CHAP. X.
How we ought to estimate the Strength of Governments.
It is also important in the study of the different governments of which I have just spoken, to examine if the prince in time of need be powerful enough to defend himself by his own forces without having recourse to the assistance of his allies. To place this point in the clearest view, I will observe that those only can so defend themselves who have men and money enough to bring an army into the field, and give battle to the power who shall attack them. On the contrary, lamentable indeed is the situation of a prince reduced to the necessity of shutting himself up in the city of his residence, and therein to await the enemy's approach. I have already treated of the first point, and shall have occasion to return to it.
As to the second, I cannot but warn princes to fortify and provision the city in which they reside, and not to trouble themselves about the rest: for if as I have said, and shall again say in the sequel, they have learned how to manage the people's affection, I think they will have nothing to fear. Men don't like to embark in difficult enterprises without some appearance of success, and it is never prudent to attack a prince who keeps the city of his residence in a good state of defence, and is not hated by the people.
The cities of Germany enjoy a very extensive liberty; they have a territory of inconsiderable extent, and obey the emperor when they please, not fearing to be attacked either by him or by others, because they all have strong walls, deep ditches, artillery and provisions for a year, so that the siege of these cities would be long and painful. Added to this, they have always in reserve labour to employ the people during the same space of time, in order to support them without having recourse to the public purse: besides, their troops are regularly exercised in military evolutions, and their regulations in that respect are as wise as they are well observed.
A prince therefore who possesses a well fortified city, the inhabitants of which are attached to him, cannot be attacked with advantage, because the affairs of this world are so liable to change, that it is almost impossible for an enemy to keep the field a year before a place so defended.
I may perhaps be asked whether the people who have property outside the walls, and who see their lands ravaged, will not lose their patience, and if the attachment they feel for the prince will so long continue against the inconveniencies of a long siege and the desire of preserving their property? To this I answer, that a prince who at once possesses talents and power will easily surmount these obstacles, either by inspiring the people with hopes that the siege will not be of long continuance, or by raising in their minds a dread of the resentment and rapacity of the conqueror, or by dexterously assuring himself of those who are too clamorous.
To this may be added, that the enemy wastes the country from the first moment he enters into it, and when the besieged are most animated, most disposed to defend themselves. The prince ought therefore in this respect to be devoid of fear, because that the first heat once passed, the inhabitants, perceiving that all the mischief is accomplished, and that there is no longer any remedy, will evince so much the more ardour to defend their prince, the greater sacrifices they have made for him. For who is it that is ignorant that men become attached as much by the good they do as by that which they receive?
All these considerations induce me to believę that a prince, however slender his abilities may be, will without difficulty succeed in sustaining the courage of the besieged, if the place be well stored with provisions, and the means of defence.