CHAP. XXI.
By what means a Prince may become esteemed.
Nothing is more likely to make a prince esteemed than great enterprises, and in general extraordinary actions. Ferdinand, the present King of Spain, may be considered as a new prince, since from being simply king of a weak state he is from his great actions become the first monarch in Christendom. Now, if we examine his actions, we shall throughout the whole perceive a character of grandeur, and some of them are indeed most splendid.
Scarcely was this prince seated on the throne when he turned his arms against the kingdom of Grenada; and this war laid the foundation of his greatness, inasmuch as the nobles of Castile thought of nothing but fighting, and entirely disregarded his political innovations, and were also far from perceiving the authority which this prince was every day acquiring at their expence, by paying with the church's and people's money those armies which have raised him to his present high state of power. Afterwards to enable him to undertake enterprises still more brilliant, he dexterously assumed the mask of religion, and by a cruel piety drove the Moors out of his dominions. This political trait is truly deplorable, and without example. (Vide Appendix D.)
Ferdinand also cloathed himself with the mantle of religion to attack successively Africa, Italy, and France, cherishing always the most extensive projects, and such as were most capable of concentrating the attention of his subjects on the events of his reign. This prince was also most expert in allaying the storms which formed round his head; so that he was able to attain his object without experiencing difficulties on the part of his subjects.
It is also very useful to a prince from time to time to decree punishments, and to distribute rewards which reflect great splendor, and impress themselves strongly on men's minds. Barnabas, Lord of Milan, was in that respect an example worthy of imitation. Those who govern ought in general to strive most anxiously to appear great in all their actions, and to avoid in their affections every thing which may incur the character of weakness and indecision. A prince who does not know how to be altogether eitlier a friend or an enemy, will with difficulty conciliate his subjects. Should two powerful neighbours go to war with each other, he should declare for one of them, without which he will become the prey of the conqueror; and the vanquished being pleased at his ruin, there will remain to him no resource; for the conqueror cannot wish for a doubtful friend, who might abandon him on the first reverse of fortune, and the vanquished cannot pardon him for having been a tranquil spectator of his defeat.
When Antiochus passed into Greece, whither the Etolians had invited him in order to drive out the Romans, he sent ambassadors to the Achaians, friends of the latter, to engage them to remain neuter. The Romans on the other hand demanded that they should declare for them. The affair being taken into deliberation in the council of the Achaians, the Roman envoy spoke after the ambassador of Antiochus, and said, "You are advised to remain neutral, as the safest mode of conduct; and I assure you there can be none so bad; for you will inevitably remain at the mercy of the conqueror, whoever he may be, and will thus have two chances to one against you." (Vide Appendix E.)
They are never friends and allies who demand neutrality. This consideration alone ought to open the eyes of a prince who would adopt that conduct: but if he is of, a weak and irresolute character, the consideration of avoiding a present embarrassment renders him blind to the danger of such a determination. When a prince declares boldly for one of two parties, he attaches that party to himself by the tie of gratitude, and has but little to dread from being placed at his mercy if he should be the conqueror; first, because men are seldom so wholly destitute of honour as to repay benefits by so revolting an ingratitude: secondly, because victory is rarely so very complete as to place the conqueror in a state to violate all the laws of propriety. If, on the other hand, he whose fortune the prince espouses should be vanquished, he may in time retrieve his losses, and acknowledge this mark of preferėnce and esteem.
A prince ought never, except as I have already said where he is forced to it by events, to take the part of a neighbouring state more powerful than himself, because he lies at his mercy should he be the conqueror. 'Twas thus that the Venetians were ruined by unnecessarily allying themselves with France against the Duke of Milan. The Florentines, on the other hand, could not be blamed for having embraced the cause of the Pope and the King of Spain, when they marched their forces against Lombardy, because in so doing they yielded, as I have already shewn, to the law of necessity. After all, there is no party perfectly sure of success, and we often avoid one danger only by encountering a greater; human prudence consists in avoiding the worst.
Princes ought to honour talents and protect the arts, particularly commerce and agriculture. It is peculiarly important that they should secure those who exercise them against the dread of being overcharged with taxes, and of seeing themselves despoiled of their lands afterhaving improved them by superior cultivation. Finally, they should not neglect to give the people, at certain periods of the year, festivals and shows, and also to honour with their presence different trading bodies, and to display on those occasions their bounty and magnificence; at the same time avoiding every thing that may compromise the dignity of the rank to which they are elevated