The Writings of Carl Schurz/To President Cleveland, December 15th, 1886
TO PRESIDENT CLEVELAND
My dear Mr. President: There are some things which should be said to you now, and as I have been asked to do it, I crave your indulgence for a few minutes.
It is your endeavor, I apprehend, to serve the cause of reform consistently with what you conceive to be the interest of your party. Under such circumstances a correct view of the relation between that cause and party interest is of high importance. In this respect it should be observed that the political situation has of late undergone a significant change. It may be doubted whether the National Labor party now organizing will live long. But it seems very probable that it will appear with some strength in the election of 1888. Had a Labor candidate in 1884 received in the whole State as many votes as Henry George received last month in this city, you would have lost New York by at least 20,000. It is by no means unlikely that two years hence a Labor candidate will receive at least something like the George vote, in the State. Much less would suffice to defeat the Democrats on the basis of the figures of 1884, considering that, according to trustworthy estimates, fully three-fourths of the Labor vote is drawn from the Democratic ranks. In New Jersey and Connecticut the proportion would probably be about the same.
The Democrats will, therefore, be doomed to defeat, unless votes enough to cover the deficiency be won over from the Republicans.
The Democratic party has, indeed, gained one important point. The superstition that a Democratic President will absolutely ruin the country, is effectually dispelled; that is to say, when a Democratic nomination especially commends itself to favor, or a Republican nomination repels public confidence, the old vague fear will no longer stand in the way of Democratic success.
But aside from that, the Democratic party, as a party, has not grown in the popular confidence since 1884. It has rather lost ground. It has, as represented in Congress, shown a singular incapacity in dealing with public problems, and the demonstrative efforts of its politicians to defeat a consistent reform policy have offered a somewhat repulsive spectacle generally. It might make some local gains by a statesmanlike treatment of the tariff question; but there is scarcely any hope of that, especially with its diminished majority in the next Congress. The Democratic party, as such, will therefore not be able to draw the necessary number of votes from the Republicans.
It has only one chance of salvation, and that is by renominating you. I do not know, and do not inquire, whether you desire to be nominated or not. I only mean to say that, whatever your personal wishes may be, a failure to renominate you would be understood as a distinct rebuke by your party of the attempted reform policy with which your name is identified, and that then any Republican candidate will easily defeat his Democratic competitor.
But your renomination will save the Democratic party only if your name remains strong enough to draw a large number of Republican votes—not only the old Independent force, but much more; and you will be renominated only if the Democratic politicians know that you can draw them and that nobody else can. You were nominated in 1884 not on account of the strength you had within your party, but on account of that strength which you were believed to possess outside of it. A renomination in 1888 will come to you only if, for the same reason, you are looked upon as a necessity—for you have already displeased the spoils politicians in your party, so much so that even a complete surrender to them would hardly make them trust and love you. The less outside strength you command, the less will you appear necessary to your party, and the less will be the probability of your renomination. The Democratic politicians who sneer most at the Mugwumps will be the first to throw you overboard as soon as they see that the Mugwumps are no longer in force on your side.
It is scarcely necessary to say that your strength outside of your party depends entirely upon the confidence inspired by the course of your Administration. In this respect it has become a duty of friendship to speak without reserve. Until recently a general trust in the sincerity of your professions sought for what appeared to be your mistakes and inconsistencies the most favorable explanations. The worst things laid to your charge were construed as mere errors of judgment, and perhaps occasionally a certain stubbornness of temper in sticking to an error once committed. But the fact should not be concealed from you, that this confiding belief has been seriously shaken by your action in the Benton-Stone case.[1] This was not a mere mistake as to the character or qualification of a person, or an error owing to misinformation. This was a retreat from a position of principle—a “back-down” apparently for partisan reasons or under partisan dictation. The letters with which that retreat was sought to be covered made the matter appear only worse, and the subsequent revelation of the fact that the Democrat Benton had really attacked your Administration while the Republican Stone had cautiously abstained from doing so, has poured over all professions of principle and impartiality in the proceeding a flood of ridicule, which is even more hurtful than serious criticism.
The evil consequences of that act go far beyond the abandonment of that one position. It was like a flash of lightning showing many other things in a new aspect. It gave a new and a strange significance to the fact that the “offensive partisan” and “pernicious activity” business, however originally intended, had, in point of practical application, served only to cloak the removal of Republican officeholders, while Democratic officeholders were permitted to do partisan work very much as they pleased. It brought to mind the other fact, that while in Republican States many good things were done, in States which had Democratic Senators or other strong and exacting Democratic leaders, the spoils system flourished again as of old. It severely staggered the old belief that where no explanation was given of a questionable act, a creditable explanation must at least be possible. In one word, this one step has greatly diminished the number of those who were always confident that whatever you did, if not always well done, was at least always well meant.
There is a condition of public confidence under which all a man does is construed favorably, and there is another under which all is construed unfavorably. You have had all the advantages of the first. If I am not mistaken, you are now standing on the dividing line between the two. If you should drift into the second, other weak points of your Administration, which so far have plagued you comparatively little, would then rise to uncomfortable importance, in a manner sometimes quite unjust to you. Such is the Pan-Electric affair, and the retention of the Attorney-General [Garland] in the Cabinet, the generous motives for which I perfectly appreciate.[2] Such is the neglect of business in the Navy Department, which has for a long time been the current talk of the service and cannot fail finally to break out in the newspapers, aside from the ostentatious—to use a mild term—display of wealth by the Secretary [Wm. C. Whitney], especially unfortunate at a time when more than ever the highest official circles should set an example in preserving the old republican simplicity of social life in Washington against the invasion of vulgar millionairedom; and especially offensive and imprudent while the contrasts between the extremes of wealth and poverty are more than ever the subject of public attention. Such is the speech of the Postmaster-General as reported, approving the partisan cry that the decapitating processs does not go fast enough, together with the fact that the number of unfortunate changes in country post-offices, which to the rural mind represent the character of the Administration, has been particularly great. Such are many things which have so far been excused when they could not be explained or justified, and which injured you comparatively little while the presumption was in your favor; but which will be calculated to harm you seriously as soon as the presumption becomes doubtful or turns against you.
As the case stands to-day I should say that, if the election were to take place to-morrow, and if you were the candidate on one and Blaine on the other side, you would receive the whole Independent vote, and perhaps some Republican votes which were cast for Blaine in 1884; whether enough of the latter to cover the deficiency caused by the Labor movement, is questionable. But if the Republicans nominated, instead of Blaine, some fair man, you would have only a part of the Independent vote—consisting of the most decided anti-tariff men. In the first case, Blaine being now the weakest man the Republicans have, your success would perhaps be barely possible; in the latter case, your defeat might be looked upon as certain, and I venture to say that while Blaine's nomination would seem inevitable, if the Convention were held to-morrow, the number of Republicans who are afraid of it is constantly growing and not at all unlikely to control the Convention in 1888.
It being clear that you can save your party only by enabling it to draw a large number of votes from its opponents; and that this can be done only by a strong reform policy commanding general confidence, it seems no exaggeration to say that your action in the Benton-Stone case is the worst blow the Democratic party has received since 1884. It as been received with jubilant shouts by your worst enemies, such as the Sun, who wish not only to defeat but to disgrace you. It has encouraged the spoilsmen in your party as they have scarcely ever been encouraged before, for it has made them confident that they can subdue the strongest President if they only try hard enough. And surely they will try more than they ever did. Neither will they be deterred by what you say about reform, in your message. On the contrary, they find there another encouragement. They find the advanced positions tacitly abandoned, and the cause of administrative reform driven back into the last line of defense within the narrow entrenchment of the civil service law,—and even that entrenchment in spots by no means impregnable. They see no longer an advancing, but a retreating cause; and let us not forget that while a strong, aggressive movement commands esteem and acquiescence, a halting, retreating one invites contempt and attack.
The spoilsmen see more. They understand perfectly who those are whom you dismiss as “impracticable friends” and men of “misguided zeal.” They remember well that this is the same taunt those men had to hear from the Republican side, when they threw their political fortunes to the winds, repudiated Blaine, turned their backs upon their party and supported you who promised to be the champion of their common principles. And the spoilsmen eagerly believe that the spirit which inspires that taunt now, cannot be very different from that which inspired it on the other side two years ago. In this new departure they will see a fresh incitement to redouble their energies. Is there any hope that the power of resistance will grow in proportion to the increased vigor of the assault?
Nothing can be more certain than this. You cannot sacrifice the reform cause to your party without at the same time sacrificing your party to the worst element in it. This surely you do not mean to do. But I warned you more than once that your principal danger was to sit down between two chairs. I am afraid you are virtually there now. Only a heroic policy can extricate you from that situation. But it must be adopted soon, for it grows more difficult every day; the time is not far off when even the most heroic policy may no longer suffice to save your party, although it may be all the more necessary to save your honor.
Do not believe that I fail to appreciate the many good things you have done. Nobody values them more highly. Nobody rejoiced more than I at the enthusiastic reception you had at Cambridge a few weeks ago, and nobody can be more grieved than I, to think that it would hardly be so enthusiastic now, and that there your popularity culminated to descend thenceforth. Neither should you believe that anything I have said was caused by irritation at the expressions contained in your message. In my long public life I have met with so many similar things that they have ceased to vex and even to surprise me. I will admit, however, that I am sorry for the younger Independents who followed your standard, and to whom this experience is new. At any rate, permit me to remind you that no great reform ever succeeded without a high degree of impracticability among its champions; that, not to any political cunning, to your own impracticability you owe all the prestige and power you have; and that you need all of it now more than ever to save your cause, your party and your own standing in the confidence of the people.
It is due to you, as well as to myself, to say that the sentiments here expressed are by no means my own alone. I have had earnest consultations with friends well known to you, both Democrats and Independents, who all believe that you have reached a very critical point in your career, some of them going in their apprehensions even much farther than I do, and requested me to write to you. To do so, I considered a duty, but I assure you it was not a welcome task.[3]
- ↑ Benton was a Democratic and Stone a Republican U. S. district attorney who had respectively made campaign speeches. Both were dismissed for offensive partisanship, but Benton was reinstated. See 43 N. Y. Nation, 430, 450.
- ↑ Attorney-General Garland held stock in the Pan-Electric Co., which owned a patent of which the Bell telephone was alleged to be an infringement. If this claim were sustained, the value of the Pan-Electric stock would be very great. Mr. Garland permitted the Solicitor-General to institute proceedings impugning the validity of the Bell patent. The Republicans charged Mr. Garland with an attempt to enrich himself by using the resources of his Department for personal ends; though the decision of the case rested, of course, with the Court and not with Mr. Garland or his Solicitor-General. A Congressional committee afterwards exonerated these gentlemen.—Peck, Twenty Years of the Republic, p. 55, n. See also E. Benj. Andrews, 2 Hist. of the Last Quarter-Century, 108, 109.
- ↑ See the letter of Feb. 3, 1887, to Col. Codman.