Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/328

3 12 The Nyiiya- Va£feika Philosophy [CH. of substance consists in this, that it is independent by itself, whereas the other things such as quality (gu1Ja), action (karma), sameness or generality (samiillya), speciality or specific individuality (visea) and the relation of inherence (samaviiya) cannot show themselves without the help of substance (dravya). Dravya is thus the place of rest (asraya) on which all the others depend (asrta). Dravya, gUl)a, karma, samanya, visea, and samavaya are the six original entities of which all things in the world are made Upl. When a man through some special merit, by the cultivation of reason and a thorough knowledge of the fallacies and pitfalls in the way of right thinking, comes to know the respective characteristics and differences of the above entities, he ceases to have any passions and to work in accordance with their promptings and attains a conviction of the nature of self, and is liberated 2. The N yaya- V aiseika is a pluralistic system which neither tries to reduce the diversity of experience to any universal principle, nor dismisses patent facts of experience on the strength of the de- mands of the logical coherence of mere abstract thought. The entities it admits are taken directly from experience. The under- lying principle is that at the root of each kind of perception there must be something to which the perception is due. It classified the percepts and concepts of experience into several ultimate types or categories (padartlza), and held that the notion of each type was due to the presence of that entity. These types are six in number-dravya, gu 1). a, etc. If we take a percept" I see a red book," the book appears to be an independent entity on which rests the concept of "redness" and" oneness," and we thus call the book a substance (dravya); dravya is thus defined as that which has the characteristic of a dravya (dravyat'lltl). So also gUl)a and karma. In the subdivision of different kinds of dravya also the same principle of classification is followed. In contrasting it with Sarpkhya or Buddhism we see that for each unit of sensation (say 1 Abhiiva (negation) as dependent on bhiiva (position) is mentioned in the Vaifejika sutra;. Later Nyiiya writers such as Udayana include abhiiva as a separate category, but Sridhara a contemporary of Udayana rightly remarks that abhava was not counted hy Prasastapada as it was dependent on bhava-"abhiivasya Prthagallupadefal:z bhiivapiiratantryiit na /vabhiivii/." N]'llyaka1Zdali, p. 6, and Lakfaiivali, p. 2. 2 " Tattva/o jliiitefu biihyiidhyii/mikefu vifayqu dofadarsaniit virak/asya samihii- lIivrttau iitmajliasya tadarthiini kanlliiryakul'va/al:z /atparityiigasiidhalll11ri frutismr- /yuditiilli asalikalpitaphaliilzi uplldl1diillasya iitl1lajiit1llamabhyasyata!z prakrf!anivart- takadhar1l10pacaye sati jaripakvii/majliil1rasycUyan/ikafarimvi)'ogasya bhiivii/." Ibid. P.7.