 Xi Jinping, “Achieving Rejuvenation is the Dream of the Chinese People” in Xi, The Governance of China I, p. 38.

160 Xi Jinping, “Speech on the 100^th Anniversary of the May 4^th Movement,” speech, Beijing, China, April 30, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2019-04/30/c_1124436427.htm.

161 Daniel J. Tobin, prepared testimony for hearing on “A ‘China Model?’ Beijing’s Promotion of Alternative Global Norms and Standards,” pp. 2-3.

162 Constitution of the Communist Party of China, Revised and Adopted at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 24, 2017, p. 4. See also Timothy R. Heath, China’s New Governing Party Paradigm: Political Renewal and the Pursuit of National Rejuvenation (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2014), p. 60; and Daniel J. Tobin, prepared testimony for hearing on “A ‘China Model?’ Beijing’s Promotion of Alternative Global Norms and Standards,” pp. 27-28.

163 Daniel J. Tobin, prepared testimony for hearing on “A ‘China Model?’ Beijing’s Promotion of Alternative Global Norms and Standards,” p. 19.

164 Constitution of the Communist Party of China, Revised and Adopted at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 24, 2017, p. 4.

165 Constitution of the Communist Party of China, Revised and Adopted at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China on October 24, 2017, p. 7.

166 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” p. 21.

167 Xi Jinping, “Uphold and Develop Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.”

168 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” p. 25.

169 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” pp. 6, 17, 21-22, 52, and 54. The Party’s official English translation renders the phrase as “community with shared future for mankind.” U.S. analysts prefer “community of common destiny for mankind,” (emphasis added) because it more faithfully reflects the CCP’s China-centrism. On “community of common destiny for mankind,” see Liza Tobin, “Xi’s Vision for Transforming Global Governance: A Strategic Challenge for Washington and its Allies,” Texas National Security Review, Vol. 2, No. 1 (November 2018), p. 155, https://tnsr.org/2018/11/xis-vision-for-transforming-global-governance-a-strategic-challenge-for-washington-and-its-allies/; and Daniel J. Tobin, prepared testimony for hearing on “A ‘China Model?’ Beijing’s Promotion of Alternative Global Norms and Standards,” p. 9. See also Xi Jinping, On Building a Human Community with a Shared Future (Beijing, China: Central Compilation and Translation Press, 2019).

170 Liza Tobin, “Xi’s Vision for Transforming Global Governance: A Strategic Challenge for Washington and its Allies,” p. 155.

171 Nadège Rolland, prepared testimony for hearing on “A ‘China Model?’ Beijing’s Promotion of Alternative Global Norms and Standards,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 13, 2020, pp. 4-6, https://www.uscc.gov/hearings/china-model-beijings-promotion-alternative-global-norms-and-standards.

172 Xi Jinping, “Improve Our Ability to Participate in Global Governance,” main points of the speech at the 35th group study session of the Political Bureau of the 18th CPC Central Committee, September 27, 2016, in Xi, The Governance of China II, pp. 489-490.

173 “Xi Urges Breaking New Ground in Major Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics,” Xinhua News, June 24, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-06/24/c_137276269.htm; and Daniel J. Tobin, prepared testimony for hearing on “A ‘China Model?’ Beijing’s Promotion of Alternative Global Norms and Standards.”

174 Matthew Kroenig, The Return of Great Power Rivalry: Democracy vs. Autocracy from the Ancient World to the U.S. and China (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 11-49.

175 Katsuji Nakazawa, “China’s Street-Stall Debate Puts Xi and Li at Odds,” Nikkei Asian Review, June 11, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/China-up-close/China-s-street-stall-debate-puts-Xi-and-Li-at-odds.

176 Christopher Gobel and Lynette H. Ong, “Social Unrest in China,” Europe China Research and Advice Network, October 1, 2012, https://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/186507; Huileng Tan, “China’s Says Its Economy Grew 6.1% in 2019, in Line with Expectations,” CNBC, January 16, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/17/china-gdp-for-full-year-and-q4-2019.html; and “GDP growth (annual %) — China,” World Bank, accessed August 28, 2020, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=CN.

177 Sidney Leng, “Coronavirus: China Faces Historic Test as Pandemic Stokes Fear of Looming Unemployment Crisis,” South China Morning Post, May 11, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3083513/coronavirus-china-faces-historic-test-pandemic-stokes-fears. See also “China Plans Tighter Control to Counter Social Unrest Over Virus,” Bloomberg News, April 22, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-22/china-plans-tighter-control-to-counter-social-unrest-over-virus.

178 Kaj Malden and Suzanna Stephens, “Cascading Economic Impacts of the COVID-19 Outbreak in China,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, April 21, 2020, https://uscc.gov/research/cascading-economic-impacts-covid-19-outbreak-china.

179 China imports more than 95 percent of high-end chips used in computers and servers “despite spending billions to catch up.” See Yuan Yang and Lucy Hornby, “China Raises Alarm Over Its Dependency on Imported Chips,” Financial Times, July 18, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/410306d8-8ae0-11e8-bf9e-8771d5404543; and “China to Import $300 Billion of Chips for Third Straight Year: Industry Group,” Reuters, August 26, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-semiconductors/china-to-import-300-billion-of-chips-for-third-straight-year-industry-group-idUSKBN25M1CX.

180 Paula J. Dobriansky, “An Allied Plan to Depend Less on China,” opinion, Wall Street Journal, April 30,2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/an-allied-plan-to-depend-less-on-china-11588288513.

181 Michael R. Auslin, The End of the Asian Century: War, Stagnation, and the Risks to the World’s Most Dynamic Region (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2017), pp. 24-25.

182 Anjani Trivedi, “A Wave of Bad Loans Could Swallow China’s Banks,” Bloomberg, April 28, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-04-29/a-wave-of-bad-loans-could-swallow-china-s-banks

183 Andrew Frew McMillan, “U.S.-Listed Chinese Stocks Open Secondary Escape Hatch in Hong Kong,” Real Money’s The Street, June 5, 2020, https://realmoney.thestreet.com/investing/stocks/u-s-listed-chinese-stocks-open-secondary-escape-hatch-in-hong-kong-15341110.

184 Derek Scissors, “A Stagnant China in 2040, Briefly,”AEI, March 16, 2020, https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/a-stagnant-china-in-2040-briefly/; Christopher Balding, “What’s Causing China’s Economic Slowdown?” Foreign Affairs, March 11, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-03-11/whats-causing-chinas-economic-slowdown; and Alexandra Stevenson, “China’s Spenders Are Saving: That’s a Problem for Everyone,” The New York Times, October 2, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/02/business/china-consumers.html.

185 For more on social unrest research, see Christian Gobel, “Social Unrest: A Bird’s Eye View,” in Teresa Wright, ed., Handbook of Protest and Resistance in China (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019), pp. 27-45; Christopher Gobel and Lynette H. Ong, “Social Unrest in China”; and “Why Protests Are So Common in China,” The Economist, October 4, 2018, https://www.economist.com/china/2018/10/04/why-protests-are-so-common-in-china.

186 James Mann, The China Fantasy, pp. 49-54.

187 Nicholas Eberstadt, “China’s Demographic Outlook to 2040 and its Implications: An Overview,” AEI, January 22, 2019, https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/chinas-demographic-outlook-to-2040-and-its-implications-an-overview/.

188 Eleanor Albert and Beina Xu, “China’s Environmental Crisis,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 18, 2016, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-environmental-crisis.

189 Jing Huang, Xiaochuan Pan, Xinbiao Guo, and Guoxing Li, “Health Impact of China’s Air Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan: an Analysis of National Air Quality Monitoring and Mortality Data,” Lancet Planetary Health, Vol. 2, No. 7 (Jun 30, 2018), pp. e313-e323, https://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lanplh/PIIS2542-5196(18)30141-4.pdf.

190 Tyler Headley and Cole Tanigawa-Lau, “Measuring Chinese Discontent,” Foreign Affairs, March 10, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-03-10/measuring-chinese-discontent. They write, “Even though protests in Hong Kong are larger in scale, protests happen more frequently in mainland China. According to a broad scholarly consensus, there are more than 130,000 protests per year, or nearly 400 daily, with fewer than 250 (less than one percent) involving more than 100 people.”

191 See endnotes 14-17.

192 Adrian Zenz, “China’s Domestic Security Spending: An Analysis of Available Data,” Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief, Vol. 18, No. 4 (March 2018), p. 6, https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/CB_18_4-2.pdf?x47979. Zenz estimates China spent 1,046,000 million RMB on external defense in 2017. Given how he calculates 1,200,400 million in RMB in national domestic security spending in 2017 as equal to $197 billion or $349 billion on a PPP basis, we proportionally calculated 1,046,000 RMB on external defense spending in 2017 as roughly equal to $171 billion in nominal dollars or $304 billion on a PPP basis.

193 Adrian Zenz, “China’s Domestic Security Spending: An Analysis of Available Data,” p. 6. Given how Zenz calculates 1,200,400 million in RMB in national domestic security spending in 2017 to equal $197 billion in nominal dollars, we proportionally calculate 348,616 million RMB on external defense spending in 2007 to equal $57.2 billion in nominal dollars. For news reporting related to Zenz’s analysis, see Josh Chin, “China Spends More on Domestic Security as Xi’s Powers Grow,” Wall Street Journal, March 6, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-spends-more-on-domestic-security-as-xis-powers-grow-1520358522; and C. K. Tan, “China spending puts domestic security ahead of defense,” Asian Nikkei Review, March 14, 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/China-People-s-Congress-2018/China-spending-puts-domestic-security-ahead-of-defense.

194 Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow, “Large and in Charge: Civil-Military Relations Under Xi Jinping,” in Saunders, ed., Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms, pp. 528-537.

195 David M. Finkelstein, Initial Thoughts on the Reorganization and Reform of the PLA (Arlington, VA: CNA, 2016), p. 19, https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/DOP-2016-U-012560-Final.pdf.

196 “China’s Most Senior Officials Endorse Economic Plans for Years Ahead; But They Left One Little Thing Out,” The Economist, October 31, 2020, https://www.economist.com/china/2020/10/31/chinas-most-senior-officials-endorse-economic-plans-for-years-ahead

197 Laura Silver, Kat Devlin, and Christine Huang, “Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries,” Pew Research Center, October 6, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/10/06/unfavorable-views-of-china-reach-historic-highs-in-many-countries/.

198 For example, Australia forcefully called for an independent inquiry into the origins of COVID-19 that resulted in a WHO World Health Assembly draft resolution supported by more than 100 countries. However, the resolution was passed with watered-down language that did not directly identify China as the virus’s source. See Ankit Panda, “Australian World Health Assembly Effort to Promote Inquiry on COVID-19 Origins Wins Wide Support,” The Diplomat, May 18, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/australian-world-health-assembly-effort-to-promote-inquiry-on-covid-19-origins-wins-wide-support/. See also Irwin Cotler and Judith Abitan, “Xi Jinping’s China Did This,” The Times of Israel, April 12, 2020, https://www.timesofisrael.com/criminality-and-corruption-reign-in-xi-pings-china/.

199 Minxin Pei, “China’s Coming Upheaval,” Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-04-03/chinas-coming-upheaval. Pei writes that the coronavirus crisis shows how the CCP leaders under Xi have become “constrained by the rigidities of their own system and therefore limited in their ability to correct policy mistakes.”

200 George Kennan, “The Long Telegram,” February 22, 1946.