Page:A History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1.djvu/349

VIII ] Percept-ion 333 Nyaya adds a fourth, Upamil1la (analogy). The principle on which the four-fold division of pramaryas depends is that the causal collocation which generates the knowledge as well as the nature or characteristic kind of knowledge in each of the four cases is different. The same thing which appears to us as the object of our perception, may become the object of inference or sabda (testimony), but the manner or mode of manifestation of know- ledge being different in each case, and the manner or conditions producing knowledge being different in each case, it is to be admitted that inference and sabda are different pramaryas, though they point to the same object indicated by the perception. Nyaya thus objects to the incorporation of sabda (testimony) or upamana within inference, on the ground that since the mode of produc- tion of knowledge is different, these are to be held as different pramary as 1. Perception (Pratyaka). The naiyayikas admitted only the five cognitive senses which they believed to be composed of one or other of the five elements. These senses could each come in contact with the special charac- teristic of that element of which they were composed. Thus the ear could perceive sound, because sound was the attribute of akasa, of which the auditory sense, the ear, was made up. The eye could send forth rays to receive the colour, etc., of things. Thus the cognitive senses can only manifest their specific objects by going over to them and thereby coming in contact with them. The conative senses (viik,Pii?li,Piida,ptryu, and upastha)recognized in Sarpkhya as separate senses are not recognized here as such for the functions of these so-called senses are discharged by the general motor functions of the body. Perception is defined as that right knowledge generated by the contact of the senses with the object, devoid of doubt and error not associated with any other simultaneous sound cognition (such VI. i. I, and VI. i. 3, to mean that the validity of the Vedas depends upon the trust- worthy character of their author, he does not consider scriptures as valid in themselves. Their validity is only derived by inference from the tnIstworthy character of their author. Arthiipatti (implication) and anupalabdhi (non-perception) are also classed as inference and upamana (analogy) and aitihya (tradition) are regarded as being the same as faith in trustworthy persons and hence cases of inference. 1 Sii11lagribhediit phalabhediicca pra11liiabhedal} A 1Zye eva hi sii11lagriphale pratyak!aliligayol} Anye eva ca siimagriphale fabdopanziillayol}. Nyiiyamaiijari, p. 33.