CHAP. IX.
Of Civil Principalities.
We will now consider another point. A private individual may become the prince of his country by favour of his fellow citizens, and without employing either violence or treason. This is what I call a civil principality. To arrive at this rank, does not require either uncommon merit or extraordinary fortune-but merely a captivating address. The sovereign magistracy is obtained either by the good will of the people or of the nobles: for the different parties who have the power of dividing a state are reduced to these two elements, one of which springs from the aversion of the people to the oppressive government of the nobles, the other from the desire these have to govern and oppress the people. Now, this diversity of views and interests produces a struggle, which in the conclusion establishes either a principality, liberty, or licentiousness.
A principality emanates either from the nobles or the people, according to the decision of fortune; for the former finding themselves closely pressed by the people, have often no other means of subduing them than by advancing from their own class one whom they nominate prince, that under the mask of an acknowledged authority they may indulge themselves in their desire of domination. The people on their part, rather than submit to their enemy, generally adopt the plan of opposing to him a plebeian from whom they expect support and protection.
He who acquires a principality through the interest of the nobles, with much difficulty maintains his situation, because he is surrounded by men who, thinking themselves still his equals, submit reluctantly to his authority. On the contrary, he who is raised to that dignity by the will of the people finds himself supreme in it, and there are few indeed among those around him, who would dare to resist his measures.
Besides this, he can without injustice content the people, but not the nobles; these seeking to exercise tyranny, the others merely to avoid it. Besides, a prince who might have the nobles against him, may in consequence of their small number easily restrain them within the limits of duty; but how could he assure himself of the obedience and fidelity of the people, if he separated his own interests from theirs?
The prince must unquestionably expect to be abandoned by a people who are disaffected to him, as he would be by nobles contrary to whose will and pleasure he should govern. So, far there is a perfect equality: but in respect to the latter, as they know how to calculate events and profit by them, the prince ought to suppose that on the first reverse of fortune they would turn against him for the purpose of making a merit of it with the conqueror.
Finally, there is an absolute necessity to live always with the same people, but not with the same nobles, whom he can at pleasure disgrace or load with favours, elevate or destroy. But to throw still more light on the subject, I propose to examine the two points of view in which the prince ought to consider the nobles; and, first, whether they are entirely attached to his fortune, or not. Those who give him proofs of their zeal and devotion to him ought to be cherished and honoured, provided they are not rapacious. Amongst those who are shy of shewing too much attachment to the fortune of the prince, some are actuated by weakness and timidity, others by calculation and particular views of ambition. The first of these the prince should endeavour to secure, particularly if they have connections elsewhere; inasmuch as he can always do them honour in prosperity, and in the hour of adversity men of this character are seldom to be dreaded. As to the others, the prince ought to distrust them as he would declared enemies, who, not content with abandoning his interests, would not hesitate, if fortune should be adverse, to take up arms against him.
He who has been raised to a civil principality by the favour of the people should earnestly exert himself to preserve their affection, which it is always easy to do, since the people ask nothing more than not to be oppressed. But he who becomes prince by the favour of the nobles, and contrary to the will of the people, should above all things strive to gain their attachment, and he will infallibly succeed in it by protecting them against those who seek to subdue them.
Men being generally very sensible of the good they receive from those from whom they expected only evil, there can be no doubt of the attachment of the people to a prince who treats them well, still more than if he had been raised to that rank by their means. Now, the good will of the people may be gained by various means which it would be useless here to adduce, seeing the difficulty there is of applying a rule adapted to so many different cireumstances.
The only resource that a prince can rely on in adversity is the affection of the people. When Nabis, Prince of Sparta, was attacked by the victorious army of the Romans, and by the other states of Greece, he had only to assure himself of a small number of citizens: if the whole people had been his enemy, the means he used could never have succeeded.
Nor is the proverb good authority, “that he who relies on the people builds on a sandy foundation." It may be true with respect to a single citizen opposed to powerful enemies, or oppressed by the magistrates, as happened to the Gracchi at Rome, and to George Scali at Florence; but a prince who is not wanting in courage, nor in a certain address, and who, far from suffering himself to be dejected by ill fortune, knows how by his firmness as well as by wise regulations to preserve order in his states, will never repent having laid his foundation on the people's affection.
A prince in wishing to be absolute hastens to ruin, especially if he does not govern by himself; for then he becomes dependant on those to whom he has confided his authority, who on the first disturbance either refuse to obey him, or even rebel against him, and then it is no longer time to think of making himself absolute; for whether it be that the prince knows not whom he can trust, or that the subjects and citizens are accustomed to obey the magistrates, and will not acknowledge any other authority; the situation of a prince in such conjunctures is so much the more lamentableę, as he cannot regulate his conduct by the state of things which take place in ordinary times, and when they have continually occasion to have recourse to his authority; for then every one presses eagerly around him, and seems disposed to die in his defence, because the death which they seem willing to risk is far distant; but on a reverse of fortune, should an opportunity offer itself of shewing such devotion, the prince unhappily finds too late how little sincerity there was in that ardour. Now, this experiment is so much the more hazardous, as it can never be made twice.
A wise prince should therefore at all times so conduct himself, that, whenever the state has occasion for the citizens, they may always be disposed to serve it with zeal and fidelity,