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334 The Nyiiya - Vazseika Philosophy [CH. as the name of the object as heard from a person uttering it, just at the time when the object is seen) or name association, and de- terminate l . If when we see a cow, a man says here is a cow, the knowledge of the sound as associated with the percept cannot be counted as perception but as sound-knowledge (Sabda-pramii.!la). That right knowledge which is generated directly by the contact of the senses with the object is said to be the product of the perceptual process. Perception may be divided as indeterminate (nir'l1ikalpa) and (savikalpa) determinate. . Indeterminate percep- tion is that in which the thing is taken at the very first moment of perception in which it appears without any association with name. Determinate perception takes place after the indeterminate stage is just passed; it reveals things as being endowed with all charac- teristics and qualities and names just as we find in all our concrete experience. Indeterminate perception reveals the things with their characteristics and universals, but at this stage there being no association of name it is more or less indistinct. When once the names are connected with the percept it forms the determinate perception of a thing called savikalpa-pratyaka. If at the time of ha ving the perception of a thing of which the name is not known to me anybody utters its name then the hearing of that should be regarded as a separate auditory name perception. Only that product is said to constitute nirvikalpa perception which results from the perceiving process of the contact of the senses with the object. Of this nirvikalpa (indeterminate) perception it is held by the later naiyayikas that we are not conscious of it directly, but yet it has to be admitted as a necessary first stage without which the determinate consciousness could not arise. The indeterminate perception is regarded as the first stage in the process of perception. At the second stage it joins the other conditions of perception in producing the determinate per- ception. The contact of the sense with the object is regarded as being of six kinds: (I) contact with the dravya (thing) called saITlyoga, (2) contact with the gUI)as (qualities) through the thing (sa1?zyukta-samaviiya) in which they inhere in samavaya (insepar- able) relation, (3) contact with the gUI)as (such as colour etc.) in the generic character as universals of those qualities, e.g. colourness (rupatva), which inhere in the gUl)aS in the samavaya relation. I Gangda. a later naiyayika of great reputation, describes perception as immediate awareness (prat}'akfaS}'a sii/fiitl.'iiritvalll lal..!a'.lalll).