Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/201

VI] Non-perceptual Knowledge 18 5 that the veil of ignorance upon the "self" regarding the object has been removed. Inwardly this removal is determined by the karma of the individual, outwardly it is determined by the pre- sence of the object of perception, light, the capacity of the sense organs, and such other conditions. Contrary to the Buddhists and many other Indian systems, the J ains denied the existence of any nirvikalpa (indeterminate) stage preceding the final savi- kalpa (determinate) stage of perception. There was a direct revelation of objects from within and no indeterminate sense- materials were necessary for the development of determinate perceptions. We must contrast this with the Buddhists who regarded that the first stage consisting of the presentation of in-, determinate sense materials was the only valid part of perception. The determinate stage with them is the result of the application of mental categories, such as imagination, memory, etc., and hence does not truly represent the presentative part!. N on-Perceptual Knowledge. Non-perceptual knowledge (paroka) differs from pratyaka in this, that it does not give us SO vivid a picture of objects as the latter. Since the J ains do not admit that the senses had any func- tion in determining the cognitions of the soul, the only distinction they could draw behveen perception and other forms of knowledge was that the knowledge of the former kind (perception) gave us clearer features and characteristics of objects than the latter. Parok!?a thus includes inference, recognition, implication, memory, etc.; and this knowledge is decidedly less vivid than perception. Regarding inference, the J ains hold that it is unnecessary to have five propositions, such as: (I) "the hill is fiery," (2)" because of smoke," (3) "wherever there is smoke there is fire, such as the kitchen," (4) "this hill is smoky," (5) "therefore it is fiery," called respectively pratijful, /zetu, drS/iillta, llpallaya and nigamana, ex- cept for the purpose of explicitness. It is only the first two propositions which actually enter into the inferential process (Prameyakamalamiirta?l{la, pp. 108, 109). When we make an of separate senses is with reference to admitting them as entities or capacities having a distinct and separate category of existence from the soul. The sense organs are like windows for the soul to look out. They cannot thus modify the sense-knowledge which rises in the soul by inward determination; for it is already existent in it; the perceptual process only means that the veil which was observing it is removed. 1 Prame)'akamalamiirta'.lfja, pp. 8- 11.