Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/200

18 4 The J aina Philosophy [CH. from within it as if by removing a veil which had been covering it before. Objects are also not mere forms of knowledge (as the Vi- jfianavadin Buddhist thinks)but are actually existing. Knowledge of external objects by perception is gained through the senses. The exterior physical sense such as the eye must be distinguished from the invisible faculty or power of vision of the soul, which alone deserves the name of sense. We have five such cognitive senses. But the J ains think that since by our experience we are only aware of five kinds of sense knowledge corresponding to the five senses, it is better to say that it is the "self" which gains of itself those different kinds of sense-knowledge in association with those exterior senses as if by removal of a covering, on account of the existence of which the knowledge could not reveal itself before. The process of external perception does not thus involve the exercise of any separate and distinct sense, though the rise of the sense-knowledge in the soul takes place in association with the particular sense-organ such as eye, etc. The soul is in touch with all parts of the body, and visual knowledge is that knowledge which is generated in the soul through that part of it which is associated with, or is in touch with the eye. To take an example, I look before me and see a rose. Before looking at it the know- ledge of rose was in me, but only in a covered condition, an hence could not get itself manifested. The act of looking at the rose means that such a fitness has come into the rose and into myself that the rose is made visible, and the veil over my know- ledge of rose is removed. Vhen visual knowledge arises, this happens in association with the eye; I say that I see through the visual sense, whereas in reality experience shows that I have only a knowledge of the visual type (associated with eye). As experience does not reveal the separate senses, it is unwarrantable to assert that they have an existence apart from the self Pro- ceeding in a similar way the J ains discard the separate existence of manas (mind-organ) also, for manas also is not given in ex- perience, and the hypothesis of its existence is unnecessary, as self alone can serve its purpose l . Perception of an object means I Tallna i11driyam bhautikam kim tu dtmd ca indriya11l...amtpahatacak!urddidc1c!u cva iit malla!z kar mak!ayo pafa11lastcII iist hagitagavilk!atulyii 11 i c ak urdd hz; upakara1J llni. Jailla- Viittika-l1"/ti, H. p. 98. In many places, however, the five senses, such as eye, ear, etc., are mentioned as senses, and living beings are often classified according to the number of scnses they possess. (See l'ramli'.zamil1uil!ISll. See also Tattz r iirthll- dlzi!;amasutra, ch. H. etc.) Hut this is with reference to the sense organs. The denial