ForewordIII 
ustria, dominated by the Germans, has become an essential feature of the German scheme of world dominion. One of the troubles with the German schemes of development has been that the Germans have always held Germanization of other nationalities a prime requisite of their plans. This constitutes an important difference between what may be termed English and French imperialism and German schemes of expansion. 
The German “Drang nach Osten” cannot be realized without Austria tied hand and foot to Berlin, and without keeping in bondage the Slav nationalities in Central and Southeastern Europe. When German dreams of world dominion were endangered by the victories of the Balkan League in 1913, the German attitude found striking expression in a speech of the Chancellor, delivered April 7, 1913, in the German Reichstag in support of increased military appropriations; from it the following deserves to be quoted verbatim: “For the future it is decisive that instead of European Turkey, whose life as a state has become passive, have appeared states that show a remarkable strength of life. We all have an interest in seeing this power prove itself of the best in peace as it has in war, and to see the Balkan states grow in close economic and cultural contact with their neighbors and with the group of Western powers. Thus they shall also be factors making for progress and European peace. But in spite of this, one thing is certain: If it should ever come to an European war wherein Slavs and Germans shall stand against each other, then it would mean damage to the Germans if in the present system of equilibrium southern Slav states were to take the place hitherto occupied by European Turkey.” These are thoughts couched of course in diplomatic language, but it is obvious that even then the German Chancellor had in mind the bugaboo of a racial conflict between Slavs and Germans; not because Germany had suffered any real damage, but because Southern Slavs had thrown off the yoke of Turkey and had asserted their right to growth as independent nations. Such was the political philosophy which dominated Ber
lin in 1913; it also dominated the most influential circles in Vienna. Of a piece with the speech of the German Chancellor is a Vienna letter published in the Frankfurter Zeitung, on the 13th of May of the same year. The letter is entitled Oesterreichische Katastrophenpolitik; the writer thereof speaks of the fact that owing to Serbian growth Austria had been twice compelled to increase its military expenses. He indicates that the real instigator of all these alleged troubles is Russia, and that there is just one way of stopping all this: “To destroy the tools of pan-Slavism; to subjugate the small neighbors, to destroy the Russian Empire, and to form a number of buffer states under Austrian and German protectorate between the remnants of the Russian Empire and Central Europe.” The writer is refreshingly frank in saying that the internal conditions of Austria require the same measures; that it has been impossible to solve the Bohemian question, the Polish-Ruthenian question, and other similar problems; that these matters endanger Austria in its existence, and that even if all this leads to an European war, the Central Powers have nothing to fear, because as yet they are stronger than Russia and her friends. The writer declares that this is not only his opinion, but the opinion of responsible Austrian persons of importance. We can readily see the connection between this letter and the speech of the German Chancellor hereinbefore referred to. The aim thus expressed was simply this: The crushing of the Slav nationalities in Austria, the subjugation of Southern Slavs, and the destruction of Russia. The writer even goes so far 
as to say that in any event Austria has nothing to lose, because with the growth of Slav nationalities in Austria she is doomed to destruction any way, and that in a world war she may have a chance to save herself. He says almost literally that a sudden catastrophe is preferable to terror without end. In reading and thinking of these astonishing documents, we must of course realize that when these writers and speakers deal with the question of the destruction of Austria, they fear the destruction of German privileges and German domination in Austria; for it is well known that the utmost the Slavs within Austria ever demanded were equal rights, and that the Germans were unwilling to concede this moderate demand. The Bohemian white sheet of paper had become proverbial in Austrian politics, and Bohemian leading statesmen told the Germans time and again to place on that sheet of paper all their demands as to the rights Germans should enjoy in Austria, and that Bohemians will have no objections to these, provided that the Bohemians have and enjoy the same rights in their own native land. Only the other day, in discussing the entry of Roumania into the war, the Pesti Hirlap, an influential Budapest paper, declared that Austria-Hungary must decide between Slavism and Germanism—this in an empire, the majority of which is Slav. I firmly believe that this war will end with victory for the Allies. A temporary truce, called a peace, may be patched up, but if so, we shall simply be confronted with a series of spasmodic struggles, resembling the Napoleonic wars of more than a century ago, and the ultimate outcome will be that German dreams of world dominion will be doomed. A year from now, two years from now, five, ten, or twenty years, from now, in any event at some future time, those parts of Austria inhabited by Italians will be joined to Italy; those parts inhabited by Roumanians to Roumania; those by Serbians to the new Serbia; and Galicia undoubtedly will constitute a part of the future autonomous Poland. When this logical historical process is carried out, even if a remnant of Austria should be preserved, the only nations left within the new Austria will be the Germans, the Magyars, the Bohemians, and the Slovaks. It will be seen from a mere statement of this fact that such Austria would be in the future, as it has been in the past, a menace to European peace. In such a state the Czechs and Slovaks would constitute the minority. The internal conditions of such a state would be volcanic. Austria so mutilated would mean the perpetuation of oppression of Czechs and Slovaks by the German and Magyar element, and since oppression inevitably breeds resistance, here again would be a foundation for future upheavals. A mere statement of this condition, once made, seems to show conclusively that the only possible solution of the Austrian problem is to get rid of the Austrian Empire once and forever, and not to permit the repetition of experiences the world had to undergo while Turkey was permitted to pose as an European power. After all, the Austrian question is the Turkish problem in another form. Austria can be no more federalized than European Turkey. To permit Austria to exist in any form when this war is concluded is merely to delay the solution of a problem that will never down. And in the life of nations, as well as of individuals, delay and procrastination, the tendency to postpone a final decision, is a crime for which penalties are sure to follow. Austria has lost its right to exist. Even now it has few of the attributes of a really sovereign state. It is a mere vassal of Germany. There is no reason for maintaining the ghost of life in a corpse from which the spirit has flown never to return. So much for what might be called the negative side of the Czech problem. What about the positive, the affirmative phase? Can a self-sustaining Bohemian-Slovak State be reconstructed? Are there present the necessary state-forming elements?
ustria, dominated by the Germans, has become an essential feature of the German scheme of world dominion. One of the troubles with the German schemes of development has been that the Germans have always held Germanization of other nationalities a prime requisite of their plans. This constitutes an important difference between what may be termed English and French imperialism and German schemes of expansion. 
The German “Drang nach Osten” cannot be realized without Austria tied hand and foot to Berlin, and without keeping in bondage the Slav nationalities in Central and Southeastern Europe. When German dreams of world dominion were endangered by the victories of the Balkan League in 1913, the German attitude found striking expression in a speech of the Chancellor, delivered April 7, 1913, in the German Reichstag in support of increased military appropriations; from it the following deserves to be quoted verbatim: “For the future it is decisive that instead of European Turkey, whose life as a state has become passive, have appeared states that show a remarkable strength of life. We all have an interest in seeing this power prove itself of the best in peace as it has in war, and to see the Balkan states grow in close economic and cultural contact with their neighbors and with the group of Western powers. Thus they shall also be factors making for progress and European peace. But in spite of this, one thing is certain: If it should ever come to an European war wherein Slavs and Germans shall stand against each other, then it would mean damage to the Germans if in the present system of equilibrium southern Slav states were to take the place hitherto occupied by European Turkey.” These are thoughts couched of course in diplomatic language, but it is obvious that even then the German Chancellor had in mind the bugaboo of a racial conflict between Slavs and Germans; not because Germany had suffered any real damage, but because Southern Slavs had thrown off the yoke of Turkey and had asserted their right to growth as independent nations. Such was the political philosophy which dominated Ber
Prof. T. G. MASARYK, Member of Austrian Parliament, Leader of movement for Bohemian (Czech) Independence. Sentenced to be executed on apprehension; his daughter was imprisoned without trial
Of a piece with the speech of the German Chancellor is a Vienna letter published in the Frankfurter Zeitung, on the 13th of May of the same year. The letter is entitled Oesterreichische Katastrophenpolitik; the writer thereof speaks of the fact that owing to Serbian growth Austria had been twice compelled to increase its military expenses. He indicates that the real instigator of all these alleged troubles is Russia, and that there is just one way of stopping all this: “To destroy the tools of pan-Slavism; to subjugate the small neighbors, to destroy the Russian Empire, and to form a number of buffer states under Austrian and German protectorate between the remnants of the Russian Empire and Central Europe.” The writer is refreshingly frank in saying that the internal conditions of Austria require the same measures; that it has been impossible to solve the Bohemian question, the Polish-Ruthenian question, and other similar problems; that these matters endanger Austria in its existence, and that even if all this leads to an European war, the Central Powers have nothing to fear, because as yet they are stronger than Russia and her friends. The writer declares that this is not only his opinion, but the opinion of responsible Austrian persons of importance. We can readily see the connection between this letter and the speech of the German Chancellor hereinbefore referred to. The aim thus expressed was simply this: The crushing of the Slav nationalities in Austria, the subjugation of Southern Slavs, and the destruction of Russia. The writer even goes so far 
Dr. CHARLES KRAMARZH, Leader of the Bohemian (Czech) delegation to the Parliament at Vienna. Is now in prison, after his sentence of death had been commuted to a term of fifteen years at hard labor
In reading and thinking of these astonishing documents, we must of course realize that when these writers and speakers deal with the question of the destruction of Austria, they fear the destruction of German privileges and German domination in Austria; for it is well known that the utmost the Slavs within Austria ever demanded were equal rights, and that the Germans were unwilling to concede this moderate demand. The Bohemian white sheet of paper had become proverbial in Austrian politics, and Bohemian leading statesmen told the Germans time and again to place on that sheet of paper all their demands as to the rights Germans should enjoy in Austria, and that Bohemians will have no objections to these, provided that the Bohemians have and enjoy the same rights in their own native land. Only the other day, in discussing the entry of Roumania into the war, the Pesti Hirlap, an influential Budapest paper, declared that Austria-Hungary must decide between Slavism and Germanism—this in an empire, the majority of which is Slav. I firmly believe that this war will end with victory for the Allies. A temporary truce, called a peace, may be patched up, but if so, we shall simply be confronted with a series of spasmodic struggles, resembling the Napoleonic wars of more than a century ago, and the ultimate outcome will be that German dreams of world dominion will be doomed. A year from now, two years from now, five, ten, or twenty years, from now, in any event at some future time, those parts of Austria inhabited by Italians will be joined to Italy; those parts inhabited by Roumanians to Roumania; those by Serbians to the new Serbia; and Galicia undoubtedly will constitute a part of the future autonomous Poland. When this logical historical process is carried out, even if a remnant of Austria should be preserved, the only nations left within the new Austria will be the Germans, the Magyars, the Bohemians, and the Slovaks. It will be seen from a mere statement of this fact that such Austria would be in the future, as it has been in the past, a menace to European peace. In such a state the Czechs and Slovaks would constitute the minority. The internal conditions of such a state would be volcanic. Austria so mutilated would mean the perpetuation of oppression of Czechs and Slovaks by the German and Magyar element, and since oppression inevitably breeds resistance, here again would be a foundation for future upheavals. A mere statement of this condition, once made, seems to show conclusively that the only possible solution of the Austrian problem is to get rid of the Austrian Empire once and forever, and not to permit the repetition of experiences the world had to undergo while Turkey was permitted to pose as an European power. After all, the Austrian question is the Turkish problem in another form. Austria can be no more federalized than European Turkey. To permit Austria to exist in any form when this war is concluded is merely to delay the solution of a problem that will never down. And in the life of nations, as well as of individuals, delay and procrastination, the tendency to postpone a final decision, is a crime for which penalties are sure to follow. Austria has lost its right to exist. Even now it has few of the attributes of a really sovereign state. It is a mere vassal of Germany. There is no reason for maintaining the ghost of life in a corpse from which the spirit has flown never to return. So much for what might be called the negative side of the Czech problem. What about the positive, the affirmative phase? Can a self-sustaining Bohemian-Slovak State be reconstructed? Are there present the necessary state-forming elements?