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Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Yazidi, Ridah Bin Saleh (2005)

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy Combatants

at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

4 May 2005

To: Al Yazidi, Ridah Bin Saleh
Subject: Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Al Yazidi, Ridah Bin Saleh


1.

An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2.

The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state or to a third state; (2) transfer you to your home state, or a third state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state, or the third state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3.

The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee attemded the Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan. One of the leaders of the mosque was Sheikh Anwar Sha'ban who spoke frequently of the Jihad ongoing in Bosnia. Sheikh Anwar Sha'ban was subsequently killed in the fighting in Jihad in Bosnia.
  2. The Italian Islamic Culltural Institute, referred to as ICI, was shut down by Italian authorities for housing the Sami Essid Ben Khemais network, which is the core for the Tunisian Combat Group in Italy.
  3. The detainee decided to join the Jihad in Afghanistan in 1996. He was influenced in his decision by Sheikh Soubeihi, an Egyptian, who spoke at the Mosque in Milan and Sheikh Silman Al Ouda Abdullah Azzan. Once he made this decision, the detainee began saving money and intensifying his religious studies.
  4. Abudallah Azzan stated that individuals should follow Usama bin Laden by imitating his devotion to Islamic Jihad, both physically and financially.
  5. The detainee was identified by Italian authorities as a member of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Terrorist Organization Reference Guide identifies the GIA as a terrorist organization.
  6. The detainee said he was provided with a letter of introduction for admission to the Khalden Training Camp. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan using a forged passport. The detainee traveled to Khost, Afghanistan via Switzerland, Islamabad, Pakistan and Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
  7. The detainee fought on the front lines in Karabel, Khwaja Ghar and Bagram, Afghanistan from March 2001 to November 2001.
  8. The detainee admitted to fighting against U.S. and Northern Alliance forces.
b. Training
  1. The detainee spent nine months at the Khalden military training camp, from May 1999 to February 2000, undergoing extensive training to include rocket-propelled grenade launchers, Kalishnikov rifle, machine guns, pistols, explosives, mountain and urban warfare.
  2. The detainee received additional explosives training in Jalalabad, Afghanistan which involved the manufacture of explosives using fertilizer and ammonium.
c, Connection/Associations
  1. The detainee was recruited by Moussa at the ICI Mosque in Milan, Italy, Moussa also recruited the first Emir of the Tunisian Combat Group (TCG) to go to Afghanistan.
  2. The detainee received explosives training from Abu Khabab, an Egyptian.
  3. Abu Khabab is an Egyptian-born al Qaida explosives trainer who instructed jihadists on improvised explosive devices in Jalalabad, Afghanistan in 2000.
  4. The detainee stayed at the Tunisian house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
  5. A Tunisian terrorist cell, with possible ties to al Qaida, operated a Tunisian guesthouse in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
  6. The detainee stayed at an al Qaida guesthouse in Khandahar , Afghanistan during the Spring of 2000 for approximately two weeks.
  7. The detainee was captured by Pakistani authorities along with thirty other Arabs, a number of them suspected of being bodyguards for Usama Bin Laden .
d. Intent[1]
4.

The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a.

The detainee denied charges by foreign government authorities. The detainee stated he was not a member of GIA and did not know anything about any terrorist activity associated with the 1998 World Cup Soccer tournament.

b.

The detainee denies receiving any counter-interrogation training while at Khaldan Training Camp or the other camp he attended.

5.

You will be provided with a meaningful opportunity to be heard and present information to this Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

  1. Page three of the four page memo was missing...