The Unpopular History of the United States by Uncle Sam Himself/Chapter 15

by Harris Dickson

XV

THE TIN HORN DEFENSE

Looking back at our catalogue of adversities, I get mighty darn hot in the collar to hear some well-meaning and loudly-vocal person go careering around the country and orate as per this formula: "Should foreign hirelings assail the integrity of this Republic, one blast upon the bugle trump of Freedom and a million patriots will spring to arms over night!" Spring to arms. What arms? Where? Not this Spring. But the worst of it is that thousands of sensible folks believe that rot. It's a shame to puncture such a pretty noise, but in 1814 this bugle trump experiment — this tin horn scheme of defense — was actually tested. A British fleet carrying 3,000 troops threatened Washington City. On July 4 President Madison sounded the bugle trump, day of all days when Freedom's blast should have been heard and answered by Freedom's warriors. Various governors were ordered "to hold in readiness for immediate service a corps of 93,500." We had these warriors on paper, upwards of ninety thousand, and their numbers seemed exuberantly ample to beat off 3,000 regulars. Besides, we had the bugle trump. Yet, heedless of that talismanic blast, the redcoats landed. On August 24th every solitary mother's son of our 93,500 warriors sprang to arms — every one of them, except 88,099. For defense of the Capital, 5,041 men actually assembled, without organization, discipline or skilled leadership. To render the spectacle more splendidly humiliating, President Madison and his Cabinet rode out to witness the battle of Bladensburg.

The British only employed 1,500 men, but they were trained men; 1,500 real soldiers marched through our paper forces of 93,500, just as if they had been paper — wet tissue paper. After a loss of eight men killed and eleven wounded, Freedom's warriors scattered, abandoning their Capital to the British torch, and yet, according to most conservative estimates, our 5,401 patriots should have easily licked a hireling army of 54,000 men.

Remember, this British fleet had been hovering along the Chesapeake for more than a year. Congress had ample time to get ready, and Congress possessed unlimited power to raise armies. Yet the administration paid no attention to the danger until June. Then they began to inquire of each other through the routine red tape channels, "What force have we?" Answer, returning by devious paths, "2,208 men," mostly recruits, dispersed at various points along the Chesapeake, from Baltimore to Norfolk.

My son, we've tried the bugle-trump and it gives me a shiver to think of relying wholly upon such a tin horn scheme of defense. It's just a little worse than the ten-to-one shot.

After the capture and burning of Washington had been so smoothly accomplished, our people got wrathy, and howled. The Secretary of War was chased out of the Capital, and not permitted to return, even for the pious purpose of handing in his most urgently demanded resignation. Washington City had fallen, and the popular indignation fell upon the Secretary. It was possibly no more his fault than the surrender of Detroit had been the fault of General Hull. He had relied upon the state governors to send 93,500 militia to protect the National Capital. But the 93,500 didn't come. As a result of his depending upon a rush of patriots who failed to rush, the Secretary was compelled to fly, "hissed and hunted" to his home in Virginia.

Now, let's skip a lot of bungles, and go south, to something that looks better, the battle of New Orleans.

At Bunker Hill, if you remember, our farmers fired from behind rail breastworks and justified Israel Putnam's prediction that "these Americans will fight forever if you protect their legs." At New Orleans our position was far stronger, a line of defense well chosen and fortified by impervious cotton bales. Yet British officers and regulars had acquired such contempt for our militia that General Pakenham ordered the impossible. Long afterwards a British officer told me that if Pakenham hadn't been killed he would have been courtmartialed for his folly.

The British were beaten with terrific loss. Yet one little fly — the same busy and buzzing little fly — got into the ointment of our jubilation. On the west bank of the river the American breastworks — with the exception of a single battery manned by sailors — were defended exclusively by militia. At the very moment of a victory unparalleled in our history, Old Hickory had the mortification of seeing his division on the west bank "abandon their position and run in headlong flight towards the city." Old Hickory naturally cussed 'em out for their disobedience, insubordination and cowardice.

The Battle of New Orleans occurred two weeks after a treaty of peace had been signed at Ghent, and before the news reached this country. Now suppose this unnecessary battle had never been fought, my son, can you point to a single big victory that we gained upon the land? Yet we outnumbered the British more than 32 to 1.

Our navy, on the contrary, waged a bold and successful warfare. But they were sea-faring men, trained, skillful and obedient. All of which further emphasizes the point that I have been trying to make clear — the transformation which can be accomplished by discipline.

Let me throw at you one more big detail, then I'm done with the War of 1812. In that war, by the same wasteful militia system, we employed first and last 527,654 men — more than half a million, which included 33,481 inexperienced officers. During 1814 alone we paid for and maintained more than 235,000 men under arms. In contrast with our reckless extravagance let me impress upon you the fact that, according to the best figures obtainable, the largest force of British ever opposed to us was 16,500. And yet with all this preponderance of numbers — more than thirty-two Americans to one British regular — we achieved only a single decisive victory before the treaty of peace. Does that sound like Americans licking ten to one?

The solitary victory which we gained was the battle of the Thames, where the British regulars, dispersed and captured, numbered 834; in addition to this. General Proctor — the same Proctor who had been raising so much sand in the northwest — had a force of Indians estimated at twelve hundred. Thirty-three of their warriors were left dead on the field, including the famous Tecumseh. General Harrison estimated his American forces at a little over three thousand.

During this War of 1812 no fewer than 5,000 British soldiers for a period of two years, brought war and devastation into our territory, and successfully withstood the misapplied power of seven million people.