ForewordIV 
f a nation is conscious of its nationality, if it demands independence and liberty, if it has proved the possibility of such independence by its economic and cultural development, its right to independence is removed from the sphere of debatable questions. 
The Czechs are intensely conscious of their nationality. Bohemia, once one of the most powerful of European states, lost its independence only as a result of the application of brute force. The Czech people never voluntarily surrendered their right to independence, and against the rights of nations there is no statute of limitations. When the war broke out, of all the belligerent countries only Austria failed to convoke its parliament, such as it is. When this failure to maintain even the semblance of parliamentary life began to be the subject of international comment, the Austrian government commenced negotiations with various political parties. It was especially afraid of the Czech protest. It asked for a pro-Austrian declaration. But cajolery, promises, threats, nothing could induce the Czechs to declare even in mild terms for Austria. The Czech political parties could not be forced to condemn the anti-Austrian activities of those Czech leaders who were fortunate enough to escape from Austria and are actively engaged in the movement for Bohemian independence. Even promises of clemency for Czech political leaders sentenced to death for alleged treason to the Austrian state were of no avail. Only recently the cable brought a report that an offer of such an infamous bargain was rejected by the Czechs. The civilized world is well aware of the fact that in spite of the fierce opposition of the Austrian government and Austrian Germans to the development of the Czech people, this nationality has reached a plane surpassing that of any other nation in Austria, and that in literature and art it is second to no nation of its numerical strength. A nation that gave to the world men like Hus and Komensky, a nation that in modern times has produced a host of writers of the highest rank, many philosophers, statesmen, and gifted journalists, such a nation is certainly capable of governing itself. Economically and financially the Czech countries are the richest of the present Austrian “provinces,” and when freed from oppressive taxation, discriminating in favor of financially “passive” Austrian lands, the independent Bohemian-Slovak State will be even richer. At the present time 62.7 per cent of the burden of Austrian taxation is borne by the Czech countries, while the rest of Austria carries only 37.3 per cent. The Bohemian lands surpass the other Austrian lands in the production of grain; 38 per cent of the grain lands of Austria is found in Bohemia. Of the coal found in Austria, 83 per cent is mined in the Bohemian lands; 60 per cent of the Austrian iron is found there; 90 per cent, if not more, of the sugar factories of Austria are located in the lands of the Bohemian crown; the textile industry is one of large proportions, and leather, paper, furniture, and electro-technical industries are of importance. When we take into consideration the undeveloped resources of Slovakia, which naturally will form a part of the state, we see very readily that economically the future Bohemian-Slovak State will be amply able to stand on its own feet. At this point we may emphasize again distinctly the fact that joining the Bohemians in their future state should be the Slovaks of Hungary. The world has by this time realized that in provoking the Great War the Magyar oligarchy was particeps criminis; this war was not only a German war, but it was a Magyar war as well. The non-Magyar nationalities in Hungary in the past have been oppressed in true Asiatic style, and the Magyars participated in the intrigues leading to the war, because they hoped that as a result of the expected German and Austrian victory their domination in Hungary would be perpetuated and their dominion extended. Budapest has been the most faithful ally of Berlin. The Slovaks form a part of the same ethnic group as the Bohemians; they desire to be joined with the Bohemians in one state, and this wish should be gratified not only because it manifests a natural tendency, but also because it is in the interests of Europe to gratify it. As a matter of fact an independent Bohemian-Slovak State will have a population of over twelve million inhabitants, and in territorial extent will be eighth among twenty-two European sovereignties, and it cannot be said that such a state would be small. Moreover, is not the belief in the necessity of large states one of the theories which are destined to be abandoned? Already voices have arisen that certain states have become too large to manage (Lord Bryce, Mr. L. P. Jacks, editor of the Hibbert Journal). Mr. Louis D. Brandeis, now of the United States Supreme Court, has shown that even under modern conditions certain business units can become so large as to be physically incapable of successful administration. May this not be equally true of states, especially polyethnic states? But it may be said that it is hard to reconstruct a state, it is not easy to organize a new state. Yes, there is no easy road to anything worth while. The road of progress has never been free of thorns. It was not easy to organize the United States of America, and the period of experimentation under the Articles of Confederation was full of trials and tribulations. For a long time it was a question whether in America we should have an aggregation of loose-jointed states, or whether a foundation for a real nation would be laid. Yet the difficulties did not prevent the fathers from undertaking the task. That the new state would not have direct access to the sea seems to some to be a serious obstacle. Access to the sea is important, but with modern methods of communication not as important as it was in the past. After all, the sea affords simply a means of communication. Whether we are restricted to communication by the sea, or by rail, makes little difference if a country is confronted by high tariffs. However, an independent Bohemian-Slovak State can be connected with the future Serbo-Croatia by giving the strip of land at the Hungarian frontier in the west, either to Serbia, or one half of it (north) to Bohemia, the other (south) to Serbia. This corridor will be formed of parts of the counties of Pozsony (Pressburg), Sopron (Oedenburg), Moson (Wieselburg), and Vas (Eisenburg). Such a corridor would give Bohemia access to the Serbo-Croatian ports. Economic rights of way for land-locked states are advocated by Mr. Toynbee in his new work (The New Europe), and Mr. Toynbee thus indicates how the problem of access to the sea may be solved. It is also true that the future Bohemian-Slovak State will have a German and perhaps a small Magyar minority, but in central and eastern Europe hardly any state can be constructed without certain national minorities. In the present instance these minorities are not as large as the false Austrian and Magyar statistics and the unequal and unfair suffrage rules would make it appear. It ought 
to be fairly easy to safeguard the interests of a German and Magyar minority in a Bohemian-Slovak State, certainly easier than it would be to protect the rights of Bohemians and Slovaks in a deformed Austria. It is rather amusing to see the concern some people exhibit over the possible oppression of a small German and Magyar minority by the Czechs and Slovaks, although they never appeared to be very much exercised over the oppression of the majority of Czechs and Slovaks by a small minority of Germans and Magyars. But in any event, the rights of such minorities certainly should be regulated in some fashion, and there can be no objection to this. The federalization of Austria and the safeguarding of the rights of Slavs in Austria can be achieved only at the point of Allied guns. This is no easier and perhaps decidedly more difficult than to dissolve Austria and get rid of the problem forever. Basing the statement on historical records, it is not to be expected that the Bohemians will oppress the Germans. In spheres where the Czechs had any degree of self-government, as for instance in school matters, the Germans were never denied their legitimate needs. The municipality of Prague has always furnished adequate school facilities for the small German minority in Prague, and this is decidedly more than was done by municipalities in the hands of Germans for their Bohemian minorities. The thought cannot be laborated in this paper, but it is worth noting that a policy of denationalization of other peoples is one peculiar almost wholly to the Germans. After all, there is such a thing as psychology of nations, and the Slavs have never been noted for attempts to impose their language upon other nationalities. Russia is not an exception to the rule. If we stop to think about it, it is immediately recognized that the reactionary policies of Russia have been due largely to the Junkers from Russian Baltic Provinces who are of German descent. The factors thus enumerated, the right of any nation to independence once its possibility is demonstrated, the necessity of dissolving Austria in the interests of permanent peace, I believe to be decisive of the merits of the Czech case. I would not even fear the joining of purely German parts of Austria to the German Empire. This would carry the principle of nationality to its logical conclusion. It would perhaps strengthen Germany absolutely, but very seriously weaken it relatively. To the German Empire would be added a few million Germans, but it would be deprived of the support of a much larger number of Slavs, who are being made use of to fight the battles of their bitterest enemy, and one bent upon their subjugation, even upon their destruction. The Bohemian question is simplicity itself when we consider the problem of small nationalities in Europe generally, and when we realize that to regenerate Europe means also the reconstruction of Poland, Serbo-Croatia, and the freeing of the French and Danes in Germany. Yet, whether difficult or easy, these questions must be faced unflinchingly. Again, let it not be forgotten that the Czech question is one of restoration; that the Czechs are asking for something which de jure they never surrendered. The Hapsburgs were called to the Bohemian throne by the free will of the representatives of the Bohemian State, and they undertook by solemn oaths and pledges to protect and safeguard the independence of this state. The violation of such pledges on their part, and the deprivation of the Czechs of their independence by force, does not do away with their legal rights, so that the Czech claim has the strongest possible legal sanction. The fact that the Czechs at one time had a strong and powerful state, well organized, as states were organized then, is also a sufficient proof of inherent political capacity. The Bohemian question has become an international problem par excellence. It was Bismarck who maintained that the power that rules Bohemia rules Europe. Such a problem cannot be permitted to remain unsolved. The only possible solution which will guarantee permanent peace, and which will also be fair to the nationalities concerned, is the reconstruction of a Bohemian-Slovak State. Victor Hugo had the theft of Alsace-Lorraine in mind when he said: “Another war, alas! Yes, it is necessary.” The Czechs firmly believe that at the conclusion of this war the Bohemian question will be solved, and that they will regain their independence; but if the problem is not definitely disposed of, and disposed of right, we shall have to paraphrase Victor Hugo’s exclamation: “Another war, alas! Yes, it is unavoidable.”
f a nation is conscious of its nationality, if it demands independence and liberty, if it has proved the possibility of such independence by its economic and cultural development, its right to independence is removed from the sphere of debatable questions. 
The Czechs are intensely conscious of their nationality. Bohemia, once one of the most powerful of European states, lost its independence only as a result of the application of brute force. The Czech people never voluntarily surrendered their right to independence, and against the rights of nations there is no statute of limitations. When the war broke out, of all the belligerent countries only Austria failed to convoke its parliament, such as it is. When this failure to maintain even the semblance of parliamentary life began to be the subject of international comment, the Austrian government commenced negotiations with various political parties. It was especially afraid of the Czech protest. It asked for a pro-Austrian declaration. But cajolery, promises, threats, nothing could induce the Czechs to declare even in mild terms for Austria. The Czech political parties could not be forced to condemn the anti-Austrian activities of those Czech leaders who were fortunate enough to escape from Austria and are actively engaged in the movement for Bohemian independence. Even promises of clemency for Czech political leaders sentenced to death for alleged treason to the Austrian state were of no avail. Only recently the cable brought a report that an offer of such an infamous bargain was rejected by the Czechs. The civilized world is well aware of the fact that in spite of the fierce opposition of the Austrian government and Austrian Germans to the development of the Czech people, this nationality has reached a plane surpassing that of any other nation in Austria, and that in literature and art it is second to no nation of its numerical strength. A nation that gave to the world men like Hus and Komensky, a nation that in modern times has produced a host of writers of the highest rank, many philosophers, statesmen, and gifted journalists, such a nation is certainly capable of governing itself. Economically and financially the Czech countries are the richest of the present Austrian “provinces,” and when freed from oppressive taxation, discriminating in favor of financially “passive” Austrian lands, the independent Bohemian-Slovak State will be even richer. At the present time 62.7 per cent of the burden of Austrian taxation is borne by the Czech countries, while the rest of Austria carries only 37.3 per cent. The Bohemian lands surpass the other Austrian lands in the production of grain; 38 per cent of the grain lands of Austria is found in Bohemia. Of the coal found in Austria, 83 per cent is mined in the Bohemian lands; 60 per cent of the Austrian iron is found there; 90 per cent, if not more, of the sugar factories of Austria are located in the lands of the Bohemian crown; the textile industry is one of large proportions, and leather, paper, furniture, and electro-technical industries are of importance. When we take into consideration the undeveloped resources of Slovakia, which naturally will form a part of the state, we see very readily that economically the future Bohemian-Slovak State will be amply able to stand on its own feet. At this point we may emphasize again distinctly the fact that joining the Bohemians in their future state should be the Slovaks of Hungary. The world has by this time realized that in provoking the Great War the Magyar oligarchy was particeps criminis; this war was not only a German war, but it was a Magyar war as well. The non-Magyar nationalities in Hungary in the past have been oppressed in true Asiatic style, and the Magyars participated in the intrigues leading to the war, because they hoped that as a result of the expected German and Austrian victory their domination in Hungary would be perpetuated and their dominion extended. Budapest has been the most faithful ally of Berlin. The Slovaks form a part of the same ethnic group as the Bohemians; they desire to be joined with the Bohemians in one state, and this wish should be gratified not only because it manifests a natural tendency, but also because it is in the interests of Europe to gratify it. As a matter of fact an independent Bohemian-Slovak State will have a population of over twelve million inhabitants, and in territorial extent will be eighth among twenty-two European sovereignties, and it cannot be said that such a state would be small. Moreover, is not the belief in the necessity of large states one of the theories which are destined to be abandoned? Already voices have arisen that certain states have become too large to manage (Lord Bryce, Mr. L. P. Jacks, editor of the Hibbert Journal). Mr. Louis D. Brandeis, now of the United States Supreme Court, has shown that even under modern conditions certain business units can become so large as to be physically incapable of successful administration. May this not be equally true of states, especially polyethnic states? But it may be said that it is hard to reconstruct a state, it is not easy to organize a new state. Yes, there is no easy road to anything worth while. The road of progress has never been free of thorns. It was not easy to organize the United States of America, and the period of experimentation under the Articles of Confederation was full of trials and tribulations. For a long time it was a question whether in America we should have an aggregation of loose-jointed states, or whether a foundation for a real nation would be laid. Yet the difficulties did not prevent the fathers from undertaking the task. That the new state would not have direct access to the sea seems to some to be a serious obstacle. Access to the sea is important, but with modern methods of communication not as important as it was in the past. After all, the sea affords simply a means of communication. Whether we are restricted to communication by the sea, or by rail, makes little difference if a country is confronted by high tariffs. However, an independent Bohemian-Slovak State can be connected with the future Serbo-Croatia by giving the strip of land at the Hungarian frontier in the west, either to Serbia, or one half of it (north) to Bohemia, the other (south) to Serbia. This corridor will be formed of parts of the counties of Pozsony (Pressburg), Sopron (Oedenburg), Moson (Wieselburg), and Vas (Eisenburg). Such a corridor would give Bohemia access to the Serbo-Croatian ports. Economic rights of way for land-locked states are advocated by Mr. Toynbee in his new work (The New Europe), and Mr. Toynbee thus indicates how the problem of access to the sea may be solved. It is also true that the future Bohemian-Slovak State will have a German and perhaps a small Magyar minority, but in central and eastern Europe hardly any state can be constructed without certain national minorities. In the present instance these minorities are not as large as the false Austrian and Magyar statistics and the unequal and unfair suffrage rules would make it appear. It ought 
Outline Map of the future Bohemian-Slovak State: Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia, and Slovakia
It is rather amusing to see the concern some people exhibit over the possible oppression of a small German and Magyar minority by the Czechs and Slovaks, although they never appeared to be very much exercised over the oppression of the majority of Czechs and Slovaks by a small minority of Germans and Magyars. But in any event, the rights of such minorities certainly should be regulated in some fashion, and there can be no objection to this. The federalization of Austria and the safeguarding of the rights of Slavs in Austria can be achieved only at the point of Allied guns. This is no easier and perhaps decidedly more difficult than to dissolve Austria and get rid of the problem forever. Basing the statement on historical records, it is not to be expected that the Bohemians will oppress the Germans. In spheres where the Czechs had any degree of self-government, as for instance in school matters, the Germans were never denied their legitimate needs. The municipality of Prague has always furnished adequate school facilities for the small German minority in Prague, and this is decidedly more than was done by municipalities in the hands of Germans for their Bohemian minorities. The thought cannot be laborated in this paper, but it is worth noting that a policy of denationalization of other peoples is one peculiar almost wholly to the Germans. After all, there is such a thing as psychology of nations, and the Slavs have never been noted for attempts to impose their language upon other nationalities. Russia is not an exception to the rule. If we stop to think about it, it is immediately recognized that the reactionary policies of Russia have been due largely to the Junkers from Russian Baltic Provinces who are of German descent. The factors thus enumerated, the right of any nation to independence once its possibility is demonstrated, the necessity of dissolving Austria in the interests of permanent peace, I believe to be decisive of the merits of the Czech case. I would not even fear the joining of purely German parts of Austria to the German Empire. This would carry the principle of nationality to its logical conclusion. It would perhaps strengthen Germany absolutely, but very seriously weaken it relatively. To the German Empire would be added a few million Germans, but it would be deprived of the support of a much larger number of Slavs, who are being made use of to fight the battles of their bitterest enemy, and one bent upon their subjugation, even upon their destruction. The Bohemian question is simplicity itself when we consider the problem of small nationalities in Europe generally, and when we realize that to regenerate Europe means also the reconstruction of Poland, Serbo-Croatia, and the freeing of the French and Danes in Germany. Yet, whether difficult or easy, these questions must be faced unflinchingly. Again, let it not be forgotten that the Czech question is one of restoration; that the Czechs are asking for something which de jure they never surrendered. The Hapsburgs were called to the Bohemian throne by the free will of the representatives of the Bohemian State, and they undertook by solemn oaths and pledges to protect and safeguard the independence of this state. The violation of such pledges on their part, and the deprivation of the Czechs of their independence by force, does not do away with their legal rights, so that the Czech claim has the strongest possible legal sanction. The fact that the Czechs at one time had a strong and powerful state, well organized, as states were organized then, is also a sufficient proof of inherent political capacity. The Bohemian question has become an international problem par excellence. It was Bismarck who maintained that the power that rules Bohemia rules Europe. Such a problem cannot be permitted to remain unsolved. The only possible solution which will guarantee permanent peace, and which will also be fair to the nationalities concerned, is the reconstruction of a Bohemian-Slovak State. Victor Hugo had the theft of Alsace-Lorraine in mind when he said: “Another war, alas! Yes, it is necessary.” The Czechs firmly believe that at the conclusion of this war the Bohemian question will be solved, and that they will regain their independence; but if the problem is not definitely disposed of, and disposed of right, we shall have to paraphrase Victor Hugo’s exclamation: “Another war, alas! Yes, it is unavoidable.”