The rise and fall of the Emperor Maximilian/Chapter XVII
CHAPTER XVII.
General Castelnau proceeds to the Capital—Marshal Bazaine's ambiguous Position—His Difficulties and Error—Dark Views of the French Cabinet—Agitated State of the Country and City of Mexico-Mexican Ingratitude—French Intrigues with Ortega—Attitude of the United States—Campbell and Sherman's Mission to Mexico—Mr. Seward's Instructions to the Envoys—They arrive at Tampico.
AFTER General Castelnau had fallen in with the Emperor Maximilian in the village of Ayotla, and had failed in obtaining an interview with the sovereign, he went on to Mexico, where he arrived October 21, 1866.
Dating from this epoch, so important to the destinies of Mexico, Marshal Bazaine's moral responsibility totally ceased. Public opinion was purposely misled when it has been attempted to throw upon the commander-in-chief the onus of any one resolution which was taken, or of any one act which was committed in this distant country after the arrival of Napoleon III.'s aide-de-camp. And, in fact, the instructions from the Tuileries, dated September 12, 1866, enjoined our head-quarters authorities neither to determine on nor execute any measure, either political or military, amidst the important events which were presenting themselves, without previously submitting everything to the assent of General Castelnau, assisted by M. Dano, the French minister, whose authority, hitherto almost effaced, now acquired fresh force.
The marshal consequently was now nothing more than a military commander, entirely subordinated to the full discretionary powers of Napoleon's envoy; placed, in fact, under the control of a mere general of brigade, invested by his sovereign with an unlimited confidence, which looked forward to every eventuality. Certainly, the commander-in-chief continued to speak and act in his own name; but the liberty of action which he appeared to preserve was only deceptive, for his power of taking the initiative disappeared at the moment of action. Only when a thing was once accomplished he was compulsorily saddled with the responsibility, since General Castelnau was only the secret prime-mover, whilst he was the visible agent. Well! we do not hesitate to say that, from the day when the policy of the French government showed itself to be ambiguous, when the official instructions came into collision with the semi-official, when policy became only a system of mental reservations; when, in short, the full confidence of the Emperor of the French was transferred from the commander-in-chief to the imperial aide-de-camp, Marshal Bazaine was led into a great and continuous error for which he pays the penalty; for he made himself responsible, before the tribunal of France and Europe, for acts which he did not originate, but to which, by his military obedience, he made himself a party. In our opinion, as regards the commander-in-chief, who was naturally loath to overturn the throne which for four years he had been helping to raise, the day had now come for him to sheathe his sword.
A protest like this would have been a great lesson: we can, however, well understand, that at this crisis a feeling of duty got the upper hand in the commander-in-chief's mind. The French army was still scattered far and wide. A retreat to be carried out over eighteen hundred leagues of territory, every stage of which he had himself worked out, needed all the experience of a man thoroughly acquainted with the country, its resources, and its hostility, if success was to be attained. Our government besides had appealed to the self-devotion of the marshal, to preserve the French flag from any insult before it left the Mexican soil. Now, if the monarchy was suddenly hurled down, it was to be expected that the two great parties in the nation would both rise against us. In the absence of the two generals of division, Douay and de Castagny, who were both away from Mexico, and necessarily engaged in the concentration of their troops, to whom could the chief command be safely entrusted? General Castelnau, being only just landed, and ignorant both of the people and country, being also inferior in rank to the above generals, was unable, in spite of his high authority as an imperial envoy, to take to the command of the expeditionary corps. The marshal, impelled by his cares for the future, and his attachment to the army, resolved, in spite of his thus being thrown into the shade, to follow out the work he had undertaken. Thus only can we explain the motives for the marshal's conduct.
One of the reasons which had decided Maximilian not to receive Napoleon's aide-de-camp at Ayotla (the aim of whose mission had already transpired), was the fact that General Castelnau was not accredited to the young sovereign, but only to our head-quarters, to whom he was sent to give the impulse desired and foreseen at the Tuileries, according to the various turns which events might take.
According to the first instructions given by the French cabinet, the programme was a very plain one,—Maximilian's abdication. The precautions taken by our government in withdrawing all assistance to the Imperial cause, had already prepared for this project, and made them hope for its success. If it had succeeded it is certain that it would have prevented that long agony, the consummation of which stained Queretaro with blood. 'If Maximilian abdicates,' the order ran from Paris, 'a congress is to be assembled. The ambition of the various disaffected chiefs, who are holding the country, is to be excited, and the presidency of the republic is to be conferred on that one amongst them (Juarez alone excepted), who will consent to grant the most weighty advantages to the intervention.' General Castelnau therefore, in spite of the bad reception which the young emperor had given him, must have rejoiced at the turn which things had already taken by Maximilian's own will, and by his spontaneously leaving the territory. For the difficulties of his mission were thus singularly diminished. The approaching downfall of the throne gave, liberty to any combination of government and to the prompt withdrawal of the expeditionary corps, which nothing need detain when the interests of our countrymen were once guaranteed. Now it had been thought in Paris, that the best means of obtaining this guarantee—means which seemed recommended by the long contest and successes of the Liberals—was to aid in the restoration of the presidential chair, in attempting to overthrow which we had uselessly expended so much money and so many lives. The French authorities were, therefore, waiting with keen impatience for the decisive news of Maximilian's embarkation. This event seemed the more desirable, as the country was a prey to a deep-seated agitation which might break out at any moment. The Mexican government, although the ministers still remained passively at their posts, existed only in name, and there was great danger in allowing a crisis to be prolonged which might develope into an insurrection of all the factions combined together against the foreigners. These symptoms, which were manifest even in the ministers themselves at the time when Maximilian, still undecided, had left Orizaba to retire to the Hacienda la Jalapilla, had assumed so menacing a character in the capital, that our head-quarters authorities were compelled to adopt measures of precaution: this is proved by the marshal's letter to the French general in command in the city.
My dear General,—I am informed of disturbances having taken place yesterday evening at the foreign theatre established on the Place d'Armes. I have written to his excellency the president of the council to request him to have this establishment closed to-day.
If the Mexican government should not think right to close the said theatre, as his majesty the Emperor Napoleon has been publicly insulted in it, and as his name has been received there with hootings and cries of hatred and contempt, you will be pleased to give orders to Captain Oudinot and to the gendarmerie that, in virtue of the state of war now existing, this theatre should be closed this evening.
You will adopt the necessary measures that the public peace should not be disturbed, and that anyone making a tumult should be immediately arrested.
Already were they thus insulting the sovereign of France: the Italians, after the battle of Villafranca, recompensed us with similar gratitude.
The cabinet of the Tuileries felt so certain of the approaching downfall of the Mexican throne, that, without loss of time, they had secretly called upon their diplomatists to enter into correspondence with Ortega, the former defender of Puebla, who had escaped from our hands in 1863 (thereby breaking his parole), and had since waged an implacable war against us,—a war dictated by personal ambition alone. This general had seemed to be the most formidable competitor that we could oppose to Juarez, both from the influence he wielded, and from the legal right he had to succeed to the former president, whose powers, according to the republican constitution, would have already expired had there been a state of peace.
This was not the way the United States looked at the matter. Until the country was tranquillised, they had neither recognised, nor intended to recognise, any one but the old Indian as the real chief of the nation. As soon as the Washington cabinet was advised of the mission of General Castelnau, it planned the mission of Mr. Campbell and General Sherman. This embassy was originated by President Johnson, who fancied that he should strengthen his somewhat compromised position by certain acts of foreign policy calculated to flatter the American pride: it was intended to rally round Juarez the principal republican chiefs, and to put a stop to the efforts of Ortega. The really important man in this mission was General Sherman—a high-minded and conciliatory man. Campbell only played a secondary part. A secretary of legation was associated with them, who had lived a long time in Mexico: he was a man of ardent temperament and rather disposed to strong measures. By quoting the instructions given by the White House to these two principal personages, we shall understand the attitude which the American government were then taking both towards Mexico and towards France.
Instructions from Mr. Seward to Mr. Campbell.
Nevertheless, the Emperor Napoleon has not made any formal communication on this subject to the government of the United States. When the question was incidentally brought forward, the state department replied, by order of the president, that the United States were awaiting the execution of the agreement for the evacuation at the times fixed by the French government, and that they would rejoice to see this evacuation carried out even more promptly than had been agreed upon. Under these circumstances the president expects that, in the course of the next month (November), a part at least of the expeditionary French force will leave Mexico; and he thinks that it is not improbable that the main body of the expeditionary force may retire at the same time, or almost the same time.
An event like this cannot fail to produce a crisis of great political interest. It is of importance that you should be present, either on the republican territory or in the immediate vicinity, in order to be able to exercise your functions as minister plenipotentiary of the United States to the Mexican republic. We cannot positively know the course which Prince Maximilian will decide on taking in case of a partial or complete evacuation of Mexico; nor can we determine beforehand the course which M. Juarez, the president of the Mexican republic, will adopt under like circumstances.
We are informed that various political parties exist in Mexico besides those of which President Juarez and Prince Maximilian are the respective heads: these various parties entertain conflicting opinions touching the most prompt and suitable means for restoring the peace, order, and civil government of the republic.
We do not know what these different parties will do after the evacuation; in short, it is impossible to foresee the conduct of the Mexican people when this event becomes known.
For the above reasons it is impossible to give you precise instructions as to the line of conduct which you should pursue in carrying out the high mission which the government of the United States has confided to you. Much must be left to your personal judgment, and you must take as your basis the political movements which the future may produce. There are, however, certain principles which, in our opinion, must guide the political conduct which the government of the United States looks for from you. The first of these principles is that, as representative of the United States, you are accredited to the Republican government of Mexico of which M. Juarez is president.
Your communications as American representative must be addressed to him in whatever place he may be, and, at all events, you will be unable to recognise officially either the Prince Maximilian, who claims to be emperor of Mexico, or any other person, chief, or commission, carrying on the executive power in Mexico, without having previously referred to my department, and without receiving the instructions of the President of the United States.
Secondly, in case the commanders of the French army and fleet carry out in good faith the agreement for the evacuation of Mexico before the time fixed, the engagement that you must make under this supposition is, that neither the United States, nor their representative, would interpose any hindrance or any obstacle to the departure of the French.
Thirdly, that which the government of the United States desire for the future of Mexico is, not the conquest of this country nor of any part of it, nor the aggrandisement of the United States by the purchase of lands or provinces; but, on the contrary, it desires to see the Mexicans delivered from all foreign military intervention, so that they may be able to regulate the conduct of their own affairs by means of the existing republican government, or any other form of rule which, when they enjoy perfect liberty, they shall adopt of their own accord uninfluenced by foreign countries, and also by the United States.
It follows from these principles, that you must not make any stipulations with the French commanders, or with the Prince Maximilian, nor with any party which may show a tendency to thwart or oppose the administration of the President Juarez, or to delay and put off the restoration of the republican authority. On the other hand, it may happen that the president of the Mexican republic may claim the good offices of the United States, or some effective action on our part to further and hasten the pacification of a country so long rent by civil and foreign war, and thus to accelerate the re-establishment of the national authority on principles in accordance with a republican and domestic system of government.
It is possible that some movement may be made by the land and sea forces of the United States, without intervening within the limits of Mexican jurisdiction, or violating the laws of neutrality, but in order to further the restoration of law, order, and republican government in that country.
You are authorised to confer on this subject with the republican government of Mexico and its agents, and even to confer, for the sake of inquiry, with any other parties or agents, in case an exceptional conference should become absolutely necessary; but in this case only.
You will thus be able to obtain information which will be important for our government to know, and you will transmit it to my department with your own suggestions and opinion as to any other measures which might be adopted on our part in conformity with the principles developed above. You will confine yourself to thus referring to my department, for the information of the president, any important proposition which may be started on the subject of the reorganisation and restoration of the republican government of Mexico.
The lieutenant-general of the United States is already in possession of a discretionary authority as to the disposition of the United States forces in the vicinity of Mexico. His military experience qualifies him to advise you on questions of the kind which may arise during the transitory period which will bring Mexico from a state of siege maintained by a foreign enemy, to the political condition of self-government.
At the same time, being near the scene of action, he will have the power of issuing any orders which may appear to him expedient or necessary to fulfil the obligations of the United States in respect to what is going on on the frontiers of Mexico. For these reasons, he has been requested and has received the president's order to accompany you to your destination, and to fulfil towards you the duties of an official councillor, who is recognised by the department of state in all that touches the matters pointed out.
After having come to an understanding with him, you will be able to proceed to the city of Chihuahua, or any other place in Mexico in which President Juarez may be; or, at your choice, you may go to any place in Mexico which, at the time of your arrival, is not occupied by the enemies of the Mexican republic. You might also stay at some point in the United States close to the frontier or coast of Mexico, to wait for the time when you might enter that portion of the country which may be subsequently occupied by the republican government. William H. Seward.
Note from President Johnson to Mr. E. Stanton, Minister of War, directing the addition of General Grant to Mr. Campbell's Mission to Mexico, dated Washington, October 26, 1866.
General Grant having declined this appointment, Lieutenant-General Sherman, who accepted it in his place, was ordered to leave for his destination without delay. As may be seen, both by their language and by their military demonstrations, the United States, rejecting at once any other candidate for the presidency, asserted more decidedly than ever the authority of Juarez; but they did not require that the Emperor Napoleon should modify his well known decision of evacuating Mexico at three separate periods. On this occasion, therefore, the court of the Tuileries had resolved entirely of its own will to accelerate the downfall of the Mexican monarchy, by hastening on the fixed date for the withdrawal of our troops, and by altering its plans of a gradual withdrawal, which would have given Maximilian time to see his real position, and to have retired honourably, which he would doubtless have done with the last detachment of our rear-guard.
On November 11, the American envoys left New York, on board the war-frigate 'Susquehannah,' and put to sea, first steering to the port of Matamoros, and afterwards to that of Tampico, both now in the power of the rebels. From the latter place they reckoned that they should be able to communicate with Juarez. Their real aim was to claim a vessel laden with arms for the Liberals, which had been captured by the Imperialists. But General Pavon, who occupied the place, had recently allied himself to the fortunes of Ortega. The Liberals, now in possession of the vessel, claimed the capture as their lawful prize. Nevertheless, the frigate remained several days anchored before the bar at Tampico.