Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/202

186 The Jaina Philosophy ECHo inference we do not proceed through the five propositions as above. They who know that the reason is inseparably connected with the probandum either as coexistence (sahabhava) or as in- variable antecedence (kramabhii.va) will from the mere statement of the existence of the reason (e.g. smoke) in the hill jump to the conclusion that the hill has got fire. A syllogism consisting of five propositions is rather for explaining the matter to a child than for representing the actual state of the mind in making an inference 1 . As regards proof by testimony the J ains do not admit the authority of the Vedas, but believe that the J aina scriptures give us right knowledge, for these are the utterances of persons who have lived a worldly life but afterwards by right actions and right knowledge have conquered all passions and removed all ignorance 2 . Knowledge as Revelation. The Buddhists had affirmed that the proof of the existence of anything depended upon the effect that it could produce on us. That which could produce any effect on us was existent, and that 1 As regards concomitance (vyiiptz) some of the J aina logicians like the Buddhists prefer alltarvyiipti (between smoke and fire) to bahirvyapti (the place containing smoke with the place containing fire). They also divide inference into two classes, sviirthii- nU11liilla for one's own self and pariirthiillumiina for convincing others. It may not be out of place to note that the earliest J aina view as maintained by Bhadrabahu in his Dasavaikalikaniryukti was in favour of ten propositions for making an inference; (I) Pratij?iii (e.g. non-injury to life is the greatest virtue), (2) Pratijiiiivibhakti (non-in- jury to life is the greatest virtue according to J aina scriptures), (3) Helu (because those who adhere to non-injury are loved by gods and it is meritorious to do them honour), (4) Hetll vibhakti (those who do so are the only persons who can live in the highest places of virtue), (5) Vipakfa (but even by doing injury one may prosper and even by reviling J aina scriptures one may attain merit as is the case with Brahmins), (6) Vipak!a prati!edha (it is not so, it is impossible that those who despise Jaina scriptmes should be loved by gods or should deserve honour), (7) Drf!iinta (the Arhats take food from householders as they do not like to cook themselves for fear of killing insects), (8) Ai- anNi (hut the sins of the householders should touch the arhats, for they cook for them), (9) AsankiiPratifedha (this cannot be, for the arhats go to certain houses unexpectedly, so it could not be said that the cooking was undertaken for them), (10) Naigama1la (non-injury is therefore the greatest virtue) (Vidyabhll!iial)a's Indian Logic). These are persuasive statements which are often actually adopted in a discussion, but from a formal point of view many of these are irrelevant. When Vatsyayana in his .Nyiiya- sutrablulIya, I. I. 32, says that Gautama introduced the doctrine of five propositions as against the doctrine of ten propositions as held by other logicians, he probably had this J aina view in his mind. 2 See/aillatarkaviirttika, and rarikiimukhasutravTtti, and acJdarfanasamuccaya with GUl)aratna on Jainism.